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The thesis consists of three separate studies related to financial misreporting in UK 
charities. The first study investigates whether large UK charities misreport numbers in 
their financial statements, and if so what motivates them in doing so. Using semi-
structured interviews of eleven finance directors of charities, two auditors and a 
banker, I find that it is predominantly funding pressure that generates incentives for 
the misreporting of financial accounts in large UK charities. In addition to traditional 
agency theory, I look at this topic through the prisms of resource dependency and 
legitimacy theories. I focus on three important areas of charity accounting reporting: 
reserves, fundraising costs and bottom-line net incoming resources.  
In the second study, I provide empirical evidence about the extent to which charities 
engage in accrual and real-based manipulation. The sample consists of charities that 
report to the Charity Commission for England and Wales over the period 2007 to 2016. 
I find evidence that charities manipulate their bottom-line income figure to achieve a 
target benchmark of a small surplus. By categorising the sector according to the 
predominant funding type and funders’ sophistication, I also find that the sophistication 
of funders is positively associated with financial reporting quality. The donor-
beneficiary separation in charities increases the likelihood of real earnings 
management; whereas for the service-oriented charities where the funders are also 
the users of a charity’s services, there appears to be an increased appetite for 
manipulation through accruals-based earnings management. Overall, I provide 
empirical evidence on earnings management in a little-researched sector that is widely 
regarded as beyond reproach. 
In the third and final study, using the same sample as in the second study, I present 
evidence of expense misclassification in UK charities between 'good' the programme 
costs and 'bad' the fundraising expenses. Employing three prediction models, I 
consistently find a strong negative relationship between unexpected levels of 
fundraising and unexpected programme costs. I further study the impact of the charity 




relationship becomes less negative for the nonprofits supported by more-sophisticated 
funders and those with lower donor-beneficiary separation. This suggests that donor 
sophistication and lower donor-beneficiary separation reduce the appetite for 
misclassification as funders have access to sources other than just the financial 
reporting one to gauge a charity's efficiency. Among various expense ratios, the 
nonprofit managers appear more willing to misclassify expenses when a charity has a 
low ‘programme ratio’ within its peer group. I do not find evidence that a high support 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
In the first part of this chapter, I present the research background, followed by the 
motivation for the research and the gap in the current literature. This leads to the 
research questions and contribution of the research. 
The second part of the chapter presents an overview of accounting in the charity sector 
and a background on earnings management, as well as on financial misreporting in 
charities.  
1.1 Research background 
This study is a vital addition to the scant academic literature on earnings management 
and expense misclassification in nonprofit organisations and particularly in the charity 
sector in the UK. Earnings management in nonprofit hospitals has been the focus of 
prior literature. This study conducts an in-depth examination of the behaviour of UK 
charity sector organisations in England and Wales to establish whether there is 
evidence that managers of these charities manipulate earnings and practise expense 
classification shifting in their financial statements. This research covers all commonly 
known aspects of financial misreporting by charities employing qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. 
There is no one specific definition for earnings management in the extant literature, 
which covers various forms and aspects of this phenomenon; however it could be 
described as follows: “earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers” (Healy 1985, p.368).  Schipper (1989) views earnings management as a 
purposeful intervention in the financial reporting process to obtain some private gain. 
The practice of earnings management in corporations has been extensively reported 
by researchers. The quality of financial information, and more specifically earnings 
quality, has been a focus of considerable attention from academics and practitioners. 
This rich body of research has primarily focused on US corporations, partially because 
the speech by the prior Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Arthur 
Levitt in September 1998 prompted many interested researchers and practitioners to 
investigate manipulation in accounting numbers and disclosures in annual reports with 
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a renewed vigour and resolve. Levitt’s report shone a bright light on the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) concerns and it was not an accident that this report 
was titled “The numbers game” (Levitt, 1998). 
The main motive for the existence of corporations is to maximise shareholders’ wealth; 
any action by management which results in either preserving that main objective or for 
their personal gain through manipulating accounting numbers can loosely fall within 
the realm of earnings management.  
After the huge scandals of World Com and Enron at the turn of the century which led 
to the downfall of those two energy giants and also became triggers for the demise of 
one of the then top-five audit firm, Arthur Anderson, one would have assumed that the 
news of earnings management would be a thing of the past. In a Wall Street Journal’s 
report, Eaglesham and Rapoport (2015) allude to the fact that the investigations by 
the SEC had increased again in comparison to the previous year into “cooking the 
books” type offences; however, the new cases were reported to be on a smaller scale 
and were generally less egregious than the big scandals at the start of this century. 
As far as research in earnings management in private sector corporations is 
concerned, the US has been the focus of attention for researchers. This is unsurprising 
when research in accounting, in general, has been far more prevalent in the US than 
anywhere else in the world. However, research on the topic in charities and not-for-
profit organisations is scarce. Therefore this study aims to fill the gap in the research. 
This study aims to investigate what motivates managers to manipulate financial 
numbers and whether charity types and predominant funding type impact manipulation 
behaviour. This study will be beneficial for stakeholders of UK Charity sectors such as 
donors, the government, volunteers and the public at large who are heavily involved 
with the sector in various capacities as customers, donors, beneficiaries, employees, 
volunteers, etc. Similarly, the media is also an important stakeholder group (NCVO, 
2014). 
 
1.2 The motivation for this research 
The nonprofit sector is an indispensably significant part of society that provide services 
which are not directly provided either by the state or the for-profit sector. Such a big 
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gap is covered by over 168,000 independent charities in the UK.1 The success of a 
sector that provides a whole host of services to those who most need it requires its 
funding from public and private sector that includes corporations and individuals.  The 
services range from local alleviation of poverty to providing clean drinking water in a 
far-flung region of the world, from reserving art and culture to promoting good through 
religion.  The purpose of all charities is not to make a profit but it is their social impact 
that keeps them distinct from the other two sectors. For all of these to have a maximum 
impact and full support, they consistently rely on public trust. Their reliance on public 
trust is to the extent that nonprofits may be judged by higher standards than for-profit 
organisations (Sisco, 2012). Charities need to work extra hard in maintaining and 
perpetuating such trust.  
Despite the necessary high degree of trust, there has been a noticeable nation-wide 
drop in trust by the public towards the sector which has been facing an increasing 
number of scandals in the UK and worldwide. The Charity Commission has flagged 
that auditors of the UK charities are “letting down” their profession and only half of a 
sample of charity accounts met the required standards in 2017.2 This is a matter of 
justifiable concern for donors, the public, the accounting profession and the regulator. 
The cost of fraud to the charities sector in the UK was at a ten-year high in 2018. The 
fraud within charities that were reported increased by more than 120% and was the 
highest reported value for the sector since 2009; even those reported maybe only 2% 
of the actual number of frauds.3 This challenges the notion of inherent nonprofit trust 
(Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). 
One logical impact of loss in trust in the sector which survives and thrives through 
public and private support is the loss in funding and sustainability of its financial 
support. The extant literature confirms that erosion of faith can lead to lower individual 
giving and reduced public support for the nonprofit sector (Rose-Ackerman 1996; 
Bekkers 2003; Steinberg 2006). A possible consequence for the loss is trust is that 
people may become sceptical whether the nonprofits’ claim of fulfilling their purpose 
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of delivering for the public good may no longer be taken on faith. “more people believe 
they have a stake in the accountability of nonprofits” (Brody 2002, p. 472). 
 
1.2.1 The increasing relevance of the sector 
The charity sector is indispensable for the economy for several reasons. A number of 
services such as education, health, social services, religious practices, including 
senior citizens, to name a few are essential. Each sub-group of charities has its own 
challenges and work needs to be done to remove inequalities within the society. It is 
fundamentally important that the funding reaches where it is intended for, through 
effective and efficient management of resources. As discussed above, the extant 
literature provides evidence that accounting numbers can influence the levels of 
funding. This is the prime reason to investigate this important area to establish whether 
charities misreport to enhance their income. 
Over £76bn of income reaches the sector every year through public and private 
support; hence there is a large economic value and intangible impact associated with 
the sector. A UK taxpayer can boost the amount of every donation by giving through 
Gift Aid, an Income Tax relief to help charities receive more funds than they are 
donated. This is effectively taxpayers’ money and therefore it is in the general public’s 
interest that the sector operates legitimately and returns good value for money through 
providing service efficiently. The Gift Aid scheme adds 25p to each £1 paid by a UK 
taxpayer at no extra cost to the funder directly, but it is returned by Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC).4 
During the time of global crisis posed by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) outbreak, this 
study becomes even more relevant wherein the depleting governmental and private 
resources need to be allocated responsibly and at the same time when the need is 
more than ever before on a global scale. The relevance of the UK charity sector is not 
limited to the UK alone, but its impact is truly global and more so when it is most 
needed in the most destitute parts of the world as well as within the developed world 
which is facing an unprecedented crisis. This study is an effort to investigate whether 
charities are motivated to misinform through their financial statements and if so what 
                                               
4 Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs - A non-ministerial department of the UK Government for the collection of 
taxes. 
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are the possible ways of doing so. A mixed-methods approach is used, given the social 
constructs associated with the precise accounting numbers. Both quantitative and 
qualitative factors need to be considered before reporting with reasonable confidence 
on whether charities act in an inappropriate manner vis-à-vis their financial reporting 
to influence funders to compete in a challenging industry. 
 
1.3 Research gap 
To my knowledge, there has not been a comprehensive study that investigates the 
most used methods of earnings management in the charitable sector setting. 
Misclassification between expenses also has not been studied directly to my 
knowledge. Where prior nonprofit literature does study the impact of poor expense 
reporting quality on income, it generally implies misclassification between fundraising 
and charitable expenses. The misclassification between the two broad expense types 
has not been explored in one study before. Details of the expense types are explained 
in the later sections. Similarly, the amount of literature covering the sector in the UK 
setting is scant. To my knowledge, semi-structured interviews have not been 
employed for an in-depth understanding of the motivations associated with 
manipulation, either in the UK or even the US setting, where most of the nonprofit 
accounting research is focused.  
 
1.4 Research questions and contribution of the study 
The thesis is divided into three separate studies that investigate different aspects of 
charitable financial misreporting.  
The first study in the thesis investigates the factors that motivate managers to 
misreport financial statements in UK charities that are established for charitable 
purposes as defined by the Charities Act 2011 and registered with the Charity 
Commission, the regulator of the sector in England and Wales. Most of my findings 
confirm the existing theory in UK context using semi-structured interview approach. I 
find that high levels of reserves may be averted by charities’ managers. Similarly rising 
overhead costs can also pose challenges and need careful allocation, so that donors 
do not view the charity in a bad light. This increases the possibility that most costs are 
allocated, some subjectively, as charitable activities expenses. I find that incognizant 
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users of financial statements, inexperienced, less qualified and incompetent trustees, 
peer benchmarking, debt covenants, job security and sustained employment are 
strong factors in enticing management to manipulate financial statements. The study 
of the entire sector is not without its challenges as various charity-specific attributes 
contribute to a complex mix of challenges. Hence, predicting financial reporting 
choices is not straight forward and conclusive through testing a large dataset. Since 
most charities are funded through a mix of sources and each source has its 
preferences towards how the charity spends its funds; furthermore, there is a growing 
trend from voluntary to more earned income. This poses challenges for charities to 
appear ‘financially viable’. I also find that the income/expense period mismatch causes 
a situation where the net surplus/deficit is likely erratic, a state that most users of 
financial statements are uneasy about.  In addition, I find that the presence of some 
facilitators increases the possibility of window-dressing. An important contribution of 
this research is to highlight that the audit quality in charities is of a substandard quality 
and less vigorous than their for-profit counterparts. A charity that is funded by 
unsophisticated funders is more likely to manage earnings as the donors do not fully 
recognise the intricacies and true costs of running a charity. This also means that the 
monitoring mechanism is lacking which sophisticated finders may offer, giving charities 
the leeway and freedom to manipulate.  
This study contributes in several ways to the limited literature on financial reporting 
quality in UK charities. To my knowledge methodologically it is the first study of its 
kind, as financial reporting quality has not been studied through in-depth semi-
structured interviews with heads of finance in large charities. Again, to my knowledge 
prior to this research no studies have exclusively focused on the motivations that 
managers face in manipulating financial statements. There have been consistent 
developments in accounting in general and the realms of charity accounting in 
particular over the last decade. There are no studies to my knowledge exploring in-
depth a wide spectrum of manipulation in charities. The first study attempts to answer 
two simple but open-ended questions. Firstly, whether UK charities have motivations 
to manipulate their financial statements, and if so, which numbers are fixated on? 
Secondly, if particular factors facilitate such manipulation? 
In the second study, I empirically examine the prevalence and extent of accrual and 
real manipulation in a sample of UK charities over the period 2007-2016. find that UK 
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nonprofits manage earnings towards a small surplus benchmark after observing pre-
managed earnings on either side of the benchmark. I find that the pursuit for loss 
avoidance is more pronounced compared to the large surplus aversion. I also observe 
that the charities funded by more sophisticated funders tend to manipulate less 
towards a target range, hence suggesting that managers recognise that sophisticated 
donors are aware of earnings management hence it would be counterproductive for 
sustaining future donations. This result is in contrast to Parsons et al. (2017) who do 
not find that donor restriction affects earnings manipulation. 
Another finding of my research in the second study points to the preferences of 
different earnings management types. I find that the accruals-based earnings 
management is more prevalent in more service-oriented charities, where the donor-
beneficiary distance is small. In contrast, I find that the real activities earnings 
management is a preferred course for more charitable nonprofits that have an implied 
lower donor-beneficiary proximity and lower programme service revenue. Therefore, 
pressure to manipulate earnings is more likely through a recognised costlier form of 
earnings management i.e. real activities earnings management. I find that charities 
that are mostly funded by endowments are less likely to manipulate bottom-line 
income. That service-oriented charities are less likely to manipulate using REM could 
be because a low donor-recipient separation would make abnormal changes to 
fundraising costs more noticeable and hence reducing their benefit from 
management’s perspective as a tool for earnings management.  
The oversight for real spending appears better for service-oriented charities, 
presumably, due to a low donor-recipient separation, through better supervision of 
charity funds. Possibly, less affinity for real accounts manipulation points to a better 
awareness of the adverse effects of this on future performance compared to the 
accounting-based earning management. Due to the implied large donor-beneficiary 
separation, financial statements are more relevant for the donors of charitable 
nonprofits, those that are expected to receive free donations rather than services or 
products in exchange. Similarly, service-oriented charities may be less interested in 
real earnings management as their service are more commercial type due to their 
contracts. I expect that they would find real earnings management on balance 
disadvantageous for their overall objectives. As accruals earnings management does 
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not have a practical impact on the wellbeing of an organisation, it may be lesser of the 
two evils.  
The second study makes a significant contribution to the nonprofit accounting 
literature. To my knowledge, this is the first study that investigates earnings 
management in a sample of all charities that meet the audit threshold criterion, as well 
as examines the behaviour between more service-oriented and their charitable 
nonprofit counterparts. The second study also confirms the findings in prior literature 
that more sophisticated funders discount poor quality financial statements.  
This study contributes to a limited accruals-based earnings management and “real” 
activities earnings management literature in a nonprofit setting. It contributes in 
understanding whether charity types determine preferences of earnings management 
approaches. The sector is complicated and studying all charities together cannot be 
generalised at an individual level but provides a good starting point to establish the 
prospect of a particular earnings management approach for a particular charity. This 
is because there are various combinations, i.e. some service-oriented charities may 
have a large element of public donations and there may or may not be donation 
restriction. This study is useful as it uses the classification method by Balsam and 
Harris (2014) and studies two broad types of charities in addition to their predominant 
funding types, the more and less sophisticated. To the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first study which investigates exclusively the effect of predominantly large 
endowment funds on both types of earnings management approaches. The study is 
also the first that divides the sample with regards to donor sophistication and donor-
beneficiary separation, and studies the impact on accruals-based and real activities 
earnings management. I use two measures to investigate sophistication of funders 
and find similar results (ratio of restricted funds and ratio of endowment funds). 
The third and final study looks into a uniquely relevant situation for nonprofits i.e. 
expense misclassification. The findings suggest that unexpected fundraising costs are 
significantly negatively associated with unexpected charitable activities expenses 
using three separate prediction models. I find this shifting to be less prominent when 
a charity is funded more by sophisticated funders. A more service-oriented charity that 
receives a higher level of programme service revenue is also less keen to misclassify 
expenses. Although all charities seem to be engaged in misclassification, the low 
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donor-beneficiary separation does reduce the willingness to misreport expenses. I 
assert that it would possibly be because donors can directly observe the level and 
quality of services. I find that the charities that receive higher restricted income funding 
are less likely to misclassify their fundraising costs as charitable activities expenses. I 
infer that a sophisticated funder does not superficially depend on reported numbers 
and that management is aware of this. The average donor on the other hand is unable 
to detect misclassification, therefore takes the expense ratios on the face value. This 
points to management’s assertion that a less sophisticated donor is more sensitive to 
unfavourable expense ratios, the ratios that in their view cast doubt over such charity’s 
‘legitimacy’. Although the results convincingly suggest that types of funders and 
charities are important factors in predicting whether a charity is susceptible to 
misclassifying its expenses, the impact of the prevailing expense ratios is mixed on 
the willingness to misclassify. Contrary to my a priori expectation, I do not find that 
high support costs on its own is a factor to convince management to misallocate. This 
finding is in contrast to the finding in the first study where rising overhead costs can 
be a factor in manipulation. There is a possibility that it shows donors and nonprofit 
managers are becoming aware that the mere presence of support costs does not 
guarantee expense classification shifting.  
In the third study, I contribute to the scant literature in two broad ways. Firstly, 
methodologically and secondly, by providing evidence of expense misclassification 
between fundraising and charitable activities expenses. In addition, I present the effect 
of more service-oriented and more sophisticated charity types on the prospect of the 
expense misclassification. Compared to classification shifting in for-profit firms, 
nonprofits are scrutinised more by media and the public to allocate most of their 
resources to the main charitable purpose for what a nonprofit exists for. I report that 
such misclassification does take place. Hence, it is an important study that should 
interest regulators, donors and nonprofit managers. This is to my knowledge the first 
study investigating whether funders’ sophistication and donor-beneficiary separation 
are mitigating factors for misclassification between “unfavourable” (fundraising) 
expenses and “favourable” (charitable) expenses. Another contribution of this study is 
to investigate whether unfavourable expense ratios influence the prediction for such 
manipulation.  
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This research is an in-depth analysis of the UK charity accounting manipulation and in 
many ways it is the first study to use qualitative and quantitative methods with a large 
dataset, the largest that has been used in the sector using UK data. The three studies 
in this thesis are independent in their approach and answer different questions, yet 
probe the common theme of financial reporting quality across UK charities.  
 
1.5 Overview of charity sector accounting 
This section introduces the elements in the charity sector accounting, which on the 
one hand have several similarities to those of the for-profit sector firms, whilst on the 
other are in many ways different from the for-profit sector financial statements.  
It is a charity’s trustees’ obligation to prepare the financial statements according to 
section 162 of Charities Act 2011. Part 8 of the Charities Act 20115 specifies the 
requirements of keeping accounting records including the form and contents that are 
required for presenting. Section 132 of the Act states “The charity trustees of a charity 
must (subject to section 133) prepare in respect of each financial year of the charity a 
statement of accounts complying with such requirements as to its form and contents 
as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.”6  
An incorporated charity is also required to prepare the financial statements in light of 
the Companies Act 2006 to fulfil its requirements of staying registered with the 
Companies House. A charity can choose between receipts and payments accounts or 
accruals accounts. The accruals accounts must be prepared, according to Charities 
Statement of Recommended Practice (hereafter, SORP) (FRS 102) which applies to 
charities that prepare financial statements following the Financial Reporting Standard 
applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland. All charities above the gross annual 
income of £250,000 must produce accruals accounts. Therefore, my sample charities 
for this study all produce accruals accounts. The charities earning over one million 
pounds a year require a statutory audit of their accounts by a registered auditor. 
Trustees are required to prepare accounts following the SORP FRS 102 since 1 
January 2016. The minimum audit income threshold was raised from £0.5 to £1m 
gross income for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2016. My sample 
                                               
5 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/25/part/8 
6 S. 132(1) applied (1.1.2018) by The Charitable Incorporated Organisations (Conversion) Regulations 2017 (S.I. 
2017/1232), regs. 1(1), 
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includes all charities which have been auditable since the first year of the data, 2007. 
It is because the lowest gross income in my data is £0.5m; therefore, representing all 
firm years in which charities must have undergone a statutory audit. Similarly, if a 
charity’s gross assets exceed £3.26m then the gross income will need to be only 
£250,000 for it to meet the statutory audit threshold.  
From the legal perspective for reporting, The Charities (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulations 2008 is the current regulation for charities to comply with. The Charities 
(Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008 requires charities to prepare their financial 
statements according to the UK Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) on 
a true and fair basis. Any departure from this ubiquitous prerequisite is against the law 
and hence should be investigated, which is the primary purpose of this thesis. 
With regards to the SORP, it is important to note that it is not an accounting standard 
per se. Any periodic amendments to the GAAP prompt the issuance of a new SORP, 
which supersedes the existing one. 
The registered charities are required to maintain accounting records, prepare and 
submit financial statements and annual report (contents of which are not the focus of 
this study). The charities are obligated to submit their financial statements and annual 
report within 10 months of their financial year-end. In addition, generally they prepare 
various narrative reports for funders, trustees and the Charity Commission to assess 
the financial position and performance. All registered charities must submit a trustees’ 
annual report. This is an important document for trustees to communicate the relevant 
financial and non-financial information to the interested parties. The details in the 
trustees’ report are expected to vary depending on the complexity and types of 
operations of a particular charity.  
 
1.5.1 Statement of financial activities (SoFA) 
The statement of financial activities (hereafter, SoFA) is the charities’ comparable 
statement of for-profit organisations’ income statement. The SoFA provides an 
analysis of a charity’s income and expenditure and movements within and between 
various fund types in a reporting period. Appendix 1.1 shows a typical template of 
SoFA. Below, I outline the different parts within the SoFA including charity income 
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classifications, as well as expense classifications and cost allocations. I also discuss 
restricted and unrestricted funds. 
 
1.5.1.2 SoFA - Charity Income classifications 
Charities receive their income from a whole host of sources. Most charities are funded 
by public money through donations, or trading via charity shops or sale of merchandise 
e.g., McMillan Cancer Support receives a large portion of its income from legacies and 
public donations, and also generates a sizeable share of its income from trading 
merchandise7. Likewise, British Heart Foundation and Cancer Research UK draw a 
significant portion of their income from fundraising by reaching out for legacies and 
donations by public.   
Other charities operate more like businesses where they charge their beneficiaries for 
their services or receive government grants in exchange of their services for public 
benefit e.g. The Air Ambulance Service receives a specific amount from the central 
government but also receives income from other charitable trusts or foundation 
charities8. 
In exchange for services in those areas where the government is unable to directly 
make an impact, the government funds a large number of charities. For example, 
Shelter charity secure government contracts in exchange for its services providing 
housing advice to people facing homelessness9. 
Then there are charity shops as a well-known medium by mostly established and large 
charities. There are currently 11,200 charity shops in the UK and Northern Ireland. 
The wealth generated through these charity shops is generated in three ways, income 
from donating, buying, and volunteering by public10. 
Charity income can be classified into 1) charitable activities income, 2) fundraising 
income, 3) income from trading activities, and 4) investment income. Charitable 
activities income includes income from contractual arrangements for supply of goods 
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or services and performance-related grants associated with the provision of specific 
goods or services by the charity.  
Fundraising income includes income from donations and legacies through a gift made 
to it voluntarily. This is seen as a free income, which is not necessarily in exchange of 
a particular service like in the case of charitable activities income. Such donations or 
legacies may form part of unrestricted, restricted or endowment funds. 
Income from trading activities are in order to raise funds for the charity and income 
from fundraising events. This income is received in exchange for supplying goods and 
services for raising funds. It is not the kind of services or goods that are supplied as 
the main operation of the charity as is the case for charitable activities income. Income 
from other trading activities is for a typically trading type activity e.g. a museum’s shop 
selling souvenirs can be classified as trading income but the income received from 
foundation charities, donors or supporters is most likely going to fall within the income 
from donations or charitable activities categories.  
Charities holding large amounts of bequest assets in the form of endowment are likely 
to make investments and the income generated from such investment in the form of 
dividends, interest, or investment property income are another type of income 
classified as investment income.  
 
1.5.1.3 SoFA - Charity expense classifications 
Charity expenses can be classified into 1) charitable activities expenses, 2) fundraising 
expenses, 3) other expenses. The charitable activities expenses comprise all costs 
associated with undertaking activities that further the charitable ‘objects’ for which a 
charity exists. Most of these costs are direct costs in fulfilling the charitable mission 
but can also have a share of support costs. Charitable expenses comprise costs in 
providing goods and services or providing grants to other charities that further the 
charitable objectives of the charity.  
Fundraising expenses include the expenses in raising funds for its charitable 
purposes. The extant literature, cited in this thesis explains at length that this is a 
relatively less desirable expense category for charity funders as its high levels could 
point to low efficiency. Typically these include those for organising fundraising events 
and other activities that cannot be directly associated with charitable expenses.  
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All expenses that do not fall in either the charitable activities or fundraising expenses 
categories are classified as other expenditures.  
 
1.5.1.4 Cost allocations in SoFA 
There are several costs that are shared across activities e.g. administration, 
accounting, information technology, governance costs and other support functions. 
Such costs must be apportioned across the activities on appropriate bases. There is 
subjectivity involved in this process and both my qualitative and quantitative studies 
look at the practice of misallocation through expense misclassification. 
There are two primary classes of funds, unrestricted and restricted. A charity is free to 
spend the unrestricted funds for any charitable purposes of a charity, contained in the 
“objects” of the charity. The restricted funds can only be used for a specific charitable 
purpose as stipulated by the funder. 
 
1.5.2 Unrestricted and restricted funds 
Charity reporting in the SoFA differs from financial reporting in the income statement 
in one major way. In addition to presenting income and expense items vertically, it 
presents columns that represent different sources of funds. These include 
‘Unrestricted funds’ and Restricted funds’ (see Appendix 1.1). Some charities will also 
include a column for endowment funds, which is part of the restricted funds.  
Unrestricted funds are those that are not restricted to be used for a particular purpose. 
Trustees of a charity choose during the reporting period to set aside a part of the 
unrestricted funds to be used for a particular future project or commitment. By 
earmarking funds in this way, the trustees set up a designated fund that remains part 
of the unrestricted funds of the charity.  
We note that a large number of charity appeals made for raising funds ranging from 
famine to Coronavirus related needs are in the form of ‘Restricted funds’. All amounts 
received for such purpose must be spent for the promoted cause. That is a typical 
example of funds that should be earmarked as restricted for the specific cause. 
Similarly, restricted funds also include funds held by specific trusts under charity law. 
The funder declares these trusts at the time of donation. I take a keen interest in the 
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proper accounting of these funds and see some as subjective, hence a possibility of 
their misclassification exists.  
There are two types of restricted funds: the restricted income funds and endowment 
funds. Restricted income funds are required to be spent within a reasonable period 
after the donation for one of the charitable “objects” as notified to the Charity 
Commission at the time of charity registration.   
A restricted endowment fund could be in the form of a non-current asset held in the 
trust or an amount which the donor obliges the charity to invest in acquiring assets 
from the endowment, to fulfil the charitable purposes. The income from such 
investment can be utilised for the stipulated purposes but the asset itself cannot be 
used up like income. 
When a charity has not been granted the discretion of turning the capital into income, 
such restricted endowment fund is termed ‘permanent endowment fund’. The fund that 
provides the trustees with the discretion to turn funds into income either partially or 
fully is called ‘expendable endowment’. Expendable endowment does not obligate a 
charity to necessarily spend as opposed to income funds. However, they have to 
provide details of all income, gains, expenses and losses recognised for a particular 
reporting period, and analyse this by the type of activities carried out to show how 
resources have furthered the charitable aims. It also presents a breakdown of the 
change in the charity’s funds for that period. 
All charities that prepare accounts on an accrual basis must prepare a SoFA for each 
reporting period and include this in their annual accounts. The SoFA should analyse 
the key activities carried out. Activity lines should show the split between unrestricted 
and restricted income (and endowment funds, if relevant). Figure 1.1 shows the 
breakdown of the types of funds within a charity into the sub-groups discussed above. 




Figure 1.1: Sub-grouping of types of funds of a charity 
 
1.5.3 The Statement of Financial Position – The Balance Sheet 
The Statement of Financial Position or more commonly known as the Balance Sheet 
is a snapshot of an organisation’s financial position at one given moment.  
According to Section 4 of FRS 10211 - The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in 
the UK and Republic of Ireland, the statement of financial position presents an entity’s 
assets, liabilities and equity at the end of the reporting period. A charity is not set up 
with equity, as would be in the case of for-profit firms. Other than its assets and 
liabilities, a charity’s balance sheet comprises the charity reserves. The charity 
reserves are also referred to as funds, which are equal to the net assets. As discussed 
above, the charity funds comprise unrestricted, endowment and restricted funds. It is, 
however, important to note that the term reserve should technically refer only to the 
unrestricted funds. In the strict sense, the restricted funds cannot be viewed as 
reserves as their use is not entirely in a charity’s control. 
 
                                               
11 https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/69f7d814-c806-4ccc-b451-aba50d6e8de2/FRS-102-FRS-
applicable-in-the-UK-and-Republic-of-Ireland-(March-2018).pdf 
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1.6 Motives for earnings management 
There has been a considerable body of literature studying possible motivations for 
managers in engaging in the practice of earnings management including stakeholder 
use of information-processing heuristics and prospect theory (e.g. Dechow and Sloan, 
1991; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). The purpose of earnings management is to 
manipulate reported earnings either upwards or downwards to meet specific targets 
such as meeting earnings benchmarks (Degeorge et al., 1999; Dechow and Dichev, 
2002), increasing share prices (e.g. Schipper, 1989) meeting performance-based 
compensation (e.g., Balsam, 1998; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006) and to avoid debt covenant violations (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994; Sweeney, 1994; Jaggi and Lee, 2002). Extant literature is extensive on this topic 
and has addressed this from various angles. In order to mitigate against erratic share 
performance that investors would be most uneasy about, managers face a constant 
pressure to maintain a smooth level of earnings through a practice, commonly referred 
to as ‘income smoothing’; it is another common incentive for managing earnings 
because erratic earnings are interpreted as a sign of increased riskiness of the firm, 
therefore, investors expect a higher return, exerting in some cases, undue pressure 
on the management. Managers in essence borrow earnings from future to compensate 
for the current poor earnings whereas they save current earnings for the future where 
future earnings are anticipated to be poor. Economic actions to smooth earnings can 
sometimes sacrifice long-term value. (e.g. Graham and Harvey, 2005; Tucker and 
Zarowin, 2006; Defond and Park, 1997).  
The majority of the studies have been undertaken on organisations that show signs of 
earnings management yet staying within the bounds of relevant accounting standards 
and not breaching any particular laws; however, there have been some studies which 
have focused on the cases where Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
was violated such as in the study by Beneish (1999) whereby he investigated the 
overstatement of earnings by employing means that violated relevant accounting 
standards and had a higher likelihood of insider trading than other firms.  
Healy and Wahlen (1999) in light of their review of the literature allude to various 
incentives for managing earnings. Stock analysis extensively uses accounting 
information to value stocks and therefore managers may be inclined to influence short-
term stock price performance. Similarly, accounting data is used to monitor and 
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regulate the contracts between the firm and its many stakeholders. This includes 
various explicit and implicit management compensation contracts that are used to 
align the incentives of management and external stakeholders. Likewise, 
compensation contracts can lead to the practice of earnings management to increase 
bonus awards and improve job security. Likewise, earnings management has been 
studied in some cases as a tool to mitigate potential violation of debt covenants. Also, 
empirical research has provided evidence that industry-specific regulation and anti-
trust regulation have also been the reasons for managing earnings (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999).  
 
1.7 Alternative techniques of earnings management 
Although the focus of this study is to contribute to the earnings management literature 
in the UK charities’ setting, in the absence of much literature in this setting it would be 
fitting to start with the well-cited prior literature on for-profit firms which finds evidence 
that managers manipulate reported earnings upward to meet performance-based 
compensation (e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006) and 
to avoid debt covenant violations (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 
1994). Schipper (1989) lays culpability on the pursuit of private gain that leads to 
earnings management.  
Roychowdhury (2006) points out that on the one hand accounting choices i.e. accrual-
based earnings management occur at the end of the financial year, whilst on the other, 
real cash flow choices i.e. real activities-based earnings management, occur 
throughout the year with direct consequences for current and future cash flows. 
Findings by Roychowdhury (2006) and by succeeding researchers (e.g. Ewert and 
Wagenhofer, 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 
2012) are consistent with the previous research that managers manage earnings 
upwards to avoid reporting losses.  
In this section I introduce the three most common techniques that have been identified 
by the extant literature in managing earnings, namely Real Activities Earnings 
Management (REM), Accruals based Earnings Management (AEM) and Classification 
Shifting.  
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1.7.1 Real Activities Earnings Management (REM) 
Real earnings management can be achieved by timing investment or financing 
decisions to influence earnings to their subset (Schipper, 1989). This is a 
comparatively new area in earnings management research. Research and 
Development costs were the focus of some of the earlier researchers in this stream of 
earnings management. (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998). 
Graham et al. (2005) through their interviews with executives identified the following 
areas as potentially used to manipulate earnings: hiring, Research and Development 
(R&D), advertising, travel, maintenance, and capital expenditures to avoid 
depreciation expense. This was taken further by Roychowdhury (2006) who identified 
some further income statement accounts of interest in this regard. Firms of interest 
that show earnings just towards the right of breakeven point i.e. with small profits 
appear to have given generous price discounts to their customers in pursuit of 
increasing revenue. Similarly, another tool employed by some managers of firms with 
the noted low earning levels includes overproduction of inventory to absorb fixed costs 
by more units which leads to lower cost of sales . Gunny (2010) report that REM is not 
opportunistic, but consistent with the firm attaining current-period benefits that allow 
the firm to perform better in the future or signalling by becoming informative about 
future earnings of the firm. Further research finds that managers sell assets to make 
a profit on disposal when the incentive is to show earnings just above the zero 
benchmarks; similarly, if the earnings are above the target level then the managers 
avoid selling assets especially when such disposals may lead to profits (Bartov, 1993; 
Hermann et al. 2003, Eldenburg, 2011). As discussed earlier, earnings management 
behaviour has been studied far less in nonprofit entities; even less so in the UK setting 
and it has been limited primarily to the nonprofit hospital setting. Specifically, the 
findings show similarities between for-profit and nonprofit entities, in the earnings 
management behaviour (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine, 2007; Eldenburg, 
2011). 
Data limitations have meant that the research in real earnings management has been 
limited to a handful of expense types (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; 
Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2010, Eldenburg 
2011). I will be utilising my dataset to study whether the 12 sub-sectors of charities 
engage in real earnings management. In the first study, I find that incentives for 
manipulating in a charity are similar to those of the for-profit firms as far as increasing 
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the income when earnings are expected to fall below zero i.e. showing a deficit. This 
is more commonly referred to as net outgoing resources in charity sector fund 
accounting. 
 
1.7.2 Accruals based Earnings Management (AEM) 
Earnings represent the difference between income and expenses; where both income 
and expenses have two components i.e. cash receipts and payments and income 
earned and expenses incurred without the relevant cash flow during the period. The 
latter is referred to as accruals. Total accruals can be prone to management 
judgements and estimates about cash flows in the future to make accounting earnings 
that better reflect a firm’s underlying economic performance and position. The extant 
literature divides accruals into two components namely discretionary accruals and 
non-discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary accruals refer to the accounting 
adjustments to the firm’s cash flow as required by relevant accounting standards and 
accepted convention. Researchers are more interested in the discretionary accruals 
element. As discretionary accruals cannot be observed directly, various proxies have 
been suggested in the existing literature. For example, Healy (1985) uses total 
accruals and DeAngelo (1986) uses the change in total accruals as a proxy for 
discretionary accruals. The Jones (1991) and modified Jones models (Dechow et al. 
1995) employ more sophisticated approaches in earnings management estimations. 
These are employed by most academic researchers in the context of earnings 
management (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; Beneish, 1997; 
Kothari et al., 2001). 
Informed by stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory, this paper 
investigates whether UK charities are engaged in earnings management practices.  
This study is similar to Nguyen and Soobaroyen (2019) to the extent that it also 
investigates whether UK charities are involved in earnings management. This is where 
the similarities end. This study utilises both qualitative and quantitative techniques in 
its attempt to answer various related questions. 
Nguyen and Soobaroyen (2019) only investigate earnings management using 
quantitative method, whereas this study in addition to utilising quantitative method for 
investigating the occurrence of earnings management includes interviews with finance 
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directors of large UK charities, and only a small part of that study investigates the 
occurrence of earnings management in UK charities.  
My thesis studies earnings management using both real and accruals-based earnings 
management. Nguyen and Soobaroyen (2019) only investigate accruals-based 
earnings management. The methodology is similar in estimating normal level of 
accruals but the sample selection process is different.  
The second study in this thesis utilises the largest available sample of over 103,000 
audited charity years, covering a period of 12 years (2007-2018). This is a very 
comprehensive study in comparison with a sample of 1414 charities over a five‐year 
period (2008–2012) used by Nguyen and Soobaroyen (2019).  
The empirical results in Nguyen and Soobaroyen (2019), study the impact of leverage 
on earnings management behaviour by charities. This thesis studies the sector in 
much deeper level by dividing charities between more service-oriented, with a larger 
donor-beneficiary distance and charitable nonprofits. Similarly, this study investigates 
the impact of donor sophistication on management’s willingness for earnings 
management, for which purpose it divides charities on the basis of restricted 
donations. It also studies the moderating effect of large endowment funds on earnings 
management behaviour using both real and accruals-based earnings management 
techniques. This study finds that charities that are funded by funders that are more 
sophisticated tend to manipulate less towards a target range, hence confirming that 
they are aware that such practice would be counterproductive to their future donations. 
I find that the accruals-based manipulation is exacerbated by more service-oriented 
charities (i.e. nonprofits with higher than median programme revenue). On the 
contrary, real activities management is higher in more charitable nonprofits (i.e. those 
with lower than median programme revenue). Therefore, pressure to manipulate 
earnings is more likely through the costlier form of earnings management i.e. real 
activities earnings management. 
These findings in the second study are significantly different from the work carried out 
by Nguyen and Soobaroyen (2019). The third study answer a very different question, 
hence there are no similarities with Nguyen and Soobaroyen (2019). 




1.7.3 Classification shifting earnings management 
Technically speaking this is not an “earnings” management technique; rather it merely 
shifts the accounting numbers within the income statement. This method is 
comparatively newer in the earnings management literature compared to the other 
two. This technique of earnings management does not affect the bottom line figure i.e. 
the profit/loss in the income statement. The seminal paper on this method of earnings 
management by McVay (2006) provides empirical evidence of classification shifting 
between core earnings and special items. This may seem trivial to an unsuspecting 
eye since it does not affect the final figure in the income statement that is available to 
investors; however, through closer scrutiny it becomes evident that core items are a 
regular and consistent year-on-year expense, whereas special items are nonrecurring. 
Therefore a higher earnings figure from core activities is far more desirable for 
investors than nonrecurring special items, as they are a better indicator of earnings 
sustainability (unsustainability) than what a figure such as net earnings after special 
items may represent. McVay (2006) shows that managers tend to shift the figures 
between core and special items in such a way that core earnings receive an income 
increasing treatment whereas special items would be at the receiving end of an income 
decreasing treatment. As mentioned above, this area is still relatively new and to build 
a theory around it needs further research employing various methods. Abernathy et 
al. (2014) suggest that a large auditor and high level of institutional ownership may be 
deterrents against classification shifting. The for-profit literature also points to the 
substitution effect of classification shifting when the ability of managers to manipulate 
accruals appears to be constrained (Fan et al., 2010; Abernathy et al., 2014). Similarly, 
UK firms are more likely to engage in classification shifting rather than in accruals 
management to avoid negative earnings surprises (Athanasakou et al., 2919). The 
nonprofit setting is different and there is no such thing as core earnings; hence it is not 
conceivable that the bottom line figure will be manipulated through a comparison of 
classification shifting in nonprofits. I do however use the broad concept and 
methodology with variation in my expense classification study (third study).  
1.8 Empirical evidence of earnings management 
The earnings management phenomenon aims to manipulate reported earnings either 
upwards or downwards to meet various targets in light of the incentives alluded to in 
the earlier discussion; such as but not limited to meeting earnings benchmarks 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
32 
 
(Degeorge et al., 1999; Dechow and Dichev, 2002), improving share prices (Schipper, 
1989). Motivations and consequences of earnings management activities vary (e.g., 
Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Jones, 1991) depending on the individual circumstances 
and setting. Managers aim at important earnings targets by employing both real 
earnings management (e.g. Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010) 
and accruals-based earnings management (e.g. Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 
2005). Similarly, managers have been reported to have purposefully misclassified 
items within the income statements to overstate core earnings (e.g. McVay 2006; Fan, 
2010; Athanasakou et al., 2014). The target of interest in the eyes of some 
stakeholders is typically not just the total earnings but, consistency in core earnings.   
Evidence, in the US in particular, suggests firms close to an important earnings 
benchmark are more likely to engage in earnings management (Burgstahler and 
Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999). The bulk of research on earnings management 
from the studies in the US present extensive evidence that managers employ a variety 
of earnings management methods such as REM, AEM and classification shifting, in 
order to meet or beat their targets,  
Earnings management activities can be implemented without violating GAAP, 
employing either accounting choices or real activities choices (Dechow and Skinner, 
2000). Earnings management must not be confused with fraudulent accounting as 
fraud is illegal and leads to breaking the law. Figure 1.2 depicts a wide spectrum of 
prudent and fraudulent accounting choices, presenting examples of the use of 
accounting vs. real cash flow choices. 




Figure 1.2: Earnings management versus fraudulent accounting 
The regulatory body in the UK which is closest to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in its jurisdiction and remit is arguably the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA). In response to the concerns that Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
in the UK has been very slow in investigating financial reporting misconduct, and that 
it is too lenient and its board too cosy with the very industry that it is meant to supervise, 
more powers have been handed to FCA ("Corporate scandals prompt shake-up at UK 
accounting watchdog", 2020)12. 
 
1.9 Financial misreporting in charities 
Burks et al., 2015 report that charities report 60 percent more errors than corporations 
traded publicly, and almost double that of a similar-sized corporation.  








Within GAAP  
 
Overly aggressive recognition of 
provision or reserves. 
Delaying sales. 
  
Overvaulting of acquired in-
process R&D in purchases 
acquisitions. 
Accelerating R&D or 
advertising expenditures. 
  
Overstatement of restructuring 
charges and asset write-offs. 
  
Neutral Accounting  
Earnings that result from a neutral 
operation of the process 
  
Aggressing Accounting  
Understatement of the provision for 
bad debts. 
Postponing R&D or 
advertising expenditure. 
  
Drawing down provisions or 
reserves in an overly aggressive 
manner. 
Accelerating sales. 
  Violate GAAP   
Fraudulent Accounting 
Recording sales before they are 
"realisable". 
  
  Recording fictitious sales.   
  Backdating sales invoices.   
  
Overstating inventory be recording 
fictitious inventory. 
  
Adapted from Dechow and Skinner, 2000 P.239 
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For-profit organisations aim to meet or beat certain external benchmarks such as 
analysts' forecasts, therefore securing the stock market performance; however, a 
charity is under pressure of heavy scrutiny from various stakeholders such as the 
regulator (Charity Commission) and funders. A charity, in general, is expected to avoid 
a breakeven point and therefore would attempt to exercise income increasing earnings 
management, possibly real activities-based earnings management (Eldenburg, 2011); 
similarly, a very high earnings level will also attract suspicions and questions from 
funders and would risk lower funding. 
In nonprofit organisations, performance indicators play an important role because the 
primary purpose for a nonprofit’s existence is not financial; its objectives are 
characteristically subjective and nonfinancial, therefore the progress in relation to 
precise objectives is difficult to quantify. According to Hofmann and McSwain (2013),  
accounting research on nonprofit entities focuses on either governmental or non-
governmental units. The scope of this research is limited to nongovernmental 
organisations which are registered with the Charity Commission as charitable entities. 
Hence strictly speaking not all nonprofits are charities but all charities are nonprofits. 
The following diagram (Figure 1.3) explains the place of charities within all 
organisations. 
 
Figure 1.3: Charitable sector context 
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There may not be a comprehensive definition of nonprofit organisations, but the sector 
covers the distinctive social space not covered entirely by the capital markets or the 
state. Similar to the US, the UK has a clear concept of the nonprofit sector (referred to 
as charity sector) but due to flexibility with a stronger hold of the “common law” 
tradition, the legal boundaries of the sector are far more complicated than in the US 
setting (Salamon and Anheier, 1997).  It is therefore difficult for funders to fully 
comprehend the intricacies and subtleties that separate the classifications within the 
sector. The social science research within the nonprofit sector has focused on the 
registered charities (Posnett, 1987) which are formally registered by the UK Charity 
Commission and thereby accorded the protection of the Crown, the Courts, and the 
Charity Commission. Currently, the entire sector has an income in excess of £77bn, 
own assets over £81bn and have over £160bn in long- and short-term investments. It 
is an important sector with over 1.1 million employees and a further 4.2 million 
volunteers.13 
Nonprofit entities are different from for-profit entities in ways that can affect reporting 
incentives and constraints. The main reason is that the objectives of a nonprofit 
organisation are not to make a profit. Although nonprofits have a different set of 
stakeholders with differing interests, research shows that nonprofits also have both 
motives and opportunities to misreport financial information in order to mislead 
stakeholders or influence contractual outcomes (Hofmann and McSwain, 2013). There 
has been evidence of incentives to manage earnings in the health sector in the US 
(and in some other countries). Potential donors want to see their contributions spent 
in meaningful, effective, and efficient ways, and creditors want to be able to assess 
credit risk and return (Parsons, 2003). Information asymmetry is greater in nonprofits 
compared to for-profit organisations. Effectively, there are two principals i.e. the donor 
and the beneficiary in case of nonprofits (Kitching, 2009). Since there are various 
income sources for charities such as from government grants, government contracts, 
corporate donations, individual donations, legacy income, endowments etc…, each 
charity’s main source of funders would have a bearing on its motives to manipulate 
financial reporting numbers; these motives are expected to be wide-ranging such as 
in pursuit of avoidance of a big surplus as there are political costs associated with a 
surplus which implies that the nonprofit is not fulfilling its charitable mission (Leone 
                                               
13 http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/SectorData/SectorOverview.aspx 
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and Van Horn, 2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006). This could potentially put donors off 
from making donations in the future. A plausible explanation could be that a surplus 
can lead a donor into believing that the charity does not need large donations in the 
next period. They may assume that the charity can meet its future costs by using its 
carried-forward surpluses. Similarly, the extant literature provides evidence that 
donations are positively associated with the programme ratio, i.e. the ratio between 
the expenses on charitable expenses to the total expenses, which implies an incentive 
to misclassify expenses (Tinkelman, 1998, 1999; Gordon et al., 2009; Okten and 
Weisbrod, 2000). 
Steinberg (1986) looks at two types of charities i.e. budget maximisers that maximise 
the incoming resources of the charities and service maximisers that attempt to 
maximise the residual of resources to be employed for the services. This can be 
attained by minimising the fundraising and administrative costs so that the available 
resources to spend on charitable costs or programme expenses are maximised in 
pursuit of the charities’ objectives. Posnett and Sandler (1989) found UK charities to 
be “net revenue maximisers” i.e. they are in pursuit of maximising the available surplus 
for charitable activities expense. Khanna et al. (1995) in their study of the UK charities 
report that where health and overseas charities are net revenue maximisers, religious 
charities maximise total revenues, whereas social welfare charities were found to 
fundraise short of the point at which net revenues are maximised.  
Potential donors are interested in assuring that nonprofits will use their contributions 
in meaningful, effective, and efficient ways, and creditors are interested in being able 
to assess credit risk and return (Parsons, 2003). Managers have understandably 
better information regarding the firm’s financial position and performance than the 
outside users of the financial information. This creates financial information asymmetry 
and naturally provides management with the incentive to indulge in financial disclosure 
management. Since there are two principals, namely donors and beneficiaries in the 
case of a nonprofit, therefore information asymmetry is more likely than in corporations 
(Kitching, 2009). Donors effectively purchase the benefit such as humanitarian aid, 
whereas a beneficiary acquires benefit from such aid.  
Information asymmetry in the nonprofit sector is worsened because all stakeholders 
have access to differing quantity and quality of financial information. A charity’s main 
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focus from its donors’ perspective is expected to be on maximising programme 
expenditure for which donors fund them. Programme expenditure is commonly 
referred to as charitable activities in the UK and it relates to all those costs which are 
directly associated with delivering the core services of a charity. 
 To make stewardship decisions, the board of trustees use information including 
accounting information (Hofmann and McSwain, 2013); similarly, accounting 
information is also needed for other implicit and explicit contracts with creditors, 
managers, and other resource providers. Regulations, governance, information 
asymmetry and agency problems provide motives and opportunities for financial 
disclosure management (Hofmann and McSwain, 2013). For a nonprofit organisation, 
there is no apparent claim to the bottom line figure as donors do not expect a monetary 
benefit out of their contributions. Therefore a surplus figure could potentially cause 
political costs, that the authorities, press and public may view suspiciously that the 
charity is not fulfilling its mission and objectives (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Jones 
and Roberts, 2006).  
According to Hansmann (1996), agency problems are exacerbated when donors do 
not effectively monitor the performance of the managers. Indeed, in such situations, 
managers may carry out their duties inefficiently and they are likely to expend the 
resources of the organisation in the activities that are “peripheral” to the main objects 
of the organisation (Krishnan et al., 2006).  
There is a significant political cost associated with showing net incoming resources or 
surplus in the statement of financial activities (SoFA). This pressure has been 
intensified by some media pressure on some of the UK’s richest charities such as 
Lloyd's Register Foundation, British Heart Foundation and Age UK that spend as low 
as less than half of their income on their charitable activities (or programme expenses). 
This could lead to a continued pressure on charities to sustain programme ratio or 
reduce fundraising expenses and other indicators to avoid political costs in the same 
vein as Leone and Van Horn (2005) and Jones and Roberts (2006). 
Charities are expected to be subject to unfavourable press attention in case they are 
not seen to be fulfilling the philanthropic objectives that they exist for. For example, 
the level of charitable expenses in comparison to the total expenses has been an area 
of specific attention for researchers. If their programme ratio considerably declines or 
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is lower than expected levels, or if the programme ratio falls below the watchdog 
benchmarks then that may result in increased scrutiny (Barrett 1999). 
 
1.10 Motives for financial misreporting in charities 
This section presents some of the motivations that managers of the nonprofit sector 
organisations have in misreporting their bottom line figures in their financial 
statements. Figure 1.4 succinctly sets the scene of the costs to a charity for showing 
high profits (surpluses) or losses (deficits), therefore motivating managers to misreport 
their bottom line figures to avoid such costs. The following sections will discuss the 
motivations from the perspectives of various other researchers in this area of literature. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Costs to charities for posting high surpluses or deficits 
 
1.10.1 Retention and perpetuation of funding 
It has been established by various academic researchers that nonprofit executives 
believe that the efficient use of resources attracts and retains funding. That is achieved 
by keeping administrative costs low (Parsons et al., 2017). Contracts with third parties 
are also influenced by the bottom line figures and may lead to negotiations for price 
concessions. Cost-shifting by hospital has been noted to maximize reimbursements 
from third-party payers. Eldenburg and Soderstrom (1996) and Eldenburg and 
Kallapur (1997) find evidence that both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals manage their 
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patient mix, cost allocations, and budget estimates of patient volume and costs to 
increase revenues and maximize cash flows. Scandals related to inefficiency of use 
of funding include  that of the Suicide Bereavement Charity Console whose founder 
squandered charity funds on salaries, care and holidays. Similarly, debacles of 
charities such as Kids Company have added to the public scrutiny of the charities’ 
finances and make financial statements quite relevant as a signal to the funders of its 
legitimacy. Trussel (2003, P616) states that “Managers of nonprofit organizations may 
have incentives to manipulate their reported program-spending ratios because donors 
use them in determining contribution decisions”. 
The extant literature has extensively provided empirical evidence that donations are 
positively associated with the programme ratio (e.g. Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986; 
Posnett and Sandler 1989; Callen 1994; Tinkelman, 1999; Baber et al. 2001; Yetman 
and Yetman 2003). Predominantly in the US and in the UK, a considerable amount of 
literature has concluded that donors of a nonprofit firm use accounting information in 
forming their decisions for allocating their donations. A better programme ratio can be 
seen as a tool to improving the chances for future donations, therefore providing a 
reason for the management to influence classification shifting in favour of a high 
programme ratio or in other words low fundraising or governance costs concerning the 
total expenses.  
 
1.10.2 Tax exemption 
Those nonprofit organisations that are engaged in taxable activities have a motive to 
shift cost allocations from charitable to taxable operations in order to reduce their tax 
bill. This motive has been heavily studied in the US (Sansing, 1998; Jegers, 2010). 
Nonprofits also face pressures from donors and the general public who seek 
reassurance that the nonprofit receiving tax is working effectively and ethically without 
wasting resources (Hoefer, 2000; Cairns et al., 2005). Nonprofit managers may 
attempt to mislead the regulator in the US, i.e. the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
regarding their organisation’s tax-exempt status to justify its position as a nonprofit. 
Leone and Van Horn (2005) state that tax authorities monitor nonprofit hospitals’ 
profitability in part to assess whether they should retain their tax-exempt status. Within 
the UK charity sector, there are no obvious tax reasons to manage earnings as long 
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as all funds are utilised for the charitable purposes. Lewis (2009) counts various tax-
exempt areas in light of the comprehensive list provided by the UK government on its 
charities and trading page. Profits from primary charitable purposes or activities, rental 
income from land and buildings, income from bank interest, dividend through 
investments, certain fundraising events, gifts and the sale of donated goods are 
exempt from corporation tax, even though many UK charities are also registered 
companies by limited guarantee14 or charitable incorporated organisations. If these 
gains are entirely used for charitable purposes, then they are exempt from capital 
gains tax as well.  
 
1.10.3 Managers’ career aspirations 
Management of an organisation would want to be running an organisation as a going 
concern. There is a degree of personal esteem attached to the performance of an 
organisation that one manages. Hospital CEOs are often evaluated on financial 
performance (Brickley and Van Horn, 2002); if losses are reported then it might 
negatively affect compensation, reputation, and career mobility. I would expect this to 
be consistent with most large charity organisations in the UK.  
 
1.10.4 Debt covenants 
As charities do not issue equity therefore there are only two sources for raising finance 
i.e. through increased revenue or by issuing debt. A “significant number of nonprofits 
have significant amounts of debt” on their balance sheets (Yetman, 2007; p248). 
Trueman and Titman (1988) provide evidence that the cost of debt can be reduced by 
reducing inconsistency or variability of earnings. This would lead me to infer that the 
management will have incentives to manage earnings around a certain benchmark, 
which is more likely to be around zero in light of the constraints with high surpluses or 
deficits. Managers may have the logic for doing so as it would reduce the cost of debt 
and those saved costs could be best utilised in providing services to the beneficiaries.  
A charity is seen as either having exhausted the activities that it once stood for or is 
unable to ascertain activities that would be required to further the objects of the charity.  
                                               
14 a company limited by guarantee is set up with special charitable articles, and is registered both at Companies 
House (as a company) and with the Charity Commission as a charity in its own right.  





This chapter presents the research gap, contributions of the study and an introduction 
to the charitable sector. It also presents an overview of charity accounting, prior 
literature on financial misreporting in UK charitable organisations, and an introduction 
to the three studies in this thesis. The importance of the sector is significant and its 
impact on our lives is immense. The charity accounts are different from for-profit 
financial statements and hence are less commonly recognisable to an untrained eye. 
The extant literature, mainly in the US nonprofit setting discuses financial reporting 
quality. Evidence in the current literature suggests that nonprofits misreport their 
bottom-line figure using accruals-based and real earnings management techniques. 
Charities are understood to misreport their fundraising and charitable activities 
expenses to improve their operating ratios.   
Better scrutiny of the charitable sector is important given the substantial public 
donations and volunteering, as well as the large government support from taxpayers’ 
money. Furthermore, the growing lack of trust puts pressure on charities to present 
their financial statements in certain ways. The financial reporting quality literature in 
the nonprofit sector is scant and particularly silent using qualitative research methods. 
This first chapter summarises the findings from the current literature of the motivations 
for financial misreporting. The chapter introduces the three studies of the thesis that 
contribute to an area for academic and practical significance. The thesis presents a 
qualitative study using semi-structured interviews, a technique that has been absent 
for understanding motivations for financial reporting manipulation, both in the for-profit 
and nonprofit sector. This thesis also uses the largest dataset in UK-based academic 
studies. This is also the first study that investigates the impact of funder sophistication 
and donor-beneficiary separation on charity managers’ willingness to misreport in their 
financial statements.   
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Appendix 1.1: Statement of Financial Position (SoFA) 
  
 





                                               
15https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8
70619/charities-sorp-frs102-2019a.pdf 
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Appendix 1.2: Balance Sheet 
 
 




                                               
16https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8
70619/charities-sorp-frs102-2019a.pdf 
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Chapter 2: Study on the Motivators of Financial Statement 
Misreporting in the UK Charity Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The study aims to explore, from charitable organisations’ perspective, the factors that 
motivate managers to misreport financial statements. The following sections discuss 
the theoretical background and analysis of interviews conducted to study misreporting 
of financial statements by charities registered in England and Wales. 
This study is limited to those large organisations that are established for charitable 
purposes as defined by the Charities Act 2011 and registered with the Charity 
Commission, the regulator of the sector in England and Wales.  
The study is motivated by the fall in trust and confidence in charities in recent times.17 
Specifically, the latest scandals surrounding UK charities (e.g. Kids Company’s 
collapse and Age UK’s mis-selling to the older generation) have contributed to a 
plunging of public confidence to its lowest level since it was first measured in 2005.18 
As a consequence, the cash donations to the charities have dropped,19 something 
which is a life line for the sector. The main reasons cited for the fall in trust were 
negative media reports of the sector in general and lack of public trust as to where the 
money was spent. A third of those whose trust and confidence has decreased, 
attribute this to general media stories about charities and a further third cite media 
coverage about how charities spend donations. Likewise, excessive spending on 
administrative costs such as advertising and wages has been reported as a reason for 
concern. 20 The Scottish Charity Regulator, OSCR, has also reported a decline in 
confidence albeit less pronounced compared to that in England and Wales.21 Add to 
this the significant reduction in the funding available to the Charity Commission, and 
the situation becomes a matter of concern for donors and philanthropists. In the 
                                               
17 According to a report published in July 2016 which was commissioned by The Charity Commission and 





20 15% of the sample from public survey suggested: “Too much money is spent on advertising/wages”.  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/532104/Public
_trust_and_confidence_in_charities_2016.pdf 
21  https://www.gov.uk/government/news/public-trust-in-charities-has-fallen-reports-charity-commission 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/532104/Public_trust_and_confiden
ce_in_charities_2016.pdf 
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absence of sufficient resources, the task of the Regulator may become more difficult 
in identifying early warning signs.22  
Commenting on the current state of affairs, William Shawcross, Chairman of the 
Charity Commission, observed “action is needed to restore public confidence. These 
results are a call to action for everyone who values public trust in charities.”23  
Furthermore, a survey conducted by Charity Aid Foundation revealed that nearly one 
fifth of charities are struggling to survive.24 The main worry for the public, as cited by 
the head of research at Charity Aid Foundation, is that ‘their hard-earned money is not 
being well spent’.  Growing cynicism towards the sector can lead to a priori assumption 
that the managers of the charity may be willing to do all that they can in order to repair 
the damage and sustain their income. There is a strong likelihood, that to be seen as 
spending responsibly in the eyes of donors and regulators a charity will consider 
window-dressing its financial statements. It is true that financial statements are not the 
only source of information about performance but it is not implausible that the 
accounting numbers are one of the most effective tools for communicating a charity’s 
legitimacy to its stakeholders. This study is conducted to find evidence of whether the 
financial reporting quality of charity organisations registered with the Charity 
Commission in England and Wales is being compromised.  
This study contributes to the scant literature on financial reporting quality amongst 
charities in various ways. Firstly, it makes a methodological contribution where to my 
knowledge financial reporting quality has not been studied through in-depth semi-
structured interviews. Secondly, this study focuses exclusively on motivations that 
managers have in manipulating financial statements; again to my knowledge this area 
has not been given such explicit attention on its own prior to this. Thirdly, vast 
development in accounting in general and charity accounting in particular over the last 
decade warrants the need for a fresh understanding of the impact of such changes on 
managers’ motivations to compromise financial reporting quality. The unprecedented 
                                               
22 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26036279 
23 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/public-trust-in-charities-has-fallen-reports-charity-commission. .Results 
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pressures exerted by COVID-19 are expected to exacerbate income uncertainty25 and 
could well lead to financial misreporting. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework for 
financial statements’ misreporting and outlines various theories that explain the 
motivations for financial reporting management in nonprofit settings. I present agency, 
resource dependency and legitimacy theories as the underpinnings vis-a-vis 
motivations for financial statements misreporting. However, I recognise that there may 
be various other theories that can explain motivations for financial statements 
misreporting in charity sector organisations. Section 3 examines the literature in 
charity accounting that deals with financial misreporting. Section 4 explains the 
methodology for this study. Section 5 presents a detailed discussion of interview 
results with an in-depth analysis of motivations and pressures for manipulation that 
are faced by charity managers and accountants. This section also develops an 
understanding of those factors which interact to facilitate financial misreporting  
Conclusion of the discussion is presented at the end in section 6 where I also propose 
further avenues for research in a significantly under-researched area. 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
In this section, I discuss the theories that underpin incentives to manipulate financial 
reporting in charities. I briefly present agency, resource dependency and legitimacy 
theories. In addition, a brief discussion on the “fraud triangle” (Cressey, 1953) is 
included which is also relevant in understanding potential motivators for managers 
who choose to perpetuate inappropriate behaviour.  
An integrated approach is of increasing relevance in explaining the complexities of 
charitable activities (Jonsson, 1991; Helmig et al., 2004). In this study, I employ the 
agency, resource dependency and legitimacy theories, which I believe shed light on 
the pressures faced by charities vis-à-vis their financial reporting choices. These are 
discussed below. 
 
                                               
25 https://www.ft.com/content/00362e6f-8854-43dc-bb01-98bf4a396b18 
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2.2.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory highlights potential conflicts of interest between principals and 
agents. A conflict of interest between management and shareholders exists when 
managers seek to maximise their utility in a way that is not in the best interest of a 
firm’s shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A moral hazard problem arises if 
external investors cannot observe the choices that made by managers (Walker, 
2013).  In order to maximise their interests, agents are willing to present a good picture 
of the firm’s financial position to shareholders. In charities, management take no 
personal financial risk and donors are in no way involved in decision making. The 
situation is not too dissimilar to the role of shareholders of a corporation who are 
predominantly detached from the decision-making process. Likewise, in charities, 
senior management makes decisions and unsophisticated donors are not directly 
involved operationally. Shareholders of commercial sector organisations are likely to 
follow the financial reports and news pertaining to the companies in which they own 
shares more closely, due to their personal tangible monetary gains either through 
capital growth or dividends. On the contrary, there are no direct financial gains to be 
had by an individual donor of a charity. Agency relationships arise between two (or 
more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as a 
representative of the principal (Ross,1973). Extensive research has attempted to 
understand the business world in light of this agent-principal relationship. According 
to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agents can use the funds from principals by making 
operating decisions that are harmful to the interest of external investors. In the same 
vein, I attempt to investigate whether trustees and managers of charities can also 
make decisions which may not be serving the purpose for which their charities are 
funded. When one party is in possession of more information than the other, this 
creates information asymmetry. According to Kitching (2009), information 
asymmetries in nonprofit organisations are higher than in corporations because there 
are two groups of principals of a charity as opposed to only one in corporations. These 
agency problems are nontrivial in nonprofits, due to the under-supply of monitoring by 
principals, consumers, and regulatory institutions (Johnson & Prakash 2007). These 
two groups are donors and beneficiaries of goods and services; contrary to just the 
shareholders as principals in for-profit corporations. The basis of agency theory is that 
the managers are usually motivated by their personal motives. In a charity setting, 
there are groups of donors who would be unable to transparently observe the flow of 
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resources from them to the beneficiaries. This can be more challenging if the quality 
of financial and non-financial information is compromised. The situation is expected to 
be exacerbated if managers’ compensation is somehow linked to the performance of 
a charity. If certain numbers are more “acceptable” from donors’ point of view then 
management of such charities that remunerate their employees on the basis of 
performance are more likely to manipulate their financial reports. 
In the capital market context, according to Healy and Palepu (2001), regulation, 
contracting and information intermediaries are the means of minimising information 
asymmetry. I posit that in a similar fashion information asymmetry in charities is 
reduced through the correct application of Statements of Recommended Practice 
(hereafter SORP). Over the decades, the sector’s regulator, the Charity Commission, 
has revised and improved SORPs. Charities’ rating agencies such as GuideStar UK 
and Charity Clarity help donors in comparing between charities and they effectively 
act as information intermediaries in the charity sector. However, analysis of these 
rating agencies is less sophisticated than financial analysts and rating agencies that 
exist in capital markets. This points to the possibility that information asymmetry can 
be more pronounced in charities. Add to this, the suggestion that two principals also 
increase information asymmetries in charities (Kitching, 2009), then there is potential 
for motives for financial misreporting in charities. 
 
2.2.2 Resource dependency theory 
Although agency theory applies to various situations within the nonprofit sector, the 
apparent appeal and applicability of agency theory in this context is rather limited 
(Steinberg, 1990; Herman and Heimovics, 1991; Brody, 1996; Helmig et al. 2004). In 
the absence of owners as principals, sociology’s resource dependency theory 
(hereafter, RDT) can provide another appropriate and relevant framework (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978) to study the charity sector, which demands modification to fit the 
unique setting. 
RDT framework appears relevant to explain the behaviour of charities’ managers in 
response to various resource-related constraints. RDT implies that managers exercise 
strategic choices within the context of constraints (Greening and Gray, 1994). An 
organisation’s degree of dependence is determined by the importance and 
Chapter 2: Study on the Motivators of Financial Statement Misreporting in the UK Charity Context 
49 
 
concentration of its resources (Froelich, 1999). I employ this theory within the realms 
of financial reporting and assert that accounting choices made by charities could be 
influenced by the importance and concentration of their funding sources. In order to 
manage resource constraints of funding, the accounting choices could be biased 
where subjectivity is involved. 
The survival of an organisation depends on acquiring and maintaining its resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This theory builds upon the role that environments play 
in shaping the behaviour of organisations (Levine and White 1961; Thompson 2011). 
Nonprofits cannot raise funds through capital markets, and voluntary contributions 
may be insufficient for the task at hand (Anheier, 2014). In addition, a firm’s managers 
are expected to have discretion in reducing resource uncertainty.  
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the behaviour of an organisation is impacted 
by the demands of the stakeholders upon which it depends for resources and support. 
They further suggest, “the key to organisational survival is the ability to acquire and 
maintain resources.” The theory focuses on the bearing of external forces on attempts 
to manage its dependencies on external groups (Greening and Gray, 1994). According 
to RDT, dependence experienced is determined by the importance and concentration 
of its resources (Froelich, 1999). Therefore, according to this theory, the source and 
pressures on resources faced by charities may impact their decisions in financial 
reporting.  
 
2.2.3 Legitimacy theory 
In addition to RDT, legitimacy theory is also relevant to understanding the pressures 
faced by charitable organisations and incentives for misreporting. In fact, I can find 
links between legitimacy theory and RDT. Legitimacy is the central resource that 
organisations require for long-term survival (Anheier, 2014). Legitimacy refers to a 
general perception or assumption that an entity must act in a desirable and proper 
manner within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions (Suchman, 1995). Legitimation is a process whereby an organisation 
justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist (Maurer, 1971). Likewise, it 
is also about the conformity to the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social 
system (e.g. Parsons, 1960; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Charities that are more 
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concerned with legitimising their existence instead of providing ethically driven 
accounts of their efficiency may face incentives to report in a way that conforms to 
norms regardless of the transparency of the reporting (Hyndman and McConville, 
2016). 
Legitimacy theory is also relevant in understanding what motivates charity 
management to manipulate accounting numbers. “Legitimacy is a generalised 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p574). Legitimation is a process whereby an 
organisation justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist (Maurer, 1971). 
Likewise, it is also about the conformity to the norms of acceptable behaviour in the 
larger social system that organisations are keen to aim for (e.g. Parsons, 1960; 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
Charities face public scrutiny if they are not seen to conform to certain norms. Such 
organisations also face the risk of increased “Political costs” that refer to the costs of 
additional regulation, including higher taxes, borne by large or high-profile firms (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986). The most applicable political costs within the charity sector 
setting is likely to be the cost of regulation and impact of some statutory inquiry by the 
Charity Commission to whom it is required to publish in the public interest under 
section 46 of Charities Act 2011.26 Such inquiries, by attracting the attention of funders 
and media are expected to put the future of such charity in jeopardy by affecting future 
income and even risking being barred from operating altogether.  
Although this study does not directly address fraud within the sector, The Fraud 
Triangle developed by Donald Cressey (Cressey, 1953) can also assist in 
understanding the behaviour of an individual who can violate a position of trust in order 
to resolve their personal financial problems. The Fraud Triangle comprises pressure, 
opportunity and rationalisation. Pressure comes into play when the job or business is 
in jeopardy. Likewise, many people commit white-collar crimes in order to maintain 
their social status. Such individuals should be able not only to misappropriate the funds 
but also must have an opportunity to do so. The third side of the triangle 
                                               
26 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/inquiry-reports-charity-commission 
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is rationalisation. Most fraudsters perpetrate fraud for the first time and attempt to 
justify i.e. rationalise their act in order to satisfy themselves that they have not done 
anything wrong. To illustrate, they may rationalise that they would do it only to provide 
for their families, or that they were entitled to the money, or that they were being 
underpaid, etc.27 
 
2.3 Literature on financial misreporting in the charity sector 
 Hyndman and McConville (2016) suggest that there are charities that are more 
interested in legitimising their existence instead of providing ethically driven accounts 
of their efficiency. I posit that the quest for being seen as adherents to SORP and other 
conventions and legitimating their accounting practices amongst other things, may 
paradoxically lure charities into acting in the very way which standards are designed 
to steer them away from. Eldenburg and Krishnan (2008) in their study of government-
run hospitals note that such organisations are constrained in incentive pay practices 
but they need to prove their efficiency to receive adequate funding. The authors 
suggest that such hospitals are more likely to use accounting information for legitimacy 
in the eyes of regulators and stakeholders.  
The extant literature identifies a small surplus as a desirable position for nonprofit 
organisations (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al. , 2007; Stalebrink, 2007; 
Eldenburg et al., 2011; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Vansant, 2016). 
Furthermore, a charity’s management is free in deciding where to spend funds from 
its unrestricted sources, as long as they are in pursuit of the objects for which the 
charity exists. Unrestricted surpluses are also relevant because they feed into the 
balance sheet reserves.  The use of restricted funds is not discretionary for 
management. Restricted income should only be used for those purposes stipulated by 
the donor. An excess of this income over the related expenses ends up in the balance 
sheet in the form of restricted funds. Restricted and unrestricted funds are kept 
                                               
27 http://www.acfe.com/fraud-triangle.aspx 
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separate in the form of columns. Likewise, endowment funds and designated funds 
are also allocated to their respective columns.28  
In addition to the above, the literature points to the need to reduce the cost of debt as 
another motivation for manipulation; and organisations do it by reducing the variance 
of earnings around a threshold (Trueman and Titman, 1988; Jaggi and Lee, 2002; 
Leone and Van Horne, 2005). This could also be explained as earnings smoothing. A 
considerable number of large charities have debts on their balance sheets and 
therefore a charity would avoid volatile net incoming or outgoing resources (terms 
used for surpluses and deficits, respectively).   
The extant research also refers to the association of management compensation with 
the accounting data. Baber et al. (2002) find that changes in compensation are 
positively associated with changes in programme spending; pointing to the theory that 
a charity with a higher ratio of programme (charitable) activities will attract higher 
amount of compensation for its management. However, financial rewards are not the 
primary motivators for many nonprofit employees (Leete, 2000). Reporting of 
programme spending can be a tool for signalling the legitimacy of a charity to its 
donors.   
If a large charity is not a household name and its donations are not impacted by the 
level of top management’s remuneration then there is a possibility that top 
management’s compensation may be relatively more generous. According to a Third 
Sector study, generous pay packages are more common in certain types of charities 
which do not depend on small donations.29 Negative media attention vis-a-vis CEO 
and top management compensation in charities has been an area marred by 
controversy.  
                                               
28 The Statement of Financial Activities (SoFA) and Balance sheet of a charity are presented in the form of columns, 
typically including unrestricted funds (which can include designated funds in addition to unrestricted income) and 
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Hofmann and McSwain (2013) review the scant but predominantly quantitative 
literature in the US nonprofit sector setting, specifying various motivations. Various 
studies posit protecting tax-exempt status, attracting donations, meeting grant criteria, 
avoiding political costs, improving watchdog ratings, enhancing managerial and 
organisational reputation and managerial compensation for financial disclosure 
management. UK charities are exempt from tax on their charitable activities; whereas 
only the activities which are not related to their mission are taxable. However, given 
the diversity of organisations within the sector, the financial reporting may not be as 
specific and clear-cut for a particular charity as donors would hope to see, as all 
organisations within the charity sector follow the same set of recommended practices.  
In the first major study of UK charities, Bird and Morgan-Jones (1981) identified that 
in order to show low revenue to attract donors, a number of income-increasing items 
were capitalised by charities such as legacy income and gains on disposal of fixed 
assets. It is important to note that under current rules legacy is required to be 
recognised separately.  
Hyndman (1990 and 1991) suggests that administration costs (including fundraising 
costs) as a percentage of total expenditure is the most important type of financial 
information required by contributors. Connolly, Hyndman and McConville (2013) also 
report that since the introduction of SORP 2005, the charitable activities ratio as 
calculated from the face of the SoFA increased significantly. This points to the 
possibility that managers may choose to manipulate accounting numbers on the face 
of the SoFA as average users would not look at the notes to the accounts to investigate 
allocations of support costs into charitable activities, fundraising and governance 
costs. 
A major portion of the research in this area has been specifically focused on US-based 
nonprofit organisations. Studies in the US also note that programme ratios have 
reportedly been commonly altered through intentional manipulation as well as 
unintentional errors, and there has been empirical evidence that managers pursue 
high programme ratios (e.g. Tinkelman 1998; Baber et al.,2001; Trussel, 2003; Hager 
and Greenlee 2004; Wing et al. 2004; Khumawala et al. 2005; Roberts 2005; Jones 
and Roberts 2006; Krishnan et al. 2006; Keating et al. 2008, Tinkelman, 2009; Parsons 
et al., 2012). The programme ratio refers to the percentage of expenses relating to the 
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programmes and services of a charity to its total expenses. As far as donors are 
concerned, their main interest is in knowing how much every pound they donate is 
spent on charitable activities (Parsons, 2003); so in other words, they would like to see 
as high programme ratio as possible. Prior literature also reflects that nonprofit 
organisations gain through better funding when they present the breakdown of their 
expended resources with a larger portion serving those charitable objectives that a 
charity is founded on. There is a positive association between programme ratio and 
donations (e.g. Buchheit & Callen 1994; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Parsons, 2006, 
Gordon et al., 2009 and Thornton & Belski, 2010).  
Where in the US it is the programme ratio that is a common point of reference; in the 
UK, fundraising costs draw the attention of the external stakeholders and 
management. It is important to note that the desire for low fundraising costs or a high 
programme ratio are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, different expense ratio 
measures are used by different donors in assessing the efficiency of a charity.  
The empirical analysis of US charities’ data supports this notion that charities with a 
high programme ratio (low fundraising ratio) are viewed favourably by the donors. 
Gordon et al. (2009) empirically test and find evidence that rating changes were 
associated with an increase in contributions. In the US, a number of private agencies 
such as Charity Navigator and GuideStar provide financial information of charities on 
their web sites to assist donors in deciding between charities. Organisations that faced 
a decline in rating were associated with accordingly reduced contributions. In the UK, 
GuideStar UK, Charity Clarity, GiveWell, aliveandgiving.com etc, exist for the same 
purpose but are a far less commonly used source of information. The Charity 
Commission maintains financial data of all UK registered charities and keeps copies 
of their financial statements for public inspection. Similarly, now most large UK 
charities’ accounts can also be accessed directly through their websites.  
These “unintended, unfortunate consequences of unreasonable donor and monitoring 
agency expectations” for a charity lead to accounting manipulation and charities have 
pressures to keep their fundraising costs under a certain percentage (Tinkleman, 
2009). Nonprofit organisations’ managers also face pressures to report favourable 
ratios that result in their willingness to manage ratios (Parsons et al., 2017). 
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The findings from the previous studies have been mixed regarding the impact of 
reserves on the future funding of charities in different sub-sectors (e.g. Marudas, 2004; 
Tinkelman and Mankaney, 2007; Chen, 2009; Wong and Ortmann, 2015). In the UK, 
the term reserves exclusively refer to “unrestricted funds” which the donors do not put 
restrictions on. This study also aims to contribute to the understanding and role of 
these reserves and their impact on future funding.  
Disclosure is limited even in the largest of the UK’s charities (Hyndman and 
McConville, 2016). Therefore it is interesting to investigate whether charities also 
manipulate their financial statements in order to mitigate adverse publicity and secure 
future funding. Thornton & Belski (2010) posit that competition amongst nonprofit 
organisations incentivises managers to under-report fundraising costs in order to 
appear relatively efficient. Heijden (2013) through their experimental study indicate 
that accounting information affects donations to charities at the extreme ends of the 
shortlist, but charities that are in the middle do not benefit. However, sophisticated 
donors discount programme ratios (Yetman and Yetman 2013). Charitable 
organisations also aim to show zero profits on their taxable activities (Omer and 
Yetman 2003). Researchers have also suggested there are political costs associated 
with showing a sizeable surplus by a charity because that would lead to the 
assumption that the charity is not fulfilling its main objectives (Jones & Roberts, 2006; 
Leone & Van Horn, 2005, Ballantine et al. 2007).  
Recent adverse media coverage and reports by the Regulator itself have become the 
primary motivation for this particular study. The report highlighted the Commission’s 
concern regarding disproportionately high governance costs and in some cases, 
erroneous classification of governance costs as support costs by several charities has 
been reported. Michelle Russell, Director of Investigations, Monitoring and 
Enforcement at the Commission, remarked “I continue to be concerned that a large 
number of charities are not meeting the accounting requirements as set out in the 
Charities SORP and are making basic errors in their annual reporting. The incorrect 
reporting of financial information causes confusion has a real impact on public trust 
and confidence in charities and it is also likely to impact on how they are perceived by 
donors and potential supporters” (The Charity Commission report, 2015).30 The 
                                               
30 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-report-suggests-charities-often-overstate-governance-costs 
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documented problems with financial reporting also include a lack of consistency in 
narrative reports of charities; specifically, these tend to have varying degrees of details 
and quality.  
Section 393 of the Companies Act 2006 requires directors to only sign the financial 
statements if they give a true and fair view. Likewise, the current SORP (FRS102) like 
its predecessors sets out the scope of a SORP which is to facilitate accounts that give 
a ‘true and fair’ view.31  
In the UK charities, the earned charitable activities income has seen a sharp rise since 
the start of this millennium whereas voluntary donations income received by the sector 
has been gradually declining. Although the number of charities registered with the 
Charity Commission is in excess of 160,000 independent charities (Register of 
charities, 2020),32 a very small fraction of this number receives the major bulk of the 
total income for the sector. Therefore, this study focuses only on large UK charities in 
the sector. Also, I expect that the users of financial statements of large charities would 
be significantly larger than small charities. 
There are both monetary and non-monetary motivations which can dictate the 
behaviour of a manager to misreport. Non-profit workers are more likely than their 
commercial sector counterparts to offer themselves for volunteering (Houston, 2006). 
As discussed above, albeit less than in public companies, performance can have 
bearing on compensation in the sector. In a report commissioned by The Charity 
Commission, public confidence has been low regarding the level of competence of 
managers in the Sector33 and therefore I have a priori assumption that charity 
managers would be conscious of the overall trust and are expected to employ various 
methods to preserve their reputation. 
Although the prior literature collectively points to motivations for misreporting in various 
US settings, this study aims to consolidate the most common motivations in one study 
to shed light on the UK nonprofit setting through in-depth interviews. Changes in the 
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UK SORPs over the last decade have improved consistency across charities and 
predominantly improved transparency but paradoxically also posed some challenges 
for the managers of these charities to show a truer picture of performance by 
misreporting financial statements. In light of the theoretical background and limited 
empirical evidence in the charity sector, I address the following questions; 
 Do UK charities have motivations to manipulate financial statements; and if they 
do, then which numbers are most prone to manipulation? 
 Are there any particular opportunities that facilitate this manipulation? 
 
2.4 Methodology 
The research population for this study constitutes the UK’s one thousand largest 
charities by income – i.e. organisations established for charitable purposes as defined 
by the Charities Act 2011 and registered with the Charity Commission, the regulator 
of the sector in the UK. These charities engage in a very wide range of activities, from 
feeding the homeless to finding cure for diseases.  
The data collection method for this qualitative research was the semi-structured 
interview, in which similar questions are asked of all interviewees but with some 
variation in the wording and the order in which questions are asked, and with the use 
of prompts and probes to follow up initial answers (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Semi-
structured interviews are probably the most common type of qualitative method 
(Kitchin and Tate, 2000). This form of interview is recommended for the investigation 
of complex behaviours, opinions, and emotions (Longhurst, 2009). It provides insights 
into attitudes and perceptions that cannot be accessed by questionnaire surveys or 
structured interviews (Bryman & Bell, 2015) because its flexibility allows the 
researcher to “dig deeper into the mind of the interviewee” (Blumberg et al, 2005, 
p193). By employing semi-structured interviews, I make a methodological contribution, 
because the existing literature lacks an in-depth study of the motivators of financial 
reporting manipulation in UK charities. This methodology is ‘useful for investigating 
complex behaviours, opinions and emotions and for collecting a diversity of 
experiences’ (Longhurst, 2009, p.135). This would not have been possible through 
survey designs such as questionnaires or structured interviews.  Interviews were 
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guided by a protocol containing a list of questions derived from the extant literature 
(Appendix 2.1).  
An interview guide was set up containing questions designed to explore a list of 
possible motivators that was prepared from the extant literature. The interview process 
followed a natural flow with each interviewee’s context in view, to ensure they elicit the 
relevant information comfortably and openly. Each interviewee’s unique setting was 
considered in framing questions and analysing responses. New themes with changing 
times are not expected to be sufficiently captured by limiting structured questions 
considering only to the existing literature.  
Qualitative enquiry typically focusses on detailed data from small samples of 
participants (Patton 1990, Richards 2005) so that it can illuminate the questions under 
study with a sufficiently intensive analysis of the data (Kuzel 1992; Gaskell 2000). 
Issues of prevalence are not an issue in qualitative research, where “phenomena need 
only appear once to be part of the analytical map” (Ritchie et al, 2014: 117). Hence, a 
sample does not need to be of a size that justifies quantitative estimates or statistical 
significance (Ritchie et al, 2014). Some recommend a minimum of a dozen interviews 
(Adler & Adler 2012; Guest et al, 2006), while Gaskell (2000: 43) suggests that the 
number of interviews be kept sufficiently low for the researcher to be able to ‘recall 
each setting and participant, and the key themes of each interview’. My relatively small 
sample is justified by the use of a single, dichotomous sampling criteria (the main type 
of income source) and the concentration on a sub-group of the overall charity sector: 
the larger charities (see Bryman & Bell, 2015; Ritchie et al, 2014).  
My research looks at the perspective of charity accountants in the UK through semi-
structured interviews that examine whether the charities would be interested in mis-
reporting their financial statements. To investigate if there are incentives for charities 
to manipulate accounting numbers I interviewed eleven charity accountants with 
internal knowledge, and three external professionals – including two auditors and a 
banker for some of the largest UK charities. This approach is similar to Gibbins et al. 
(1990) where they studied corporate financial disclosure by interviewing “internal 
informants” (Financial controllers or similar) and “external informants”. Semi-
structured interviews have not been employed by researchers as a methodology to 
study motivations, opportunities and methodologies of financial disclosure 
management practice in UK charities accounts. The analysis of these interviews is 
presented in the succeeding section. 
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The sampling frame for this study consists of the UK’s largest one thousand charities 
by income. The primary sampling criterion was the main income source: “fundraising” 
or “earning”. Here I classify those charities as funded if they receive the majority of 
their income through voluntary contributions. The terms broadly equate to Charitable 
and Service-oriented types (see Balsam and Harris, 2014) in previous literature. 
Instead, for this paper I use the terms “Fundraising” (coded as FR prefix for the 
interviewees from Fundraising type charities), similar to Charitable and “Earning” 
(coded as ER prefix for the interviewees from Earning type charities) similar to Service-
oriented. Those charities that receive a larger portion of their income in exchange for 
services or trade have been categorised as earning charities for this study.  
The achieved sample consisted of eleven charity heads of finance or senior personnel 
in similar positions. All interviewees were senior chartered accountants or chartered 
management accountants. I used criterion-based, purposive sampling (e.g. Masson 
2002; Patton 2002). I set out to interview qualified accountants with significant 
experience in the sector and representing two broad classification of charities. My 
secondary sampling criterion was the charities’ substantive areas of work: in order to 
identify whether there are any motivations specific to various sub-groups, I included a 
variety of sector sub-groups. The represented charities engaged in a range of activities 
and had annual incomes ranging from £12m to above £300m (Figure 2.1). All eleven 
charities gain their income from a range of sources: fundraising, charitable activities, 
trading etc. In the text, I label the participants according to their dominant income 
source: FR (Fundraising; n=6) and ER (Earnings; n=5). 
To recruit the participants, emails were sent to a random sample of the available email 
addresses from a sampling frame of largest UK charities; these invited heads of 
finance to participate in the study. Figure 2.1 describes the eleven charities to the 
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The charities below include those where the heads of finance interviewees are employed 
Charity ID Income bracket Charity sub-group 
FR1 £300m-310m International activities 
FR2 £120m-£130m Social Services 
FR3  £25m-£35m Professional Association 
FR4 £10m-£20m Medical Research 
FR5 £25m - £35m Income Support and Maintenance 
FR6 £10m-£20m Grant-making foundation 
ER1 £10m - £20m Economic, Social and Community Development 
ER2 £20m-£30m Development and Housing 
ER3 £15m -£25m Economic, Social and Community Development 
ER4 £15m-£25m Culture and Arts 
ER5 £25m - £35m Primary and Secondary Education 
 
Other professional interviewees 
AUD1 Senior Nonprofits Audit Manager at a top Global Accounting firm 
AUD2 Nonprofits Audit Manager at a top Global Accounting firm 
BNK Relationships’ Director at a top UK bank 
 
Figure 2.1: List of charities 
Almost all the email addresses were generic and therefore may not have reached the 
intended participants directly. Efforts were made to search for the contact details of 
senior management at large charities but such information was not readily available. 
It is not known how many charities would have effective internal communication to 
deliver the interview request to the intended personnel. In light of the responses from 
some charities and some that did not respond, it is understood that several charities 
are constrained by time and resources for academic research. Similarly, a large 
number of preparers of financial statements to agree to this interview is not expected 
especially when the questions are expected to probe about financial statement 
manipulation; so it is possible that those engaging in most manipulation are not 
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captured in the sample. Therefore, the value of the available data is in the evidence of 
manipulation from the direct quotes of the preparers of financial statements.  
Although the sector is very diverse and there would always be unique data for each 
charity, the type of evidence sought in this study is expected to have wider relevance.   
These interviews can be classed as convenience samples (e.g. Creswell, 2013; Berg 
and Lune, 2012; Patton, 2002). The two senior audit managers were accessed through 
the UK head of assurance at a top global audit firm. A Relationships Director at a 
leading UK bank was interviewed in order to understand the benchmarks set by a bank 
whilst lending to the sector. This interview was included because some of the finance 
director interviewees had referred to debt covenants but declined to divulge details on 
account of their being “commercially confidential”. This interviewee currently looks 
after circa forty charity clients and deals exclusively with lending to the nonprofit sector 
which, in his words, is his sector of “specialism”.  
All interviews were recorded after gaining explicit, written consent from the 
interviewees and were subsequently transcribed for coding.  
During the analysis stage of the interviews, thematic analysis was used to analyse the 
data with a framework approach facilitating this process (Ritchie, et al, 2014; Bryman 
& Bell, 2015). The relevant themes were identified and guided by theory and extant 
literature. Interpretative strength of the analysis was enhanced in light of theoretical 
framework and therefore primarily the analysis was theory-driven but any deviations 
were also noted that emerged from the data. Figure 2.1 depicts the two income 
categories (primary sampling criterion) and subgroups of the sample charities 
according to their objectives. Exact incomes have been veiled and instead ranges of 
income have been presented to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees and their 
charities. 
 
2.5 Analysis of results: Motivations for financial statements 
misreporting 
This section presents a detailed analysis of the interviews and lists and expounds on 
various themes that were identified as motivations for financial statements 
misreporting.  
The following section presents the main themes identified with examples of responses 
from the eleven finance directors. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data 
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with a framework approach facilitating this process (Ritchie, et al, 2014; Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). The relevant themes were identified and guided by theory and extant 
literature. Before presenting specific accounting areas that face pressures, I begin with 
discussing whether financial reporting-related pressures, either perceived or real, do 
at all prey on managers’ minds. 
Most interviewees acknowledged the presence of pressures coming from donors and 
that these can prompt financial misreporting. For example, one interviewee 
acknowledged the importance of the emotional factors influencing some donors and 
the implications of this for reporting: “Funders are not logical are they. Fundraising is 
about emotions…if you’re competing for funding with a similar organisation” then 
comparisons with a close competitor will be inevitable, “because of the way financial 
statements are” (FR2). Therefore, charities would face pressures to stay within the 
norms of their peers. 
The above suggests that financial statements play an important role, especially when 
charities compete with similar organisations for funding. The pressure to misreport 
may depend on the sophistication of funders and their level of familiarity with charity 
accounting. A surplus/deficit in charities is not as simplistic as an earnings figure is in 
a company. When asked whether trusts and foundations were interested in accounting 
data before making donation decisions an interviewee replied “yes, always!” Such 
relevance is expected to be less if the assumed understanding of charity accounting 
is limited: “if they’re not a financy (sic) person then maybe not.  Community and 
(donors at) events, I doubt if many of them look at our reports” (FR2). 
Therefore, the relevance of accounting numbers appears to have a link with the 
sophistication levels of the users.  Trustees’ lack of familiarity with accounting can also 
put pressure on accountants to manage accounting numbers in such a way as to avoid 
scrutiny of the charity’s position or performance.  For example, one interviewee noted 
that: “I’m not unprepared to manipulate the way that I report information in order to put 
us in the best light with stakeholders and others.” (ER4). As this illustrates, some 
charities are cognizant of donors’ needs and are prepared to manipulate their reports 
to address these needs. 
Responses also highlighted that the economic environment can impact the level of 
pressure from resource dependency. In periods of financial distress and strained 
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resource dependency, the trustees of financially distressed charities “may be more 
manipulative I’ve found…(it) depends on the trustees and how competent they are; 
because I’ve been with trustees who just really care about what they (financial 
statements) look like.” Alluding to the resource dependency pressures, the interviewee 
further said, “Most charities had to put people on notice of redundancy because you 
don’t know where the funding’s coming” (FR2). 
There was some evidence of pressures other than resource dependency – such as 
employees’ desire to be awarded bonuses. Some fundraisers can persuade 
accountants to manipulate accounting numbers. One interviewee reported that a 
fundraising colleague had said to them, “make things look good so that they can get 
their bonuses at the end of the year” (ER1). 
The interview data highlighted three major accounting areas as likely to be 
manipulated in response to resource dependency pressures. These are discussed in 
the next subsections. They include reserves (unrestricted), fundraising costs, and 
bottom line income (surplus/deficit). The pressure on the reporting of these areas and 
accounting responses vary according to the funding sources.  
The interviews highlighted six recurring broad motivations or pressures for 
misreporting financial information: 1) preservation of income; 2) peer benchmarking; 
3) averting debt covenant breaches; 4) securing jobs and employees’ compensation; 
5) safeguarding professional reputation, and 6) guiding less acquainted charity 
accounting users.  
The data reveals that the leading financial challenge faced by charities is the 
unpredictable and unsustainable future income. Various factors that I call “subordinate 
motivations” were identified that directly or indirectly affect the first theme, the need to 
preserve future income, which has been reported separately. These “subordinate 
motivations” included the need to regulate reserve levels, rising overheads, shifting 
trends from voluntary to earned income and variations in reported income due to 
changes in SORP.  
In addition to the above, the data suggests that amongst charities that are faced with 
motivations to manipulate accounting data, poor audit quality, ineptness of trustees, 
unsophisticated funders and period mismatch in income and expenses might increase 
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the likelihood that accounts are misreported. I call them “facilitators”, as they increase 
the likelihood that motivation to manipulate is translated into manipulation.  
As a result of the  contemporaneous media attention on mismanagement of charity 
resources (e.g. over the Kids Company affair),34 some interviewees expressed 
concern over dwindling public confidence and trust.  Participants of the study 
expressed disquiet over the deteriorating public perceptions of charity sector 
management. As one interviewee said, “I’m just slightly worried …...of course 
everybody wants when they give their pound that their pound is going to a frontline 
service.”  
Interviewees also commented on the importance of non-financial data. Whilst 
discussing the direct or indirect impact of accounting numbers on compensation it is 
important to note that manipulation of non-financial data is not just possible but also 
directly beneficial for employees – i.e. by exaggerating success at meeting KPIs. Such 
manipulation can have “more incentive than just the accounting numbers.” In some 
charities, employees’ compensation is directly linked with reported KPIs and these are 
shown in the annual report. One participant said that over and above their base salary 
a bonus is added if the organisation achieves certain business goals and that the 
income of an employee would simply drop if they do not achieve those target KPIs. A 
senior chartered accountant said, “there is more challenge to keep us honest in how I 
report the KPIs.” It appears that the incentive to misreport is not only strong because 
management compensation is linked to such targets, but also because of how easy it 
is to report them in a way that serves vested interests. As one participant put it, “there’s 
more challenge to keep us honest in how we report the KPI’s and things like lives 
you’ve improved tends to get a bit subjective and you can get carried away and go too 
far down” (FR5). A senior auditor also confirmed the importance of KPIs, by saying 
that they are mindful of specific audit risks associated with such performance related 
packages which sometimes are linked to “financial targets or financial KPIs” (AUD1). 
Therefore, showing good KPIs is in every staff member’s interest. In order to maintain 
their independence, finance teams are not supposed to be incentivised in the same 
way as others but the rest of the teams are incentivised through performance based 
                                               
34 Kids Company underwent the inquiry by charities commission was opened after increasing number of allegations 
in the public domain about its governance and financial management. Amongst many others this was a typical 
example of agency problems where £800,000 were being paid for monthly wage bills out of government’s £3m 
grant, even when the company was facing huge challenges to its sustainability. Kids company went into insolvency 
and was found up under court order in August 2015. 
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awards. In light if the available evidence, it appears that resource dependency 
pressures are a likely cause of financial misreporting.  
As the focus of this study is manipulation of financial statements and particularly of the 
SoFA and Balance Sheet, the following analysis deals exclusively with the motivations 
to manipulate accounting data.  
 
2.5.1 Preservation of future Income 
In many respects, the ultimate motivation for a charity is to secure its future funding to 
remain in business. For a fundraising charity that generates income through donations, 
legacies or grants, the income also depends on shrewd techniques with a degree of a 
sentimental appeal; as one interviewee commented “funders are not logical are they? 
Fundraising is about emotions.” (FR2). 
For a fundraising charity, “if you’re competing for funding with a similar 
organisation” (FR2) then comparisons with a close competitor will be inevitable 
“because of the way financial statements are; you will sort of think is my fund raising 
costs lower than somebody else or higher than somebody else? Have I got higher 
reserves or lower reserves?” (FR2). Endowment charities may be comparatively 
immune to certain cuts by the governments or corporations but they would be affected 
by the performance of their funds in stocks and shares and other investments. 
On the other hand, an earning charity i.e. a charity that competes with other peers for 
contracts of services or sells its merchandise, faces pressures and incentives which 
are different from its fundraising counterpart. It needs to employ techniques which are 
akin to commercial organisations as one interviewee whilst referring to “pure 
mismanagement” (ER1) of an earning charity said “(the charity) just didn’t have people 
who had commercial skills to make sure that contract got fulfilled.” (ER1). I therefore 
posit that the incentives are different for earning and fundraising charities.  
There appears to be an amplified motivation for the fundraising charities to show low 
levels of surplus, fundraising costs and reserves to secure future income. The desire 
for a low bottom line figure was echoed by several interviewees including the finance 
director of a professional institute charity in which the main source of funding is in the 
form of membership subscription fees. He commented “so long as I don’t make too 
much profit because otherwise all they’ll want is their fees reducing. What I do with 
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their fees most of them are not that interested.” (ER6). Therefore I theorise that 
amongst other types of charities professional institutes also have an incentive to show 
low surplus and reserves in order to justify subscription fees. 
The goal for any charity is to fulfil its objectives and in doing so it needs to secure 
funds and ensure their perpetuation. There are various subordinate motivations or 
pressures that charities may face to preserve and sustain future 
income. The subordinate motivations lead to the overarching goal of maintaining 
income, and are described in the following sections. 
 
2.5.1.1 Level of charity reserves 
The level of reserves is an important consideration for charities and, surprisingly, the 
extant literature is largely silent in this regard. When asked about the most relevant 
accounting numbers a finance director said, “I would probably say surplus and then 
the reserves” (ER2). Another interviewee remarked “Biggest pressures are reserves 
and charitable activities” (FR3). 
The issue of how much reserves to keep has always been contentious, as high levels 
of reserves attract the unwanted attention by the media and regulator. It is therefore a 
situation where one may argue that a little more conservatism would have been a safer 
option.  
The Charity Commission’s guidance on reserves states “All charities need to develop 
a policy on reserves which establishes a level of reserves that is right for the charity 
and clearly explains to its stakeholders why holding these reserves is necessary.”35 It 
is important to note that strictly speaking “reserves” only include free reserves which 
have no restrictions on them. On the other hand, I have noted that restricted funds 
may erroneously be referred to as “reserves” by even the accountants themselves. 
The use of restricted funds is not discretionary for the management.  Restricted 
income is only used for specific purposes as postulated by the donor. An excess of 
this income over the related expenses ends up in the balance sheet in the form of 
restricted funds. Restricted and unrestricted funds are kept separate in the form of 
                                               
35 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charities-and-reserves-cc19/charities-and-reserves. 
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columns. Likewise, endowment funds and designated funds are also allocated to their 
respective columns.36  
High levels of reserves are not desirable, particularly for a fundraising charity. They 
can lead to charities being “accused of being too conservative and (making) inefficient 
use of capital” (FR1). Talking about their well-known fundraising charity, a senior 
chartered accountant said, “there are times when I deliberately make a loss because 
I’ve got more reserves than I need” (FR2). A finance director of a medical charity said 
that their “plan over the next 5 years is deliberately to have a deficit because I have 
reserves and I want to be able to use them so our trustees would be happy to see a 
deficit as long as it’s in the right place” (FR3). 
In their pursuit of legitimacy, earning charities are faced with a dilemma. It appears 
heightened pressures to reduce reserves can potentially lead to inefficient use of 
resources to augment legitimacy. That is to say there is a risk that the pursuit for 
depleting the reserves may become the focus and not necessarily the consideration 
whether there is a genuine need to reduce the level of reserves. Depleting reserves to 
appease certain stakeholders in the short-term may come at the cost of the long-term 
viability of a charity.   
In their effort to deplete high levels of reserves, fundraising charities are motivated to 
make small surpluses or deficits. They do so while ensuring that a major portion of the 
costs is not shown as fundraising. This is because “trustees would be happy to see a 
deficit as long as it’s in the right place..(if) I spent more on fundraising or on central 
costs, they wouldn’t be happy” (FR3). This statement signifies the pressure from 
trustees when the main focus is not about spending on the most appropriate causes 
but it is to reduce reserves by showing deficits in the correct column i.e. unrestricted 
earnings column; that would eventually feed into the unrestricted reserves. Those 
charities that are funded by trusts and foundations are likely to be keener on keeping 
their reserves at optimum levels. There were instances described by some 
                                               
36 The Statement of Financial Activities (SoFA) and Balance sheet of a charity are presented in the form of columns, 
typically including unrestricted funds (which can include designated funds in addition to unrestricted income) and 
restricted funds that can have endowment funds in addition to restricted income. 
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interviewees where trusts and foundations have not hesitated in providing feedback 
regarding their reason for keeping high reserves. 
From the above discussion I infer two important points. Firstly, the level of reserves is 
an important motivation to manage charity accounts because a charity could 
potentially be willing to make deficits in the foreseeable future rather than have high 
reserves; I find that fundraising charities have stronger incentives to do so 
than earning charities. Secondly, by showing a lower fundraising ratio, charities can 
aim to counterbalance the negative impact of sustained (deliberate) deficits that are 
accepted to deplete reserves and legitimatise the management by showing their 
competence in suitably running the charity.  
One such comments that reinforce the earlier discussion was "I know that I have had 
grant applications rejected on the basis that our reserves were too high or our 
fundraising costs were too high so they definitely are making decisions on the basis of 
those” (FR3). My inference above that high level of reserves could be a deterrent for 
future donations was corroborated by the auditors too. One auditor said “if you’ve built 
up, for whatever reason, a high level of unrestricted reserves…you’ll end up with 
funders looking at your accounts and saying why are they applying to me for 
funding”  (AUD1). 
On the contrary, a lending institution or a bank would be interested in knowing the 
breakdown of various funds to assess the financial health of their client charities. “One 
of the other things I look at particularly in charities obviously is what have they got in 
reserves, what’s restricted, what’s designated, what’s unrestricted” (BNK). Here it is 
also evident as discussed above that several users of financial statements refer to all 
funds as “reserves” including the restricted funds; which is technically an incorrect term 
and points to the complexity of charity accounting in comparison to mainstream 
accounting that most stakeholders are expected to be better accustomed to. Although 
it was not the main focus of this research, I note as a side point that some interviewees 
expressed their disappointment that by not being able to accumulate reserves they 
were less prudent and therefore unable to keep a buffer for a rainy day. Hence, a 
careful balance is needed between being responsibly cautious and yet seen as a 
charity that spends on worthy causes while not excessively accumulating funds.  
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2.5.1.2 Rising overheads 
The Charity Commission reports that charities tend to either overstate governance 
costs or inaccurately equate governance costs with support costs (such as general 
management and administration costs).37 The latter however may not be as 
objectionable as the former. If a charity has high amounts of indirect costs which are 
subject to apportionment, the interviews suggest that there will be incentives to 
misallocate more into charitable activities. 
Donors disapprove of overhead costs and the level of donations has been linked with 
overhead costs.38 Strained income but rising overhead costs mean charities are under 
constant pressure to minimise the reported overhead costs. Those charities that have 
a large number of permanent staff would face a bigger challenge in curtailing costs as 
one interviewee said, “it’s difficult to fire staff and can be expensive with redundancy 
costs and claims and so on.” Therefore charity accountants can potentially be 
motivated to misallocate as in words of another participant “pressure would be to 
allocate as much as possible (to charitable activities)” (FR3). 
An interviewee’s charity that spends “seventy odd percent” on staff costs which in their 
view was nondiscretionary and therefore difficult to cut down commented “Well to be 
honest I’m not being funny it’s all how you decide to allocate” (ER2). 
An interviewee whose charity has high level of overheads, whilst discussing 
apportionment of these costs went as far as saying “I’m not unprepared to manipulate 
the way that I report information in order to put us in the best light with stakeholders 
and others” (ER4). 
Even if I accept that scrupulous accountants meticulously work out true and fair 
estimates for allocating overheads, it could be a tedious exercise. An interviewee 
alluded to this by saying “I’m still doing a massive manual overlay on the accounts, 
going through line by line to say do I believe that that allocation is right?” (ER4).  
Another accountant remarked ““The pressure would be to allocate (support costs) as 
much as possible to charitable activities but again you have to be true and fair so it 
wouldn’t be true and fair if all of them relate to charitable" (FR3).  
                                               
37 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-report-suggests-charities-often-overstate-governance-costs 
38 http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/donors-are-turned-off-by-overhead-costs-here-s-what-charities-can-do 
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It is noteworthy that the new Charities SORP (FRS 102) which has been adopted by 
all charities for financial reports on or after 1st January 2015 includes governance costs 
within charitable activities and therefore its misclassification will directly impact the 
programme ratio. Most charities may not mind having governance costs attributable 
exclusively to the “favourable” expenses now.  Those charities that resort to 
misclassifying support costs as governance costs will have an enhanced programme 
ratio.  
A foundation charity also seems to be concerned with its level of indirect costs and not 
immune to the temptation to misclassify. “From Foundation’s point of view it is the 
management fee which is like fundraising costs… their target is 90% programme ratio” 
(FR5). 
Funding cuts by the government39 have added pressure on charities to render services 
for the causes that they exist for. The increase in yearly income is being outstripped 
by a surge in respective relevant costs, and in some cases even by the rate of inflation. 
One interviewee remarked “Ok so for us the biggest challenge is that support is 
actually commissioned by a local authority... they are under a huge pressure to 
cut…they will offer five year contract.. now it is often starting to happen that the 
commissioners will set a ceiling price...no more than say £225,000 a year...everybody 
else is bidding at that and you know you have to come up with the winning price… we 
are about to hit the London living wage and the London living wage increases on an 
annual basis so our costs are going up on an annual basis but our income is fixed” 
(FR4). This comment suggests that the charities bidding for local government 
contracts are under constant pressure to keep the quotes down despite increasing 
costs. I would expect such charity would aim to diversify its sources of income to 
remain financially sustainable. This includes income from other sources including 
donations from the public.  
Severe funding cuts and their impact on charities was a recurring theme in the 
interviews. One finance director called such cuts from the local authorities “totally 
unsustainable” and “madness” (ER1). One finance director explained that now the 
                                               
39 https://www.theguardian.com/voluntary-sector-network/2016/feb/11/grants-local-charities-campaign-appeal-
government-cuts 
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commissioners are setting price ceilings on five year contracts and they are not 
increasing the value of such contracts above inflation. 
The finance director of a charity that runs independent schools remarked that “making 
ends meet in the market where staff salaries go quicker than inflation, so people don’t 
want to see their fees go up at 3% but on the other hand teachers expect their wages 
to go up” (ER5). Hence even an established independent school which would 
apparently have predictable income from fees also seems to be challenged by a 
steeper rise in overheads compared to its income. Hence resource dependency 
pressures appear a common theme in an otherwise vastly varied sector.  
I infer that, for earning charities, costs that rise more steeply than income, are a cause 
for further strain on charities and therefore the pressure to increase income is 
pronounced in the current climate of austerity. Another comment from the finance 
director of a housing charity that predominantly earns through local government 
housing contracts that accounting numbers that may affect funding and therefore 
motivate management to manipulate them. The comment reads as follows: “… (Local 
council) would really just want to make sure that your reserves were relatively strong 
and you were probably making a surplus or at least breaking even in theory, to be 
honest.” (ER2). 
 
2.5.1.3 Shifting trends from voluntary to earned income 
As far as the income of the entire sector is concerned, in the past decade there has 
been a significant shift from grants to contracts mostly with local authorities and also 
with the central government.40 It appears that the need for financial viability, which 
implies reasonable levels of reserves and surplus, would affect larger charities more, 
and particularly those charities that bid for sizeable contracts where ”the pre-qualifying 
questionnaire says you’ve got to be financially viable”  (FR2). Another interviewee got 
the feedback from a local authority for not being “financially viable” stating that “this 
company is not financially viable to take on a contract of this size” (FR2). As discussed 
                                               
40 For instance public-sector grants (voluntary income) added up to £6.11 bn in 2003-04 which had plunged to just 
£2.8bn by 2013-14. The picture of the change in government contracts (earned income and fees) is quite the 
opposite where it increased from £5.77 bn in 2003-04 to £12.17 bn in 2013-14 
https://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac16/income-4/ 
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above, fundraising charities would stick to low reserves and low surplus. I posit that a 
notable shift from voluntary to earned income is expected to take the focus away from 
low reserves and low surplus to “financially viable” targets.  
Another interviewee’s comment helps in understanding what a “financially 
viable” position may mean. An interviewee stated, “whoever looked at the accounts at 
the local authority said this company is not financially viable to take on a contract of 
this size” (FR2). A local authority in a contractual relationship would treat a charity like 
a commercial organisation which must appear “financially viable” as an assurance that 
the contractual obligations would be honoured. Another interviewee commented, 
“contracts (commissioning entity) would really just want to make sure that your 
reserves were relatively strong and you were probably making a surplus or at least 
breaking even in theory” (ER2). This comment was echoed even in more definitive 
terms by another accountant “I run complex contract arrangements and performance 
arrangements and that leads us to try and have an even stronger focus on our 
unrestricted net income and our reserves as well”  (FR1). Contracts are acquired 
through the tendering process and then they are expected to be fulfilled in a similar 
fashion as in the case of the services provided by commercial organisations.   
Likewise, interviewees referred to some accounting ratios of relevance such as quick 
ratio, gearing ratio, fundraising/programme ratio and interest cover ratio. A strong 
desire for a small surplus was noted across the board. Whilst discussing the most 
desirable performance according to SoFA, one auditor said that it would be “stable 
bottom-line net incoming (resources) with a small positive” (AUD2), hence confirming 
what the charity accountants said.  
Financial viability, therefore, may refer to strong reserves, liquidity, profitability and 
solvency ratios, or a surplus under the unrestricted column. It is an increasingly 
important factor in assessing whether a charity has the capacity to fulfil contracts. I 
infer that this makes the incentives to manipulate accounting numbers similar to the 
commercial sector organisations where a charity is faced with incentives to turn its 
unrestricted deficit into a small surplus or regulate its bottom line figure in order to 
strengthen the unrestricted reserves.  
On the other side of the spectrum, those charities that rely heavily on grants and 
cannot compete in winning tenders for contracts will have an added pressure of 
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showing acceptable amounts in their accounts too. I postulate that this shift from 
grants to contracts can further tighten the available funding to fundraising charities. 
The head of finance at a museum referred to the public sector funding cuts and its 
potential implications: “… even the funding organisations have their own funds being 
cut by the government; they will have to compete harder to convince government and 
if accountants believe that reserves have a bearing on future grants then they would 
inevitably reduce their reserves which are high” (FR4).  Practical response of this 
could be manifested by some charities trimming their reserves by taking either very 
low surpluses or even deficits in subsequent years until a desired level of reserves 
was reached. “In our case definitely...I should always be looking to spend our 
income...If I overspend, that’s equally bad” (FR5). 
Although it was not the focus of this research, some interviewees expressed their 
dismay that the consequence of a significant shift from voluntary to earned income 
through tendered contracts was responsible for pricing out smaller charities.  
 
2.5.1.4 Peer benchmarking 
In order to understand whether data in the financial statements of the nearest 
competitor could be a potential motivator, I found evidence that it was the case to a 
degree for some charities. A senior chartered accountant, who has worked at eleven 
charities in his/her long career in the sector, indicated that the charities do compare 
their financials with similar organisations that compete for funding. Therefore the 
content of financial statements and the way they are presented are relevant amongst 
the peer groups. There is an assumption on the part of the charity accountants that 
the competitors’ numbers are relevant as one participant said “you will sort of think, 
(are) my fundraising costs lower than somebody else or higher than somebody else; 
have I got higher reserves or lower reserves? I guess the other people are probably 
looking at our competitors you know to sort of kind of judge really” (FR2). 
I also found evidence that funders compare peers’ financial statements. One finance 
director at a charity that gets its funding from a foundation trust revealed a funders’ 
cynicism regarding the reported numbers “you are spending X on this while they are 
only spending Y. Why is it costing you X?” (ER2). 
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The data suggests that some charities would be motivated to peer benchmark more 
than others; for instance, nationally acclaimed “big players” would be interested to 
know what “the others have got in their accounts” in a similar vein as in corporations; 
as one interviewee explained such comparison in their current as well as “previous 
charity” (FR3). 
Likewise, such comparisons have a “psychological” effect for some accountants and 
exhibit a sense of competitiveness as one participant commented that they  “smile 
brightly when they (competitors) have got a deficit” (ER2). 
Some Interviewees expressed their frustration regarding inefficiencies in the sector 
where there are too many charities within each sub-group. I conclude that most 
organisations in the sector are likely to face some form of competition and the peer 
group for each charity would be determined by its sub-group, its scope of services, 
geographical location and the source or type of funding. 
 
2.5.1.5 Debt Covenants 
Interviews with charity accountants, auditors and a banker made it clear that the 
enforcement of debt covenants on charities may not be as common as in their for-
profit counterparts. For those charities that do have debts with covenants attached to 
them, these are scrutinised by the lender for “surplus for the year” or as a certain 
“multiple” of the loan interest so there “may well be an incentive to manage certain 
financial information”(AUD1). I found evidence that debt covenants of those charities 
that have sizeable endowment funds are likely to be linked with the level of their 
endowment funds. Head of finance at a charity running independent schools said, “I 
very often got a covenant….on the size of the fund’s endowment which goes up and 
down ….(to use) for working capital for our schools and if I do so….the bank will be 
interested” (ER5). This particular interviewee was understandably reluctant to divulge 
further “commercially confidential” information in this regard. 
Banks look at sustainable income for debt serviceability. According to the interviewed 
banker, an inconsistent stream of small donations and therefore the unpredictable 
income of particularly religious charities is viewed as a less safe investment from a 
bank’s perspective. The interviewee compared that with independent schools which 
are a much safer investment for a bank. I infer that this can potentially be an incentive 
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for a fundraising charity that depends on several small donations. A motivated charity 
may massage its accounts to appear more palatable to demonstrate sustainability to 
the lender. The banker revealed that a bank may consider scrutinising either financial 
performance in SoFA or examine cash flows that are calculated by the bank itself. The 
bank “would expect debt to be serviced by X times on cash flow basis or EBITAD 
(surplus) basis” (BNK). The banker did, however, suggest that for risky “fundraising 
type” charities, debt covenants “will lean towards cash basis” whereas for less risky 
and sustainable income-generating charities, the bank is more likely to consider the 
surplus as the covenant. 
 
2.5.1.6 Employees’ compensation and job security 
Although the earnings of top management are significantly less compared to the top 
public limited companies, they are still significantly larger compared to the mean or 
median of the overall working population.  
This study suggests that performance-related pay may be limited to fundraisers or 
commercial directors employed by charities, and the management compensation in 
relation to accounting numbers may be less common in the UK charities sector than 
in commercial organisations. The charity sector has traditionally been vigorously 
scrutinised by the media. On balance, such pressures may be beneficial because they 
act as a deterrent and may compel charities to respond by improving various 
processes.  
There has been an increase in the mean income of CEOs in the top 100 charities.41 It 
is conceivable that the top management of a charity would want to hold on to his/her 
role and if the financial statements have an impact on their salary or job security then 
they may be motivated to present a favourable picture. One auditor gave anecdotal 
evidence of a client charity where a new chief executive had recently joined. He 
                                               
41 It was £255,000, in 2017 according to a study which compares with £212,500 in 2015. Household names do not 
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was “very sensitive to the fact that the charity had been very good at keeping to its 
target of breaking even on restricted reserves for a good number of years under the 
previous Chief Executive” (AUD1). In this instance the auditor did, however, factor that 
into their audit risk assessment of the client. 
I found evidence that other than trustees, fundraising staff are particularly interested 
in how the expenses are classified between charitable activities and fundraising costs. 
Data suggests that funders examine these numbers minutely in order to make funding 
decisions as their annual bonuses may be linked with the funds; therefore there is an 
indirect link of accounting numbers to their future bonuses. A charity is expected to 
gain through more funds in future if the funder is satisfied with its accounting data and 
therefore will fund the charity. As far as fundraising staff are concerned, securing 
funding is their primary task. Fundraising costs ratios impact their job security and in 
many cases, their annual bonuses are linked with achieving these funds too. 
Fundraising teams also aspire for low reserves; according to one interviewee, their 
colleagues in the fundraising department “are starting to get a bit nervous about the 
level of reserves and what our accounts are showing and how they can use that to 
explain to potential funders" (ER4). 
Another interview referred to some of the director level employees stating, “some of 
the finance directors that I know making things look good so that they get their bonus 
at the end of the year for sure” (ER1). 
There are certain monetary incentives in the form of bonuses and even job security 
for some colleagues that can potentially convince a charity accountant to manipulate 
particular numbers in the SoFA as well as Balance Sheet. I found evidence that some 
fundraisers persuade accountants to manage numbers to help them achieve their 
personal targets. One interviewee revealed that a fundraiser said to them “make things 
look good so that they can get their bonuses at the end of the year”  (ER1). Due to 
public funding cuts, the pressure to raise funds by the charities is mounting and 
although it is not a financial reporting issue, such pressures could potentially affect the 
accountants’ integrity too. One interviewee commented, “..and most charities I know 
have gone through a phase where you’ve had to put people on notice of redundancy 
because you don’t know where the funding’s coming in or you’ve had to reduce hours 
or whatever because of the funding, but that’s not to do with financial reporting” (ER2). 
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This study has also brought to light going concern issues faced by various charities in 
the wake of shrinking resources and intensifying competition. The main concern for 
several fundraising and earning charities is to sustain cash flow into the foreseeable 
future. In times of financially distressing motivations to raise funds to get stronger, any 
pressure from either fundraising teams or commercial directors to manipulate numbers 
directly or indirectly impacts everyone’s job security; therefore it could potentially be a 
strong motivator to manipulate financial statements. A participant’s colleagues in the 
fundraising department started to get a “bit nervous about the level of reserves” and 
what their accounts were “showing” and were wondering how they were able 
to “explain high reserves to potential funders” (ER4). Pointing to the emotive area of 
fundraising costs an interviewee stated that it was expensive to fundraise but the way 
numbers were reported opened one up to risk because “nobody would want to see 
high fundraising costs” (FR4). This statement also demonstrates a conundrum faced 
by charities; where on the one hand they need to spend on raising funds to remain 
competitive in a difficult market; but on the other hand, they may be compelled to 
camouflage even justifiable costs to appease the funders.  
External professionals, the auditors, in the study confirmed that performance for pay 
incentives is not as common in charities as in commercial organisations. One auditor 
remarked “maybe you’ve got fundraising targets at this level or more... and if you meet 
it you’re in line for a bonus, but that being said, performance-related pay and bonuses 
don’t feature as much in the charity sector as they would do in a more commercial 
sector. And so I see limited examples of that” (AUD1). 
Referring to the pressure from a commercial director who also happened to be a 
qualified accountant, an interviewee stated that they were approached and 
asked, “could I not just do it like this cause it looks like I hit at our forecast?” (ER1). 
This comment points to two matters; firstly, that the employees within a charity are 
interested in accounting numbers; and secondly, the benefactor would consider these 
numbers as an important factor in deciding whether to support a charity. Even if it is 
assumed that there are no direct monetary gains from manipulating numbers, or that 
the job security of only the fundraisers is affected by the amounts of funds raised, the 
ultimate goal for all employees is to see consistent growth in funds as it would ensure 
job security not just for the fundraisers but for all, including those tasked with financial 
reporting. The head of finance of a large fundraising medical research charity indicated 
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such motivation by saying “I would say for me personally my motivation would be 
because I want to support my fundraising colleagues to make as much money as they 
can for the charity and would want to make sure that, yes, the Trustees were 
comfortable (too)” (FR3). According to this interviewee if fundraising colleagues fail to 
achieve fundraising targets then they may have to be answerable to management.  
In light of the empirical evidence, I deduce that there are more incentives for 
fundraisers and commercial directors than for other personnel. Performance-related-
pay exists in the sector albeit less prevalent but significant funding cuts and shifting to 
earned income as in the commercial sector has put some jobs at risk; therefore, those 
charities that see funding as a function of accounting numbers or funding being an 
assurance for job security and even bonuses for some colleagues have the motivation 
to window-dress numbers to fit the need.  
The pressure or persuasion from fundraisers and commercial directors is likely to be 
an antecedent to manipulation of financial statement data; these groups may not 
always benefit instantly from such manipulation but there is strong evidence that the 
frontline personnel and their colleagues responsible for financial reporting see a causal 
effect which can be a potential motivator for accounting manipulation. 
 
2.5.1.7 Professional reputation and career mobility 
In order to judge a charity’s success, the head of finance at a housing charity alluded 
to three perceptions or expectations by the “external world” for a charity to be 
“financially secure”, act “within objectives” and spend money where it “should be 
spent” (ER2). Poor performance can have an adverse impact on reputation and career 
mobility of the non-profit sector managers including accountants. The sector which is 
supposed to enjoy its reputation as a flagbearer for noble causes and generosity is 
expected to attract individuals who are motivated by various factors other than purely 
financial ones, such as preserving and improving their personal reputation.  
Talking about the fear of reputational damage of professionals by being associated 
with a failing charity, an interviewee recalled a conversation with a treasurer who had 
trained at a top 4 audit firm stating that their manager advised them to leave the charity 
because they “could not afford to be seen …part of an organisation that entered 
administration” (ER2). 
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A similar sentiment was echoed by an auditor who felt that at times an accountant who 
has not flagged certain deficiencies in the accounts in good time feels personally 
responsible for a less palatable final state of the accounts. This could act as a 
motivation to manipulate “you don’t wanna look wrong do you that’s your job you 
should be all over the numbers...I mean is throughout the year if something was going 
wrong he should have flagged back to the audit committee but people don’t because 
they think it’s going to be ok .. you still feel like you failed so then you think people 
would judge you that you have not done any good job that it will” (AUD2). 
Some trustees may even encourage manipulation of accounting numbers as “they 
don’t want to be seen to be failing”. Trustees of relatively smaller charities “could be 
local businessmen” who would not want to be associated with a charity that is “seen 
as doing badly” (FR2). 
 
2.5.1.8 Less sophisticated and incognizant users of financial statements 
One recurring theme that emerged was the complexity that surrounds the charity 
sector accounting. Suppliers of services and even trustees and bankers are not fully 
familiarised with idiosyncrasies of this type of accounting. Evidence in the data 
suggests that charity financial statements are too complicated to comprehend by 
trustees and external suppliers of services alike. A surplus or deficit in charities is not 
as simplistic as an earnings figure in a corporation. Some interviews suggested that a 
deficit may be an act by choice to regulate the reserves levels. Likewise, a number of 
interviewees alluded to the fact that the unrestricted column in SoFA may have a 
surplus whereas restricted column may be showing a slight deficit and still the charity 
does reasonably well, as it is unrestricted income that eventually form the reserves. 
Most stakeholders other than charity accountants may find these intricacies difficult to 
understand.  
One interviewee expressed their frustration that creditors and suppliers of various 
services may struggle to assess true financial stability or creditworthiness of a charity 
by simply employing the same yardstick as they would do in analysing viability within 
the commercial sector. In order to satisfy funding criteria or to appease trustees, a 
charity accountant may be content with showing a small surplus or at times even a 
slight deficit to regulate the levels of its reserves. Similarly in the years of higher 
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outgoings than incoming resources, there may be a temporary deficit which is normal 
for various charities because such a situation is reversed in a year when large income 
is received. This comment by an interviewee explains this problem “Accounts that they 
may not look smooth due to large income in one year and expenses in another). At 
(Charity name) every other year I have a really big annual fundraising thing with 
(renowned celebrity) and I don’t know, that brings in £1 million. The year that you do 
it you’re £1 million up, and the year that you don’t you’re £1 million down, I think it 
takes 2 years to organise” (ER2). This becomes problematic because various 
unsophisticated users would not understand this distinctive issue faced by charities. 
Suppliers of goods and services may be tentative to deal with an organisation with a 
negative bottom-line figure as they are likely to read financial statements in the same 
light as they would do for for-profit corporations. That is to say, most suppliers of 
services are likely to have a disproportionately larger number of commercial sector 
debtors; hence there is a possibility that they may not have the required expertise to 
analyse the peculiar accounts of a charity. Another interviewee said, “The people that 
use (accounts), who may look at other companies’ accounts, even our bank manager 
I have to explain to our bank manager sometimes” (ER2). It may even be challenging 
to decipher the wisdom and motives for certain levels of surplus or deficit, let alone 
getting to grips with restricted and unrestricted columns.  Suppliers “would not want to 
see a deficit” (FR3). Similarly, the complexity of accounts can genuinely mystify and 
intimidate otherwise intelligent people too.  
The data also suggests that a large number of trustees are also unable to fully 
comprehend the peculiarities of charity accounting. A respondent said "…these charity 
accounts are for use with people who sell us phones or with internet provider or with 
our funders and with our trustees and our staff and they don’t get it, and our trustees 
are quite intelligent people, they’re high-powered in terms of people, and they don’t 
get it. The only people who get it are people who are charity accountants and that’s 
stupid” (FR2). I posit that these factors also incentivise charity accountants to present 
financial statements in a way that draws minimal questioning and time wastage in 
explaining to various users of financial statements. The auditors in the sample 
mentioned financial instruments and holiday pay accruals as some of the examples 
where things have become rather complex even for the qualified charity accountants.  
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2.5.1.9 Income and expense period mismatch  
The SORP has undergone significant development over the course of the last three 
decades.42 Even recently, there has been considerable development in line with 
financial reporting standards. In line with overall International Financial Reporting 
Standards, there have been some considerable changes in SORP (in line with FRS 
102) such as revenue recognition, holiday pay accruals and other charity accounting 
specific areas. On the one hand, these changes are useful in improving consistency 
in reporting amongst various charities and “got greater disclosure and there is some 
more information on support costs and governance costs” (ER2), but on the other 
hand various charity accountants believe that these changes have adversely affected 
their accounts and certain numbers do not represent the true position of their 
underlying economics. Some interviewees questioned whether the accruals concept 
was being breached in any way “FRS 102 has completely thrown all of this lot out the 
water....because you have to recognise income much earlier than you would ever have 
done and the matching concept as far as I can work out has gone” (ER3). Another 
interviewee from a large international charity said: “the world of the new SORP and 
FRS, it has been a challenge to understand changes.” For instance, income 
recognition criteria are based on “probability” and not “certainty” now. (FR1). 
Participants believed that charities’ income is now likely to be recognised less 
prudently than before e.g. “We are quite conservative but actually the SORP is actually 
leading to an encouragement to maybe an earlier recognition.”  Another comment 
confirms the mismatch between income and expenses as “the way you recognise 
income and expenditure can often mean that they don’t match” (FR3).  I believe that 
as a consequence, there is motivation to either over-accrue future expenses in the 
interest of income smoothing or bring forward certain expenses that were needed in 
the future. This is because most organisations including charities would like to disclose 
smooth income. One interviewee commented “you’ll look like you’ve got a big surplus 
one year and then it will look like you’ve got lots of deficits following on from 
that” (ER3), and further expressed concern by saying “there’s a perception for the 
external people that deficits are bad and surpluses are good” (ER3). 
                                               
42 There have been periodic developments to improve Charity SORP since 1988 when this first was introduced. 
Subsequent refined versions were introduced in 1995, 2000, 2005 and now Charity SORP in line with FRS102 
which has been in effect from 1st January 2015. 
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The matching principle is at the heart of the accruals concept in accounting where 
income and expenses are recognised within the period to which they belong and not 
necessarily when the cash is paid or received, for the incurred expenses and earned 
income respectively. One interviewee remarked “I think I’ve had to recognise £5 million 
in this year that I really wouldn’t have from an accounting perspective because it’s 
something that’s going to happen over 4 years but for me, it looks wrong” 
(ER3). Another interviewee commented that what you accrue for "is an art, not a 
science” (ER2). There are several examples of interviewees’ disquiet over the period 
mismatch between income and its related expenses. If in one year their income 
became large due to early recognition and corresponding expenses were relatively 
minor this could theoretically motivate charities to manipulate SoFA by smoothing the 
bottom line figure. Interviews suggested that there exists motivation to either delay 
income or front-load expenses. I posit that in periods where large sums are expected 
through legacy or other forms of income such motivations would be pronounced. So it 
is a paradox that although the recent development in accounting standards and SORP 
is to discourage excessive and selective prudence, it has a tendency to undermine the 
accruals concept and therefore it can potentially incentivise accountants to manipulate 
using other means to smooth their income. Some interviewees suggested that the 
solution for such complexities is to have SORPs that are relevant to individual charity 
sub-groups whilst some agreed that it may not be a feasible undertaking by the 
Regulator. A charity under new rules is required to recognise income earlier in a year 
and then there is a likelihood that its corresponding expenses may straddle between 
periods. I postulate that the changes in the SORP, on the one hand, improve reporting 
quality by presenting the true state of the movement in charity funds but on the other 
hand, they pose problems for those charities in which the timing of income stream 
could be inconsistent. Such charities are more likely to be incentivised to smooth their 
earnings.  
Legacy income has been affected specifically by the changes in income recognition 
guidance. As the amounts are usually large for legacy income, in the following year 
the charity’s income could show a steep decline, particularly if a comparably large 
income is absent. While the criteria of income recognition are in the right direction for 
ensuring consistency between charities, those charities whose SoFA will show volatile 
performance over the years may have the motivation to smooth their income.  




2.5.2 Misreporting facilitators 
In addition to motives extant nonprofit research highlights opportunities to misreport 
financial information to mislead stakeholders or influence contractual outcomes 
(Hofmann and McSwain, 2013). This unplanned theme of opportunities emerged in 
the interviews that there are various factors which present as opportunities to facilitate 
the fulfilment of the motives. The interviews pointed to some enablers that I call 
“facilitators.” These not direct motivators for misreporting, however, their presence can 
potentially increase the probability of turning motivation into action. Managers are 
more likely to manipulate accounting numbers if either the users cannot detect such 
manipulation or the cost to manipulate is lower than the benefit associated with it 
(Matsumoto, 2002). In addition to the motivations to manipulate accounting numbers 
identified in the analysis, some other factors were also highlighted in the interviews 
which I view as facilitators and they interact in the manipulation of financial reporting. 
These interacting terms can present the opportunities to make the objective of 
massaging the financial statements relatively easier. It is important to note that the 
presence of particular motivations is important for these elements to act as enablers.  
 
2.5.2.1 Low audit quality  
The extant research on manipulation in nonprofit organisations highlights the 
existence of opportunities to misreport financial information in order to mislead 
stakeholders or influence contractual outcomes (Hofmann and McSwain, 2013). This 
section presents a discussion of opportunities that emerged during the interviews that 
appear to facilitate the fulfilment of the motives. The interviews pointed to some 
enablers that I call “facilitators.” These not direct motivators for misreporting; however, 
their presence can potentially increase the probability of turning motivation into action. 
In addition to the motivations to manipulate accounting numbers identified in the 
analysis, some other factors were also highlighted in the interviews which I view as 
facilitators and they interact with the manipulation of financial reporting. These 
interacting terms can present the opportunities to make the objective of manipulating 
the financial statements relatively easier. It is important to note that the presence of 
particular motivations is important for these elements to act as enablers.  
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Incentives for financial statements manipulation are reinforced if the chance of their 
detection is low (Wayne et al., 1996). The need for monitoring may be more relevant 
for nonprofits than for for-profit firms because donors do not directly monitor the use 
of their funds and receive no direct benefit from their contributions (Tate 2007; 
Vermeer, 2008). In a concerning report about the audit quality in the sector, the Charity 
Commission has found in its review that almost half of UK charity sector independent 
statutory audits do not meet the required standard.43 
My research points to the possibility that a number of auditors may not be in a position 
to spend enough time in ensuring high-quality audits partially because the audit fees 
are lower in the sector compared to the commercial world. The top 5,000 charities 
marked a 2.5% increase in audit fees in 2015 which is the lowest increase over the 
previous four years according to a report by Charity Financials. Of the 934 auditing 
firms, 55% have only one charity client. Two-thirds of the charities’ audit fees were 
either reduced or remained at the same level. An increase in audit fees was more 
prevalent in the larger charities.44 The UK’s largest charities spent over £72m on audit 
fees in 2018 and 43 per cent of charities have not changed their auditor in the last 
decade (Charity Financials report).45 
Although it is not the scope of this research it is worth noting that auditors with relatively 
smaller charity clients are faced with increased competition as the statutory audit 
threshold has been raised from £500,000 to £1m since 31st March 2015, 46 which has 
spared over 4,000 charities from undertaking a statutory audit.  
The limited amount of time and resources can make the detection of material 
misstatements challenging. In this regard, one interviewee stated, “I don’t know if it’s 
even possible to audit in the timescales…what I ask auditors to do is nearly an 
impossible task.” Another interviewee said “sometimes when they catch up they are 
here for 2 weeks and then at the end of 6 days they write we are done, we are off, you 
think: really? You are done?” (ER1). 







46 The Charity Commission, 2019 audit quality review - https://www.gov.uk/government/news/changes-to-audit-
thresholds-to-help-charities-come-into-force 
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Auditors may also be reluctant to ask difficult questions to their clients in order to save 
time and possibly even to avoid the embarrassment of not understanding the 
operations and controls in the short time that they can afford to allocate on the field. 
One interviewee even questioned the competence of auditors vis-a-vis complex 
transactions “...around the more complex areas so stock being one of them and 
deferred income I think it is dead easy something that auditors don’t understand it and 
on mergers and acquisitions auditors’ understanding of even the journal entries is 
totally appalling” (ER1). 
One sub-theme that emerged through experiences of several interviewees was the 
rarity of the audit adjustments demanded by the statutory auditors. The head of finance 
for an international charity said: “I was surprised that there were so few adjustments 
identified by our auditors” (FR1). Another comment succinctly expressed “across the 
board the quality of audits is not high and actually I don’t know if it’s even possible to 
audit in the timescales”(ER1).  One interviewee who was an accountant at a charity in 
London before joining another charity in a relatively smaller city revealed that the audit 
quality even from a regional office of a top 4 audit firm “appalled” them compared to 
what they experienced in London. I conclude that inferior audit quality is an opportunity 
which can encourage those individuals and charities that are more prone to 
manipulating. I could, therefore, have also included this as a main motivation but it is 
included in catalytic factors because only those accountants who are already 
motivated to manipulate will find the courage to exploit low audit quality. 
I took the perspective of auditors on this too; in contrast to some charity accountants’ 
perception that auditors do not spend enough time on the audits, auditors articulated 
that they were aware of some of the inherent risks associated with auditing charities 
as well as predispositions due to firm-specific risks and their audit approach is 
designed accordingly.   
Given the complexity of charity accounting, a vigorous approach may not be as 
economically viable as in the case of profit-making organisations. I note that auditors 
are aware of the challenges faced in auditing the sector. Referring to smaller charities, 
one auditor agreed that “they might not have the time or enough people or experience 
and expertise to prepare and maintain financial records and keep them up to date, the 
level of quality that really is needed.” AUD1. There are other challenges in auditing 
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larger charities where it is “difficult to make sense sometimes or to gain a more detailed 
understanding of the financial information they give you to audit” (AUD1). This does 
however somewhat endorse what a charity accountant called “embarrassment” on 
auditor’s part to ask questions. Extant literature supports that proxies of audit quality 
such as audit size and audit committee have a positive impact on the expense 
classification accuracy (e.g. Harris et al., 2015). Charities are reported to have almost 
double the number of financial reporting errors that their similar-sized corporate 
counterparts have, while the Big 4 and second-tier auditors reduce the rate of 
misreporting (Burks et al., 2015). The lower audit quality is expected to be because of 
reduced litigation risk to nonprofit organisations’ auditors (Beattie et al. 2001; Vermeer 
2008; Lopez and Peters 2010) in the absence of personal loss of contributors47. 
2.5.2.2 Trustees’ ineptitude 
This study finds evidence that the trustees’ role in accounting numbers varies 
depending on their qualifications, experience, and size of the charities that they are 
associated with. Those trustees who are not versed with recommended practices or 
relevant reporting standards to treat certain accounting transactions may have 
unreasonable expectations from the accountants to show certain numbers in a 
particular way, giving less thought to the binding accounting treatment. There are 
cases where they even compel accountants to aim for certain numbers. A lack of 
independence can adversely affect the likelihood of manipulation. On the contrary, 
their role demands them to assertively question and challenge the accounting 
numbers in order for them to give a true and fair view. 
There is an impression about some trustees amongst accountants that they do 
not “understand financial management” and they are “embarrassed that they don’t 
know or understand things.” Another interviewee commented that they “do not really 
understand the nitty-gritty of the accounting needs.” (ER1). 
When asked whether, in periods of financial distress, there is a possibility of 
manipulation, one interviewee responded: “depends on the trustees and how 
competent they are; because I’ve been with trustees who just really care about what 
they (financial statements) look like.” Regarding the trustees of financially distressed 
charities one interviewee said “(they) may be more manipulative I’ve found” (FR2). 
                                               
47https://www.ft.com/content/44e78d4e-c998-11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0 
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On the contrary, trustees are cognizant of certain “acceptable” norms and conventions. 
In certain cases, trustees are expected to influence accountants in pursuit of 
conforming to such financial statements’ 'norms'; for instance they “always check what 
the ratio is for the fundraising costs to fundraising expenditure” (FR2). Another head 
of finance at a nationally renowned fundraising charity said: “our Trustees here have 
chosen 35% (for fundraising costs) but that is completely finger in the air” (FR3). 
 When asked what may motivate an accountant to manipulate accounting numbers 
one finance director unambiguously said “to pull the wool over donor's eyes, (and) to 
satisfy trustees” There is also a feeling that some trustees are not even interested in 
financial statements as they “care about the front bit” of the annual report; referring to 
just the narrative reports (ER1). 
This finding is in line with the extant literature, for example that asset misappropriation, 
a form of manipulation, is negatively associated with the independence of key 
individuals (Harris, 2017). Jonathan Orchard, partner at Sayer Vincent, Charity 
Accountants has openly suggested that charities might be more susceptible to internal 
fraud than private-sector firms because of being less likely to have a financially literate 
chief executive, who may not be asking their finance directors the right questions.48 
The data also suggests that the frequency of the trustees’ meetings and discussion on 
financial statements varied significantly but I was not able to find unique patterns in 
relation to income types or sub-groups. 
 
2.5.2.3 Unsophisticated funders 
The extant literature in the for-profit landscape investigates vertical classification 
shifting (e.g. McVay, 2006). I am intrigued to understand whether charities are 
motivated to “manage” restricted and unrestricted income and expenses by exercising 
horizontal classification shifting. The literature has been silent on whether charities are 
motivated to shift between the columns (such as restricted, unrestricted and 
designated).  
A senior audit manager when asked about this potential misclassification responded 
by saying “Yes there could be incentives definitely. It could be difficult to I think to get 
away with it just because a funder for restricted purposes can often ask a charity to 
                                               
48 https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/fraud-costs-charities-over-2-5bn-a-year.html#sthash.tF8MmmkH.dpuf 
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report back to them how they’ve spent the funds.” AUD1. This response can be 
interpreted in various ways. A charity is motivated to misclassify between columns and 
it is only deterred for the fear of being caught. It may not, therefore, be a farfetched 
assumption that unsophisticated and individual donors may be less likely to dissect 
through the numbers in comparison to large donors such as trusts and foundations. 
Furthermore, there is evidence of vertical misclassification between expenses in the 
same column. Those charities that have a large number of permanent staff would face 
a bigger pressure to curtail costs. “It’s difficult to fire staff and can be expensive with 
redundancy costs and claims and so on…the pressure would be to allocate as much 
as possible (to charitable activities)” (FR5). Therefore, the pressures seem to lead to 
misclassification of fundraising costs as expenses spent on charitable activities. 
With less sophisticated donors, it is not expected that they would scrutinise the 
financial statements; instead, it is the media that charities try to avoid by adhering to 
certain “acceptable” benchmarks as one interviewee said “every now and again there 
will be a series of stories that hit the news, the headlines, where people are talking 
about how expensive charities are and that ratio, for every pound raised, how much of 
it did you spend on fundraising or how you choose to interpret it” (FR3). 
For a fundraising charity that collects small donations from a large number of donors, 
as long as adverse media attention is warded off “I would say it’s much easier because 
you know this might sound quite cynical but then the level of post donations scrutiny 
probably isn’t as hard...they are not saying well I gave you I gave you 10 quid a month 
so show me exactly how you spend my 10 quid” (ER2). Regarding this low scrutiny 
from small donors, a comment from another interviewee provides evidence that the 
fundraising charities would find it easier to misclassify between restricted and 
unrestricted columns as they would prefer to have a larger “free” income “I just think 
sometimes that a project is restricted but actually people perceive it as being 
unrestricted because maybe the donor is not as involved in it as you would perceive 
within a more restricted project”. Conversely, sophisticated funders would scrutinise 
the financial statements in-depth and in certain cases would demand “assurance 
reports” which are provided by auditors. Both finance directors and auditors discussed 
these reports in the interview. I, therefore, argue that fundraising charities collecting 
their income from a large number of small donors would seek to “legitimise” their 
existence by presenting “acceptable” numbers. I posit that for a fundraising charity 
Chapter 2: Study on the Motivators of Financial Statement Misreporting in the UK Charity Context 
89 
 
with a large number of unsophisticated donors, on the one hand, their accounts are 
relevant for (a superficial) media scrutiny but at the same time dispersed donors would 
not demand a detailed account of columnar and horizontal classifications. Whilst giving 
an example of a well-known fundraising charity, a senior charity accountant 
commented: “you may well have people looking at their accounts and there will be 
commentators in the press making their observations about how they run their charity 
and therefore the accounts do matter a lot more” (ER5). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This study has confirmed various theoretical assertions in relation to motivations for 
financial misreporting in a charity setting. Employing semi-structured interviews, this 
study is the first to my knowledge in examining financial misreporting in the setting of 
charity accounting research.  
In-depth semi-structured interviews helped to develop a better understanding of 
motivators for accounting manipulation that confirmed several concepts in the extant 
literature as well as adding new observations. It appears that, for charities, the prime 
motive remains the continuance of financial support through signalling conformity to 
the ‘norms’ of acceptable behaviour for long-term survival (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) 
as the survival of an organisation depends on acquiring and maintaining its resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Charities use levels of income, expenses and reserves 
as tools to convince donors of their legitimacy. 
My study reveals that charities are faced with competing pressures to manipulate its 
financial reports. Furthermore, each incentive in its own right may lead to a certain 
course of action which may not amount to true and fair accounting. The interviews 
support the assertion considering various theoretical frameworks such as resource 
dependency, legitimacy, and agency theories, that large UK charities do indeed face 
pressures and motivations for misreporting their accounting numbers. I highlight three 
major areas of financial reporting mis-statements namely expense misclassifications, 
funds misclassification and the bottom line surplus/deficit misreporting. Most large 
charities receive a mix of income resources, and therefore financial reporting choices 
may face complex pressures. For simplicity, I separate the charities into two broad 
categories, namely fundraising and earning.  
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The indispensable need for a charity is that the sources of its funding stay intact and 
it remains financially sustainable so that it carries on achieving its objectives for which 
it exists. Various determinants make the situation uncertain, hence motivate financial 
statements’ misreporting. A charity with high levels of reserves may suffer with 
crowding-out (e.g. Abrams and Schmitz, 1978, 1984; Daws and Thaler, 1988) because 
it is viewed as self-sufficient by donors. The Charity Commission is also currently 
recommending charities to use their reserves in these times of crisis. However a 
quarter of the charities only have reserves that would last for three months. Half of the 
charities can survive without further income for just over six months.49  
Rising overheads, especially in London due to competitive staff wages and 
redundancy costs, can challenge management with difficult financial reporting 
decisions. Charities are expected to avoid allocating a large part to fundraising 
expenses, hence increasing the likelihood that they would subjectively misallocate 
most costs as charitable activities expense. Less sophisticated users of financial 
statements e.g. suppliers of goods and services may view a charity’s financial 
statements in the same light as users of for-profit firms’ financial statements will. This 
contributes to a complex mix of challenges in financial reporting choices. Similarly, an 
increasing trend from voluntary to more earned income poses intricate challenges for 
charities to appear financially viable, while appearing legitimate to keep private donors 
conciliated. The legitimacy pressures are further exacerbated if charities in the same 
sub-group exhibit more “acceptable” numbers in their financial statements, as my 
interviews confirm that peer benchmarking is a general practice in the sector. This is 
extensively reported in the literature covering for-profit industries. Agency theory also 
appears to be at play, for instance the indebted charities are expected to have 
covenants linked to their financial statements. Although my interviews do not confirm 
whether charities manipulate their financial statements in response to this particular 
pressure, there is a possibility that debt covenants are a relevant factor in influencing 
the financial reporting quality. Future research in this area is invited to elucidate the 
impact of this pressure. I also find that the career aspirations of personnel of the 
charities as well as their job security add to pressures for manipulation for the ultimate 
goal of securing the charity’s future funding. The income/expense period mismatch is 
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another factor that perplexes managers as that results in an apparently erratic financial 
performance, something that incognizant users of financial statements would view 
unfavourably.  
I identify three facilitators or catalytic aspects that increase the probability of financial 
misreporting. Generally it appears from the data that the audit quality in charities is 
inferior to their for-profit counterparts. Given that charities do not operate in financial 
markets, one would expect the need for a superior audit quality due to increased 
information asymmetry (Kitching, 2009) with less monitors. Inexperienced or less 
qualified trustees are more likely to turn a blind eye at best, and instigate financial 
misreporting at worst. Charities with donors from the general public, who do not keep 
tabs on their funds, are expected to have a freer hand in misreporting their financial 
statements.   
The expectations for a charity by donors and monitoring agencies could be unintended 
and unreasonable and can put pressures on charities to present low-quality financial 
reporting (Tinkleman, 2009). The role of auditors appears inconsistent and there is a 
research gap in fully understanding the level of their training and the level of 
subjectivity that may be acceptable. The question of materiality in joint cost allocation 
is an important one (Tinkleman, 2009) and my interviews show that there are 
significant inconsistencies and variabilities in audit quality and auditor’s attitudes 
towards the level of subjectivity.  
I find that low levels of fundraising costs are in the interest of all types of charities. This 
can prove quite a conundrum; where on the one hand the charities need to spend for 
raising funds to remain competitive; on the other, they may be compelled to cover-up 
even justifiable costs to appease the funders. Similarly, in order to satiate resource 
dependency, they would need an acceptable level of reserves as a provision for rainy 
days, yet they may succumb to the dependency pressure and deliberately deplete the 
reserves to preserve legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders.  
In most charities, the pressure to regulate reserves seems prevalent. Whilst 
fundraising charities may have incentives to regulate reserves downwards in some 
cases, those earning charities that are awarded large contracts may prefer 
comparatively healthier reserves to show financial viability. The quest for reducing 
reserves may lead to inefficient use of resources. I suspect that the main focus of 
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some charities may become the pursuit for reserves depletion, and not necessarily the 
consideration whether there is a legitimate necessity for a certain level of expenditure, 
or indeed if there is a genuine case to reduce the reserves at all. In the short-term, 
depleting reserves may come at a cost of the long-term sustainability and perpetuation 
of a charity. Supposedly, reserves can be reduced in mainly two ways; either by 
decreasing income or increasing expenditure. I note that in the interest of a fairer 
distribution of limited donors’ resources, it may be rational to expect a charity with high 
reserves to halt its fundraising so that new funding could be directed to more deserving 
charities, but in practice adjustments to reserves’ policies, accounting manipulation or 
inefficient spending are amongst the possible responses.   
Furthermore, certain charities may have incentives to appear “financially viable” via 
healthy reserves and unrestricted surplus. In order to appear financially viable 
sustained deficits are likely to be avoided. On the contrary, the bottom-line surpluses 
(net incoming resources) are expected to be sustained by such charities to bolster 
their unrestricted reserves. Charities need to regulate reserves at levels that are 
neither too high (inviting dissatisfaction of the funders) nor too low that the charity 
faces challenges to its going concern position.  
There may be years when there are higher incoming over outgoing resources such as 
through large one-off bequest receipts or significant income through grand fundraising 
events. This may create a curious accruals mismatch causing a temporary large 
surplus, motivating charities to smooth the bottom line downwards by either recording 
expenses too early or simply spending inefficiently and extravagantly on ill-considered 
projects in the current year. In the years when such one-off income is absent, charities 
may be tempted to defer expenses or accrue income too early to turn a large deficit to 
a small surplus.  
I further discover another response to resource dependency pressures that the extant 
literature largely ignores. I call it “horizontal misclassification,” alluding to unrestricted 
expenses misclassified as restricted expenses. This is a serious breach of the relevant 
accounting standard, SORP 2015. This expense shifting, referred to as ‘cross-
contamination’ by an interviewee can be used to a) bolster levels of free reserves and 
b) turn an unrestricted deficit into a surplus.  
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I also find that debt covenants could be linked to charities’ reserves. This is another 
area which to my knowledge has not been identified before. Therefore, I expect the 
indebted charities may be interested in presenting a higher level of reserves.  
Comparing bottom-line surplus/deficit with competitors appears a factor which could 
potentially be a motive in managing earnings to a legitimate level, something which 
can be investigated in future research.  I also gather from the interviews that to report 
deficits, fundraising ratios should possibly be kept low enough to ward off criticism 
citing poor financial management by trustees. 
Overall, there is a clear need to educate charity accountants, trustees and most 
importantly the donors to not treat certain numbers simplistically. If there remains a 
common perception of what is and is not a legitimate or acceptable number or ratio, 
charity accountants would keep facing pressures to manipulate certain figures, and in 
doing so they would not only misguide the grantors in the allocation of limited 
resources but also indulge in expending funds inefficiently, such as by spending too 
early to regulate the bottom line in the years of abundance and delay expenditures in 
the years of austerity. This would nurture an inefficient system and an already growing 
trust deficit in the sector would only worsen; something that is in none of the 
stakeholders’ interest.   
There may be a case for the Charity Commission to consider certain modifications to 
SORP that can cater to different charity sub-groups. This may not be a feasible option 
for a very complex sector with several sub-groups but further research can point to the 
right direction in gathering similar sub-groups which can be catered for with similar 
guidelines in addition to the SORPs. 
This study has its inherent limitations. Firstly, the charity sector is very complex and 
varied in the UK and with the given time and resources it is not feasible to carry out in-
depth semi-structured interviews with a large sample within each of the charity sub-
groups. This research has however included accountants from charities that 
collectively cover all major sources of UK charity income. Similarly, the response rate 
has been very low. It is also recognised by the author that if a low response rate 
indicates some kind of response bias where the respondents differ in a meaningful 
way from the non-respondents, then there may be a theme that this study has not 
managed to capture.  
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This study is a vital addition to the scant academic literature on financial misreporting 
in the charity sector in the UK. Earnings management in nonprofit hospitals has been 
the focus of prior literature. To my knowledge, this is the first study that involves in-
depth examination of the behaviour of UK charity sector organisations in England and 
Wales to establish whether managers of these charities manipulate earnings and 
practise expense classification shifting in their financial statements through the use of 
a less used method, which strengthens the existing theory. As this study covers all 
commonly known aspects of financial misreporting by charities it is a useful response 
to the calls by the Charity Commission that auditors of the UK charities are “letting 
down” their profession and only half of a sample of charity accounts met the required 
standards in 2017.50 Hence it has policy implications as well as a reminder for the audit 
profession that the quality of audit needs to be even more rigorous than corporations 
due to a reduced level of monitoring. This study also reminds the public that charities 
are motivated to misreport in their financial statements to avoid criticism. Hence it 
informs sophisticated as well as disparate individual donors to be more informed of 
their chosen charities through various financial and non-financial means. This study is 
also a very timely response to the concerns by the regulator and media about the 
dwindling confidence in the sector; the financial reporting related misgivings remind us 
of “The numbers game” (Levitt, 1998) that preceded high profile corporate scandals. 
This study has practical implications for the accounting profession, regulators, 
charities and funders to tighten the loose ends that have a potential to contribute to 
catastrophes with serious implications for public trust and the future of a very important 
sector in the economy. 
Future research in this area can make a useful contribution to the positive accounting theory 
to predict management behaviour in the UK charity accounting setting. This will assist the 
charity regulator in utilising its limited resources by focusing its random inquiries in the right 
direction and developing SORPs that cater for individual sub-sectors; so that their financial 
statements portray their true position and are comprehensible to the average primary user. 
Most importantly, a better understanding of such motives can guide donors in making more 
informed and economically rational funding decisions.   
                                               
50 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accounts-monitoring-review-auditors-and-independent-examiners-
compliance-with-their-responsibilities/auditors-and-independent-examiners-compliance-with-their-responsibilities 
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Appendix 2.1: Interview questions guide 
 
The list of questions below are those that were asked of the heads of finance. The 
auditors and banker were asked similar questions but targeted towards their 
experience with charities. 
 Please provide some brief details of your current role 
 Briefly state your qualifications and previous roles in your career 
 Who are the main funders of your charity? 
 In your opinion, which numbers in your financial statements may interest your 
funders? 
 How do these numbers, if at all, influence your funders? 
 What do your funders look for in the SoFA and Balance Sheet in order to renew 
their donations and/or contracts? 
 What are the greatest challenges faced by a charity like yours concerning 
financial reporting? 
 Are there any ideal ratios or numbers in the financial statements that you aspire 
to achieve? 
 Are there any particular financial reporting pressures that you are faced with? 
 Do you face any pressures from trustees or anybody within the organisation 
regarding some financial reporting figures? 
 What is the most desirable position in the SoFA: a large deficit, a small deficit, 
breakeven, a small surplus or a large surplus? And why?  
 What is the ideal level of reserves that may look good in your financial 
statements? 
 Have there been any major audit adjustments required by your auditors since 
you assumed the current role as the head of Finance?  
 With regards to your reserves policy, if you do not meet the targets set by 
trustees (or others) then what pressures do you face? 
 Is management compensation ever linked to the financial performance of a 
charity? 
 Is misclassification between restricted and unrestricted income and expenses 
possible? 
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Chapter 3: Study on Accruals-based and Real Activities 
Earnings Management by UK Charities 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The government’s inability to meet the demand for public goods in populations with 
heterogeneous preferences leads to the need for nonprofit organisations (e.g. 
Weisbrod, 1977; Weisbrod, 2009). Therefore, governments support charities as they 
reduce the burden on state funds (Salamon, 1990; Mayer & Wilson, 2010; Hyndman 
& McMahon, 2011). Charities earning over £5 million account for only 1.3% of the total 
number of charities in the UK (2,263 out of some 168,000 charities) but they account 
for over 72% (over £55bn of £77bn) of total income generated by the charitable sector. 
Where almost a billion individuals volunteer globally (Salamon et al., 2011), one in four 
adults donate to the sector in the UK and amongst them young adults volunteer the 
most (UK Parliament research briefing, 2017).51 Although, the scale of social and 
economic value added by the sector may not be fully quantifiable, with the help of a 
large “volunteers army”, 1.25 million full-time employees create economic value above 
£50bn annually.52 To put this into perspective, charities fund almost half of all medical 
research in the UK.53 
Because of the economic and social significance of the sector, it is important that it 
remains transparent. However, the confidence level in the sector has been low and 
according to the Charity Commission’s head of the accountancy services “the 
deterioration in the quality of accounts is of serious concern.”54Since there is a large 
public stake in nonprofits or not-for-profit organisations, it is important that their 
accounting is trustworthy. Agency problems could contribute to accounting 
manipulation in charities which can impact negatively on welfare (Jegers, 2010). There 
is evidence, albeit much limited compared to for-profit firms, that managers of 
nonprofits opportunistically misreport the accounting numbers that may influence the 
level of private donations or government funding (e.g. Bouwens et al., 2004; Leone & 
                                               
51Community Life Survey data for 2015/16 shows that 73% of adults in England had given to charity in the four 
weeks prior to survey.  
52 In giving, how much do we receive? The social value of volunteering. Speech given by Andrew G Haldane, 
Chief Economist, Bank of England. A Pro Bono Economics lecture to the Society of Business Economists, 
London 9 September 2014. 
53Association of Medical Research Charities: “The charities’ combined research spend makes up nearly half 
(47%) of publicly funded medical research” 
https://www.amrc.org.uk/news/uk-charities-research-funding-remains-stable-despite-tough-environment 
54GOV.UK - Regulator finds quality and transparency in charity accounts has fallen. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/regulator-finds-quality-and-transparency-in-charity-accounts-has-fallen 
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Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Yetman & 
Yetman, 2012; Balsam and Harris, 2013; Ferreira, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2017; 
Beck, 2018). Research on earnings manipulation in nonprofits is predominantly 
focused on nonprofit hospitals. Only a small number of studies focus on the charity 
sector as a whole. Given the importance of the sector and the potential impact of 
misreporting on resource allocation, this study investigates this issue in UK charities, 
focusing on how funders’ sophistication and donor-beneficiary separation affect 
earnings management behaviour. 
There are several stakeholders of a charity such as the users of its services, donors, 
lenders, and the regulator. Many of these stakeholders expect nonprofits to break-
even and therefore report a zero-profit figure in their financial statements. The violation 
of the zero-profit constraint increases the likelihood of CEO termination (e.g. in 
nonprofit hospitals in Leone and Van Horn 2005). A large surplus implies that the 
nonprofit is not fulfilling its charitable purpose and a deficit would be equally 
undesirable, casting doubt over management’s ability to sustain a nonprofit as a going 
concern. Similarly, an indebted nonprofit’s deficit could increase the cost of debt, or 
damage its reputation in the eyes of the subsidising government, affecting the number 
of services (Leone & Van Horn, 2005; Jones & Roberts, 2006; Ballantine et al., 2007; 
Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012). This leads to an inherent need for a bottom line 
earnings figure which is around zero. Furthermore, a significant number of nonprofits 
maintain very little reserves because charities discount the benefits of reserves as they 
are possibly evaluated on spending (Calabrese, 2013). As surplus/deficit end up in the 
reserves, large surpluses would, therefore, lead to large reserves. This may attract 
undue attention, leading to reduced funding owing to the assertion that the charity has 
sufficient funds and does not need more.  
Following limited previous studies that firms use multiple earnings management 
strategies (e.g. Leone et al. 2005; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang 2012), I study 
whether UK charities resort to accrual and real-based earnings management activities 
to report bottom-line earnings that are around a zero surplus/deficit. Using an initial 
sample of more than 103,000 nonprofit firm-year observations, I find that nonprofits 
drive their results towards a target range of a small surplus. Consistent with prior 
literature (e.g. Yetman & Yetman, 2012; Balsam and Harris, 2013) accounting 
manipulation is observed more in the charities that are funded by less sophisticated 
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funders. Therefore, charities that are funded by more sophisticated funders tend to 
manipulate less towards a target range, hence confirming that they are aware that 
such practice would be counterproductive to their future donations. Furthermore, while 
Parsons et al. (2017) do not find that donor restriction affects earnings manipulation, 
my results suggest that donor restriction does reduce the level of managing bottom-
line earnings.  
I also find that charities have preferences of different earnings management types, 
depending on the level of their programme revenue. I find that the accruals-based 
manipulation is exacerbated by more service-oriented charities (i.e. nonprofits with 
higher than median programme revenue). On the contrary, real activities management 
is higher in more charitable nonprofits (i.e. those with lower than median programme 
revenue). Therefore, pressure to manipulate earnings is more likely through the 
costlier form of earnings management i.e. real activities earnings management.  
The results of the current study provide a significant contribution to the nonprofit 
accounting literature, which has a limited number of studies on the charity sector’s 
earnings quality. To my knowledge, there have been no studies that separately 
investigate the earnings management approaches between more service-oriented 
charities and their charitable nonprofit counterparts. Furthermore, prior literature finds 
that more sophisticated funders discount poor quality financial statements (e.g. 
Yetman & Yetman, 2012; Balsam and Harris, 2013) or goes as far as suggesting that 
sophisticated managers of a nonprofit are less likely to manipulate earnings, but does 
not investigate the impact of sophistication on nonprofit management's behaviour 
towards manipulation. I use two measures to investigate sophistication of funders and 
find similar results (ratio of restricted funds and ratio endowment funds). 
This study has societal relevance as it boosts confidence in earnings quality of the 
charities funded by donors that are more sophisticated: those that place restrictions 
on the use of their donations. Whereas prior research points to the preference for 
accrual-based earnings management due to their lower reversal costs than making 
real decisions vis-à-vis operational costs (Peasnell, 1998; Pilcher and Van der Zhan, 
2010), in this study, I show that charities are interested in accruals-based earnings 
management to preserve their “real” level of services. 
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The remainder of the study is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
literature and develops the hypotheses of the study. This is followed by a discussion 
of the sample of variables used. In the next section, I present the results of the study, 
followed by a conclusion and discussion of limitations and future research. 
 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
Resource dependency theory (hereafter, RDT) explains that organisational actions 
have societal acceptance rather than economic performance as an underlying motive 
(Drees & Heugens, 2013). This theory postulates that an organisation devises its 
operating strategy according to the expectations and preferences of its resource 
providers (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Drees & Heugens, 2013; Parsons, 2017).  
Variations in financial reporting quality could undermine both regulatory effectiveness 
and resource allocation (Greenwood et al., 2017). RDT suggests that funding sources 
are associated with varying levels of oversight. Recognising these levels, the 
managers must respond to every key resource provider’s demands to sustain 
continued funding (Ling and Roberts, 2017). Therefore, the information contained in 
financial statements can be aimed at responding to resource dependency pressures 
and that sometimes can come at the cost of true and fair reporting.  
Theoretical and anecdotal evidence presented in the literature finds a preference for 
managers of firms to report profits compared to losses. Individuals are more averse to 
losses than to an equivalent amount of profits (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 2013). 
This can be extended to the preference for managers of firms to avoid reporting losses 
in favour of profits or a breakeven point i.e. zero bottom-line earnings (Leone and Van 
Horne, 2005). Alternatively, managers can opportunistically use reporting discretion to 
achieve certain objectives for cost purposes (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). In this 
regard, a firm that reports a loss may face higher transaction costs with stakeholders 
than firms reporting a profit. Therefore, a firm may decide to avoid losses to decrease 
the transaction costs with its stakeholders (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Also, small 
losses may harm a CEO’s reputation and therefore managers are more likely to aim 
for small profits (Leone and Van Horne, 2005). 
Although the above applies to the for-profit sector, managers of charities arguably 
have similar preferences. Based on prospect theory, the cost to a nonprofit of reporting 
a £1 loss will be larger than the cost of reporting a £1 profit.  However, reporting a 
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surplus can also come with transactional costs in the form of increased scrutiny 
(Eldenburg et al., 2011). An excessive level of surplus may suggest that the charity 
has exhausted its philanthropic activities, delayed these to a future period, or not 
exerted sufficient effort to identify worthy projects (Leone and Van Horn 2005). On the 
other hand, if a charity suffers sustained deficits, this would lead to the depletion of its 
reserves making it appear less sustainable and therefore casting doubts over its ability 
to fulfil its mission. This could lead to going concern issues which would inevitably 
concern the relevant internal and external stakeholders, such as contract 
commissioners and funders with a vision for impact. Although some nonprofit sectors 
such as the UK National Health Service (NHS) Trust hospitals have a regulatory duty 
to deliver zero bottom-line earnings (Ballantine et al., 2007), there is currently no such 
regulatory obligation for charities. In the nonprofit context, prior research confirms that 
donors consider earnings in deciding on the level of current or future donations. They 
are found less likely to donate money to those nonprofits that return high levels of 
surpluses  (e.g. Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Bouwens et al., 2006;  Ballantine et al., 
2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012; Ferreira et al., 2013; Jegers, 2013; Arcas 
and Marti, 2016 ). 
Managers are known to use both accrual earnings management (hereafter, AEM) and 
real activities earnings management (hereafter, REM) to manage earnings towards a 
benchmark target or range. A target earnings benchmark (Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997) has been studied extensively in for-profit firms. Most studies have focused on 
AEM (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Peasnell et al., 1999; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Gore et al., 2007; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
However, there has been growing evidence that firms also engage in REM (e.g. Baber 
et al. 1,991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham et al., 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Cheng et al., 
2016). Empirical evidence finds that managers avoid reporting small deficits and 
manage earnings to report a small surplus in the for-profit sector (e.g. Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999;).  
Just as in for-profit sectors, there is evidence that managers manage earnings to 
report a small surplus in the nonprofit sector (e.g. Leone and Van Horn, 2005; 
Bouwens et al., 2006; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012; 
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Ferreira et al., 2013; Jegers, 2013; Arcas and Marti, 2016; Beck, 2018). Again, most 
studies concentrate on accruals-based manipulation with a handful that investigates 
real earnings management (e.g. Leone and Van Horn, 2005). Arcas and Marti (2016) 
identify the incidence of abnormal earnings in pursuit of an earnings figure close to 
zero and in avoiding big deficits. Jegers (2013) in his study of 844 Belgian nonprofits’ 
financial statements finds that debt and potential agency conflicts between board and 
management prompt accruals-based manipulation towards zero earnings. He also 
reports that larger nonprofits are more prone to reaching earnings benchmark through 
manipulation. Furthermore, Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) explore the use of 
discretionary accruals and an unexpected level of depreciation by nonprofits in pursuit 
of government subsidies using the data of 925 nonprofits from the year 2006. They 
find that manipulation to push earnings towards the breakeven point is exacerbated 
when government funding is increased. Similarly, Ferreira et al. (2012) find that the 
Portuguese public sector also use discretionary accruals in a study of 1,453 firm years 
2002 through 2008. 
Studying panel data of 1,520 firm years of NHS hospital Trusts from 1998–2005, 
Ballantine (2007) discover the use of discretionary accruals to report earnings within 
the target range around zero. Stalebrink (2007) studies 288 Swedish municipalities 
between the years 2000 through 2004 indicating that municipalities increase write-off 
and depreciation expenses when large deficits are recorded for income smoothing or 
when there are large pre-discretion surpluses. Bouwens et al. (2004) find that Dutch 
nonprofit hospitals manage discretionary accruals upwards in the year before and 
within the year of new financial debt. Greenwood et al. (2017) in their study of 700 
NHS Foundation Trusts over five years (2009–2014) report that despite a shift away 
from breakeven in profits, as the primary performance objective, there remains an 
aversion to reporting small deficits and preferring a small surplus. 
Leone and Van Horn (2005), in their study of 8,179 hospital-year observations find the 
use of discretionary spending on charity care and discretionary accrual management. 
Similarly, Eldenburg et al. (2011) studying 432 nonprofit hospital years (1998–2003) 
in California find discretionary spending (non-operating and non-revenue- generating 
activities) is regulated to achieve a benchmark of zero profits. Hoerger (1991) using 
six years of panel data (1983-88) of over 15,000 hospital-years find that nonprofit 
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hospitals minimise the variance in reported earnings through real spending. In a study 
examining accrual manipulation in US municipalities, Beck (2018) suggests that 
creditors as “sophisticated users” increase the scrutiny of municipalities with 
questionable financial performance. 
Although managers of nonprofits may ideally prefer an exact breakeven point, this may 
be a risky benchmark to target. Planning to achieve a small surplus can create a buffer 
for unforeseen circumstances that could push a breakeven position into a deficit 
(Leone and Van Horn, 2005). Since the objective of a nonprofit is to serve the purpose 
for which it exists and not make a profit for redistributing to shareholders, its funders 
would expect to see the earnings level around the zero benchmark. Whilst studying a 
large number of firm years it can, therefore, be expected that the earnings 
(surplus/deficit) distribution should be close to zero with a tendency towards a small 
surplus; this small surplus would assure the stakeholders of its financial viability.  
Based on the above discussion, I present the first hypothesis below: 
H1: Nonprofits are more likely to report a small surplus than a small deficit. 
One way in which managers of firms can avoid reporting losses or an excessive 
surplus is through the use of accounting accruals. Several researchers have found 
that nonprofits manage earnings using discretionary accruals to achieve a small 
surplus (e.g. Leone and Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; Ferreira et al., 2012). 
Managers can take advantage of the subjective nature of certain accounting standards 
to adjust reported earnings rather than increase or decrease real spending (Hoerger, 
1991; Leone and Van Horne, 2005). Many studies find a negative association between 
discretionary accruals and pre-managed performance and find that discretionary 
accruals are managed to reduce both surplus and deficit (e.g. Leone and Van Horne, 
2005; Ferreira et al., 2012; Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012).  
Therefore, I expect a negative relationship between discretionary accruals and 
earnings before discretionary accruals. This expectation is founded on the assumption 
that the managers of a charity with a surplus will more likely exercise income-
decreasing negative discretionary accruals. Likewise, managers of a charity with a 
deficit are more likely to exercise income-increasing positive discretionary accruals. 
Therefore, I formulate the second hypothesis as follows: 
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H2: There is a negative relationship between discretionary accruals and 
earnings before discretionary accruals in nonprofits. 
The RDT posits that different funding sources lead to varying monitoring demands by 
the funders/donors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Gaver and Im, 2014). Therefore, it is 
expected that the ability to report a small surplus may not be comparable for charities 
with varying degrees of funder sophistication. The extant literature provides empirical 
evidence that the sophistication of funders has an impact on financial reporting quality 
of a nonprofit (Krishnan and Yetman, 2011; Balsam and Harris, 2014; Greenwood and 
Tao, 2016).  
Earlier studies have considered a high proportion of restricted funds as an indicator of 
sophistication. More sophisticated donors are more likely to discount the impact of 
manipulation compared to their less sophisticated counterparts who are made up of 
disparate small donors (Yetman and Yetman, 2013). The reason for this is that smaller 
individual donors do not generally seek detailed information directly. Also, they may 
not have the necessary skills to unpick the intricate details of the accounting data. A 
large number of small donors may not know where to find the relevant information in 
the financial reports (Tinkelman 1998; Yetman and Yetman 2013). On the contrary, 
sophisticated funders/donors are expected to better comprehend a complicated set of 
financial information. Similarly, they would be more interested in monitoring, with the 
intent to assess whether their restricted funds are being used for the stipulated 
purposes. Restrictions on the use of donations impose direct control over the spending 
of resources by a nonprofit (Loftin, 1998; Silverman & Beatty, 2006; Parsons et al., 
2017). 
Parsons et al.’s (2017) survey of 200 nonprofits (2006 to 2008) shows that charities 
that face pressures to manage their ratios are less likely to do so when there are 
monitors and sophisticated managers. Information asymmetry between a nonprofit 
and those monitoring and evaluating its performance is often low (Greenwood et al., 
2017). In their event-study approach, Balsam and Harris (2014) find that sophisticated 
donors look at more complex forms of information in the financial statements whereas 
small donors tend to rely on media reports. Yetman and Yetman (2013) report that 
sophisticated donors discount the inflated ratios more and discount ratios that are 
inflated by more complex methods. Tinkelman (1998) study the impact of joint costs 
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allocation on donations. He finds that larger donors, who are likely to examine the 
financial statements in detail, respond more negatively to inefficient joint costs 
allocations.  Although most of these studies do not investigate the earnings figure, they 
guide this research in separately studying the impact of sophistication on nonprofit 
management’s manipulative behaviour. 
There is scant literature on the relationship between sophistication and earnings 
management. Based on the discussed ratio manipulation literature (e.g. Tinkelman 
1998; Yetman and Yetman, 2013; Balsam and Harris, 2014; Parsons et al., 2017)  and 
a limited accruals-based earnings management literature (e.g. Greenwood and Tao, 
2016), I expect the sophistication of funders to be a deterrent against accrual-based 
earnings manipulation and therefore formulate the following hypothesis:  
H3: The relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings before 
discretionary accruals is less negative for charities with more sophisticated 
funders than for charities with less sophisticated funders. 
In addition to the sophistication of the charity funders, the restrictions placed by the 
funders may also be a factor in financial reporting of the charities. A charity that 
receives a lump-sum donation where the donor stipulates that the money is invested 
to provide a regular stream of income is categorised as an endowed charity.  The 
income itself is not necessarily restricted, but the essence for such restriction is to 
preserve the endowment fund; therefore, it is customary for only the income from 
investment to be spent for charitable causes while the endowment fund is kept intact. 
The UK regulations allow charities to spend permanent endowments in certain 
circumstances by special permission from the Charity Commission. In some cases, 
nonprofits may be more restricted in spending these endowments. For example, if 
charities are funded mainly via government grants, have relatively stronger control 
policies and therefore a higher level of scrutiny, then they are more restricted (e.g. 
Rose-Ackerman, 1981; Ostrower, 2007).  A ‘Permanent endowment’ is meant to be 
held by a charity forever. It is usually set out as a restriction in the charity’s governing 
document. The purpose for this is to invest and earn additional income, and preserve 
the endowed wealth in perpetuity.  
Since the endowment fund is set out as a restriction, just as other restricted funds that 
are donated by sophisticated funders, I hypothesise that the likelihood of manipulation 
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would be less prevalent for an endowment charity due to the sophistication of its 
funders.  
H4: The relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings before 
discretionary accruals is less negative for endowment charities than for non-
endowment charities. 
Although all nonprofits cannot be fit neatly into one category, those nonprofits that 
receive most or all of their income from grants/donations, are categorised as 
"donative" and those that rely predominantly on income from the sale of services are 
classified as "commercial" (Hansmann, 1980). These two types have also been 
referred to as charitable nonprofits and service-oriented nonprofits, respectively (e.g. 
Yetman and Yetman, 2013; Balsam and Harris, 2014), where, the charitable nonprofits 
receive donations mostly from donors who are not themselves the recipients of its 
services, as opposed to service-oriented charities, where donors are also in receipt of 
such charities' services (e.g. museums who charge entrance fees including a 
donation). This donor-beneficiary separation is expected to have an impact on the 
earnings management behaviour of the managers. 
Differences between these types of charities have been found in terms of donation 
levels in response to executive compensation and accounting quality. Specifically, 
Balsam and Harris (2014) find a stronger negative relationship between executive 
compensation and future donations for more charitable nonprofits, and a weaker 
relationship for more service-oriented charities. Yetman and Yetman (2013) in a 
sample of 78,959 nonprofit firm-year observations from 1992 to 2007 find that smaller 
donors do not react to more complex measures of accounting quality. Therefore, it 
may be that more service-oriented nonprofits would have more compelling incentives 
to manage earnings using the accruals-based method in response to funder 
pressures. On the other hand, their more charitable counterparts may also face 
pressures due to the agency of the media that scrutinises charities on donors’ behalf. 
Therefore, it is difficult to form an a priori assumption about which of the two types may 
be more prone to exercising AEM. I, therefore, form a non-directional prediction for the 
effect of more service-oriented charities on the relationship between accounting-based 
discretion and earnings before discretionary accruals relationship. 
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H5: The relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings before 
discretionary accruals is different for service-oriented charities compared with 
their more charitable counterparts.   
Following Leone and Van Horne (2005), in addition to investigating AEM, in the same 
study I also explore the existence of REM in UK nonprofits.  It is an important part of 
the study  as making real changes to spending is potentially more dysfunctional than 
manipulating accounting information (Parsons et al., 2017). Eldenburg et al. (2011) 
make an important contribution in determining real earnings management in nonprofits 
but with a small sample size.  They find that hospitals with stronger incentives to 
manage earnings upwards (downwards) experience significantly larger decreases 
(increases) in non-revenue-generating and non-operating activities expenditures. 
According to Hoerger (1991),  nonprofits minimise the variance in profits by cutting 
back or increasing real spending of their choice variable in their objective function. I 
would expect that charities curtail their fundraising spending, which to an extent would 
be discretionary, in the years when expected earnings are below zero and increase 
their fundraising spending when the expected earnings are above a small surplus 
range. Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis when earnings are below and 
above the zero-profit benchmark. 
H6:When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be below (above) the benchmark, 
nonprofits will decrease (increase) spending on fundraising activities. 
Just like the presence of large stockholders is associated with accurate reporting in 
the for-profit setting, donors act as stockholders in nonprofits. The donors provide 
funding and large donations tend to place restrictions on the use of their donations 
(Yates and Yates, 2012). Guo et al. (2015) indicate that sophisticated investors 
improve the accounting oversight curbing earnings manipulation via operating 
activities regulations. Restricting donations give donors direct control over where, 
when, and how the organisation spends its resources (Loftin, 1998). With the fear that 
debt holders, being another sophisticated stakeholder group would be suspicious, 
municipalities’ managers do not manipulate earnings upward in the public sector 
(Beck, 2018).  
The formal compliance with financial reporting standards improves with dependence 
on funding sources such as government subsidies and financial debts (Verbruggen et 
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al., 2011). As the economic impact of real earnings management is expected to be 
higher than accruals-based earnings management, sophisticated funders must be 
particularly interested in maintaining the level of “real” services to the end beneficiaries 
and that they do not freely fluctuate in pursuit of a target bottom line. Therefore, I 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H7: When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be above (below) the benchmark, 
nonprofits with more sophisticated funders are less likely to increase (decrease) 
spending on fundraising activities than nonprofits with less sophisticated 
funders. 
Similarly, I would expect, the charities that are predominantly funded through 
endowments would face higher scrutiny from relatively sophisticated funders. Also, 
they would have weaker incentives to make real spending manipulation, as their 
income is relatively assured from mostly connected and closely associated donors. 
Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H8: When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be above (below) the benchmark, 
nonprofits with high endowment funding are less likely to increase (decrease) 
spending on fundraising activities than other nonprofits. 
According to the for-profit literature, managers might find it difficult to manipulate real 
activities when their operation is being monitored closely (e.g. Bushee, 1998; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). The fact that the donor-beneficiary separation is 
minimal in more service-oriented charities would suggest closer monitoring of the 
“real” services by the beneficiaries, who are their funders, either institutional or small 
donors. The “supporters who are recipients of nonprofit services can directly evaluate 
the quality of those services” (Balsam and Harris, 2014). The level of real earnings 
management activities increased significantly after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX) due to increased scrutiny (Cohen et al. 2008). Similarly, a surge in real 
manipulation was noticed after the adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (Ferentinou and Anagnostopoulou, 2016), at the time of seasonal equity 
offerings (Kothari et al., 2015) and with better audit quality (e.g., Chi et al., 2011). 
Therefore, this suggests that a stricter inspection, either through the enactment of a 
tighter reporting regime or tighter scrutiny is associated with more real manipulation. 
In the same vein, I expect that a service-oriented charity would be less manipulative 
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using real discretionary spending as their donors, who are also the recipients of their 
services, would have other ways than financial statements to gauge the performance 
of a charity; hence making the accounting-based manipulation more likely than a 
charitable nonprofit. A charitable nonprofit, with donor-beneficiary separation, would 
face heightened financial statement scrutiny due to the limited first-hand experience 
of the charity’s services. This would suggest a higher real activities management than 
accounting-based manipulation, which is not easily detectable through financial 
statement scrutiny; something that charitable nonprofit donors are expected to rely on 
more. Therefore, I formulate the final hypothesis below: 
H9: When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be above (below) the benchmark, 
nonprofits that are service-oriented are less likely to increase (decrease) 
spending on fundraising activities compared to charitable nonprofits. 
 
3.3 Data and sample 
 
3.3.1 Sample 
The data used for this study is from the Charity Commission for England and Wales 
dataset.55 The charities are required to submit their accounts to the Charity 
Commission within ten months of their financial year-end. Due to limited data 
availability, the sample consists of all firms with gross income over £0.5m from 2007 
to 2016. Until 2015, the audit threshold for registered charities was £1m, which was 
subsequently reduced to £0.5m under the Charity Statement of Recommended 
Practice (SORP: FRS102).56 Hence, the data do not exclude any charity which would 
have required a statutory audit in the period of study. I exclude firms that earned 
trading income because discretionary accruals would carry a measurement error due 
to the unavailability of data on inventory in the annual returns filed by charities to the 
Charity Commission.57 All charities with three years of data were included in the 
sample. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). 
 
                                               
55 The content is available under the Open Government Licence v3.0. 
56 In England and Wales, an audit is required if either the charity’s gross income exceeds £500,000 or its gross 
assets exceed £3.26m and gross income exceeds £250,000. 
http://www.charitysorp.org/media/619101/frs102_complete.pdf 
57 All auditable charities are required to complete Part b of the online annual return. 
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3.3.2 Classification of nonprofits 
An organisation’s operating strategy depends on the expectations of its resource 
providers (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The degree to which an 
organisation depends on a particular source of income is the first major determinant 
of resource importance according to RDT. The resource importance is dependent on 
the relative magnitude of that resource to the total income of a charity. “Resource size 
is measured on its relative magnitude to total revenues” (Parsons et al., 2017, p707). 
I classify my sample in light of the relative resource dependency and test my 
hypotheses accordingly.  
The first classification relates to the type of funders in terms of sophistication. Prior 
literature (e.g. Yetman and Yetman, 2013; Balsam and Harris, 2014; Amin and Harris, 
2017) classifies sophistication according to the level of restricted funds or donations, 
suggesting that sophisticated donors are more likely to place permanent or temporary 
restrictions on their donations.58 I use the level of restricted funds (following Yetman 
and Yetman, 2013) as the criterion for categorising a charity as sophisticated or Less 
sophisticated. Those charities which have above-median restricted funds within their 
respective nonprofit subgroup classification are categorised as sophisticated. Hence 
to measure donor sophistication I partition organisations in each charity subgroup by 
the presence of restricted donations using a 0/1 dummy variable, where 1(0) 
represents a charity with more sophisticated (less sophisticated) donors. 
The second classification of nonprofits is according to their source of funding from 
endowment. This has not been previously used as a classification in prior literature. 
First, I calculate the endowment fund ratio by dividing the year-end endowment fund 
by the year-end total funds. Those charities that have an above-median level of 
endowment fund ratio within their respective charity subgroup, have been categorised 
as endowed charities. Hence, an endowed charity has a relatively sizeable income 
from its endowment fund. 
Finally, to test the impact of more service-oriented charities against more charitable 
nonprofits, following Balsam and Harris (2014), I partition the sample according to the 
median of programme service revenue (hereafter, PSR), which is measured as the 
ratio of programme service revenue to total revenue. The firms with higher PSR than 
                                               
58 Relatively older studies use accounting expertise or donor size as proxies for sophistication (e.g. Keating et al., 
2008; Tinkelman,1998) 
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the median of their respective nonprofit subcategory classification are categorised as 
more service-oriented and those below the median as charitable. Hence to measure 
donor-beneficiary proximity I partition organisations in each charity subgroup by PSR 
using a 0/1 dummy variable, where 1(0) represents a more service-oriented 
(charitable) nonprofit. 
To classify nonprofits by industry or subcategory, I use the Charity Commission data, 
merged with the classification specified by the International Classification of Nonprofit 
Organisations (ICNPO)59 (Salamon and Anheier, 1996). All charities have been 
classified using the International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations (ICNPO) as 
listed in appendix 3.2. Except for group 12 (Not elsewhere classified), all classifications 
have been allocated according to the median values of each respective group. The 
charities in group 12 have been dropped from the analysis, as the median value for a 
miscellaneous group may not be a good representation of the individual nonprofits 
placed in that group. Following the extant literature (e.g. Yetman and Yetman, 2013; 
Balsam and Harris, 2014) the classification for the main analysis is based on median 
levels of PSR and restricted funds. The grouping of endowment charities is made in a 
similar vein.  
This categorisation is superior to the earlier studies, where the median value of the 
entire sample is taken as reference points. In this study, I am more careful by using 
the median-level criterion for the classification at each subgroup level. 
Robustness tests are carried out using the ratios as continuous variables; they give 
similar results. 
 
3.4 Manipulation measures 
I use two measures of manipulation to investigate earnings management: accrual and 
real manipulation. The measure of accrual manipulation is discretionary accruals 
(DACC). The early studies by Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) and Jones (1991) 
suggested models of discretionary or abnormal accrual models to detect earnings 
management.  Dechow et al. (1995) report that among the aforementioned models, a 
modified version of the Jones (1991) model is the most powerful method of detecting 
                                               
59 The National Council of Voluntary Organisations classification data was merged with Charity Commission data 
to allocate charity types according to the International classification.  
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earnings manipulation. A vast amount of extant literature employs the Jones (1991) 
model as a basis for estimating discretionary accruals. The discretionary accruals are 
used to indicate the quality of earnings recognising that accruals are likely to be the 
result of managerial discretion and changes in the firm’s economic environment 
(Hermanns, 2006).  
In this study, in accordance with previous literature in the charity sector accruals-based 
earnings management (e.g. Bouwens et al, 2004; Leone and Van Horn, 2005; 
Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012), I use an aggregate 
accruals model primarily based on the Jones (1991) model with modifications 
proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005).60 
I use a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals, which is used in various 
studies such as in Ibrahim and Lloyd (2011), where for each year, I estimate the model 
for every charity subgroup (industry) according to the Charity Commission 
classification. In doing so, I partially control for any changes that are specific to each 
charity subgroup. The modified Jones model is estimated for all charity classifications 
as follows: 
𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝜟𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕/
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕           (3.1) 
Where: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is total reported accruals; It is calculated as the change in current assets 
(excluding cash) from year t-1 to year t, less the change in current liabilities from year 
t-1 to year t, minus depreciation charge for the year; 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1is total assets in year t-1; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡represents annual change in revenues from year t-1 to year t; 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡denotes property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t; 
                                               
60 Kothari et al. (2005) developed the modified Jones model by adding Return on Asset (ROA) as an additional 
independent variable to the modified Jones model to control for performance in the discretionary accrual 
regression. ROA is a better measure than many other variables such as size, market-to-book, earnings yield, etc. 
and complements other studies that document ROA as a better measure of performance (e.g. Dechow 1994; 
Barber & Lyon, 1996 and Cheng et al., 2008). Extensive previous research recommends and attempts to develop 
accrual models as a function of performance (e.g. Barth et al. 2001, Peasnell et al., 2000, Dechow et al., 1998; 
Guay, et al., 1996; Healy, 1996). According to them the forecasted accruals of firms that have unusual 
performance might be systematically non-zero, pointing to a potential correlation between firm performance and 
accruals. 
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𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡is the return on assets measured as net income for firm i in year t divided by total 
assets in year t; and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡is the error term. 
I run industry-specific regression models and use their residuals to proxy for 
discretionary accruals (DACC). It is worth noting that the accruals calculation in the 
extant literature comprises inventory. The Charity Commission data does not include 
separate figures for inventory. Although the amount of inventory in the charity sector 
is expected to be negligible compared to the for-profit sector, to alleviate the risk of 
measurement error, I remove all those firm years where there were any expenses on 
trading expecting that the trading charities would have inventory within their current 
assets.61 
The second measure of manipulation relates to real accounts. Real earnings 
management involves manipulation of operating, investing, or financing activities. 
There are several ways to manipulate earnings using real accounts such as the 
overproduction of finished goods inventory to suppress cost of goods sold (COGS), 
hence higher gross profit, or disposal of fixed assets to inflate profit (e.g. Bartov, 1993; 
Herrmann et al. 2003; Roychowdhury, 2006; Xu et al., 2007; Gunny, 2010), relaxing 
credit terms by offering price discounts to accelerate sales (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; 
Kothari et al., 2015), curtailing the discretionary expenses e.g. research and 
development (R&D) and selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses (e.g. 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). 
Real activities management in nonprofits relates to the decisions that can be 
implemented swiftly, hence affecting accounting performance quickly. I expect that 
real earnings management for nonprofits can either be achieved by regulating 
fundraising activities or fundraising expenses. Fixed costs are allocated between 
charitable and fundraising costs and therefore it would not be easy to decouple fixed 
from variable costs, which I would expect to be more discretionary.  
Advertisement expense is characteristically acknowledged as a discretionary expense 
in the literature (e.g. Gunny, 2005; Cohen et al., 2010; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
                                               
61 The effect of such inventory is very small and the results are very similar even when the firm years with more 
than zero pounds of trading expenses are included in the final sample.  
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Eldenburg et al., 2011; ). In nonprofits, the fundraising expenses are incurred to induce 
contributions. These fundraising costs are associated with fundraising campaigns, 
mailings for funds from supporters, and other solicitations for contributions from 
individuals, foundations, and governments; in other words, they effectively advertise 
the nonprofit to raise awareness. A large portion of fundraising cost typically relates to 
the advertising employing various sources such as a grand fundraising gala dinner. 
Even though the solicited funds and contributions may not come in until a later date 
(maybe even in the subsequent year), the cost of mailing solicitation letters and the 
salaries of development/fundraising employees should be expensed as the expense 
is incurred. Advertising expenditures could be cut back or postponed (Eldenburg et 
al., 2011), therefore fundraising expenses could be an ideal candidate for managing 
earnings through discretionary expenses. Due to the absence of investors or analysts, 
a specific benchmark of earnings is not relevant; it is, however, clear from literature 
that there is a discontinuity around zero (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge 
et al. 1999; Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Eldenburg et al., 2011), possibly due to 
earnings management. Firms also avoid small losses (e.g. Leone and Van Horn, 2005; 
Gunny, 2010) and prefer a small surplus. To study REM in charities, I use prior 
literature to use small earnings as a target benchmark that managers pursue. I focus 
on fundraising activities as the discretionary expense to be manipulated. 
 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for all charity years in the sample. The mean 
(median) total income deflated by lagged total assets is 1.46 (0.86). A large number 
of very small and a small number of very large charities drive the skewness. The mean 
(median) of fundraising expenses (FR) deflated by lagged total assets is 0.08 (0.00), 
showing that most charities have a very low level of fundraising costs in their SoFA. 
The mean (median) of Net_Income deflated by lagged total assets is 0.06 (0.02), 
showing that most charities’ results lean towards a small surplus.  After winsorising 
the variables at the 1% and 99% percentiles of the distribution, the positive mean net 
income is consistent with charities aiming for small surpluses. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  103,469 1.46 0.86 1.94 0.38 1.79 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  88,739 0.04 0.01 0.39 -0.04 0.11 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  88,743 0.06 0.02 0.22 -0.02 0.08 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡) 103,469 14.81 14.66 1.71 13.52 15.98 
𝐹𝑅 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡  103,469 0.08 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.04 
𝛥𝐹𝑅 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡  88,739 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 88,743 -0.03 -0.02 0.2 -0.07 0.02 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 88,743 0.07 0.01 0.48 -0.05 0.12 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 88,743 0.54 0.62 0.40 0.10 0.88 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 103,469 0.04 0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.09 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 88,731 0.00 0.01 0.19 -0.05 0.05 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡 88,731 0.06 0.01 0.29 -0.06 0.12 
       
 
Table 3.2: Correlation  










































𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  1 0.191 0.404 -0.004 0.899 0.026 0.788 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 0.151 1 -0.183 -0.033 0.221 0.921 -0.390 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 0.331 -0.174 1 -0.045 0.321 0.000 0.336 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 -0.023 -0.035 -0.033 1 0.062 0.000 -0.004 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 0.997 0.160 0.329 -0.027 1 0.000 0.727 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 -0.103 0.832 -0.069 0.049 -0.098 1 -0.568 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡 0.699 -0.400 0.288 -0.045 0.693 -0.662 1 
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𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  1 0.150 -0.589 0.298 -0.033 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  0.236 1 -0.040 0.042 0.119 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡) -0.750 -0.088 1 -0.216 0.043 
𝐹𝑅 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡  0.129 0.040 -0.048 1 0.260 
𝛥𝐹𝑅 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡  0.007 0.104 0.022 0.310 1 





3.6 Hypotheses testing 
3.6.1 Accrual manipulation 
To test the first hypothesis, I use Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) methodology which 
is based on the analysis of the frequency distribution of earnings, with the assumption 
that, in the presence of earnings management, this distribution will be not be smooth 
around the benchmark (in this case zero-profit). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use 
net earnings deflated by lagged market value as their variable of choice. As charities 
Variable Definition 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  
Income in year t (similar to revenues in for-profit organisations), deflated by lagged total 
assets. 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  Change in Income from year t-1 to t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  Net income in year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t. 
𝐹𝑅𝑡  Fundraising expenses in year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝛥𝐹𝑅𝑡  Change in fundraising expenses from t-1 to t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  Accruals in year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡  Change in revenues from year t-1 to year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡  Property, plant, and equipment in year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  
Return (Net Income) on assets in year t measured as net income in year t divided by 
total assets in year t. 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  Discretionary accruals in year t from equation (1) of chapter 3. 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡  
Earnings before discretionary accruals in year t, measured as net income in year t less 
discretionary accruals. 
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do not have equity, I use lagged total assets as the deflator following the earlier 
nonprofit literature (e.g. Leone and Horn, 2005; Ferreira et al., 2013). I also present 
the distribution of earnings before discretionary accruals, which should be smooth 
around the benchmark.  
Figure 3.1 in the Appendix (panels A and B) present the histograms of earnings before 
discretionary accruals (EBDA) and net income respectively. Both EBDA and net 
income are deflated by lagged total assets using bin widths of 0.005.62 Similar to earlier 
studies (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Jacob and 
Jorgensen, 2007; Gore et al., 2007; Bennett et al., 2017), the distribution of EBDA 
(Figure 3.1 – Panel A) is compared with that of net income (Panel B). The histograms 
show that a large number of charities’ earnings have been shifted to slightly right of 
zero. The mean (standard deviation) of EBDA and net income are not significantly 
different at 0.056 (0.286) and 0.056 (0.222) respectively. This confirms Leone and Van 
Horn’s (2005) assertion, that overall, discretionary accruals do not contribute in 
altering the mean and medians but they do reduce the variance. The standard 
deviation is reduced from 0.286 for EBDA to 0.222 for net income.  A one-tailed F-test 
for differences in variances is significant and strongly rejects the null of the two 
distributions as equal at p < 0.001. 
To further study whether the distribution of net income is smooth, I conduct statistical 
tests similar to those performed by Leone and Van Horn (2005) (following Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997). For the test, the null hypothesis is for a smooth distribution of net 
income. The literature suggests that the smoothness is confirmed if the number of 
observations in a given interval (i) is equal to the expected number of observations in 
that particular interval.63I find that the z-score of the standardised difference to the left 
                                               
62 Following Degeorge et al. (1999) the bin widths were chosen using the formula 2(IQR)n -1/3. n denotes the 
number of available observations where IQR represents the interquartile range. 
 
63 Expected number is the average of the adjacent intervals on either side i.e. i−1 and i + 1. If the actual is more in 
the subject interval (i) then the difference can be statistically tested by calculating the difference between the 
expected and actual number in the relevant bin and divide by the estimated standard deviation. The estimated 
standard deviation of an interval can be calculated using a probability distribution. The standardised differences 
are calculated by dividing the difference between actual and observed observations in the interval (i) with the 
expected standard deviation of that interval. The variance (being the square of standard deviation) of the difference 
between actual and expected observations is approximately as follows: 
Npi(1−pi) + (1/4)N(pi−1 + pi+1)(1−pi−1 −pi+1) 
where N is the number of observations  and pi is the probability for observation to fall into the interval i.  Under the 
null, I would expect a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and the standard deviation of 1. My results are even 
more compelling than Leone and Van Horn’s (2005) as I observe negative signs in the adjacent bins to the happy 
range pointing to the fact that the expected numbers are lower on either side of the target range of small surplus 
and adding to the conviction that firms have chosen to move out of those intervals into the small surplus interval. 
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of the benchmark range in Panel B is -0.58, which is not significantly different from 0. 
On the other hand, the z-score of the standardised difference in the interval to the 
immediate right of the benchmark range is −0.68, which is not significantly different 
from zero and is in the predicted direction. The benchmark range has a 
disproportionately high number of firm years with a z-score of the standardised 
difference of 2.35 which is significantly different from 0. Therefore, there is a higher 
than expected number of charities that report zero profits. This provides limited support 
to the first hypothesis. 
The correlation matrix in table 3.2 shows low correlation between the independent 
variables used in the estimation regression, following earlier literature (e.g. Jones, 
1991; Leone and Van Horne, 2005; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012) with a 
correlation coefficient between  ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 of -0.033, and 0.33 between 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡. Similarly the coefficient between 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is also sufficiently 
low at -0.027.  
The mean and median results of the estimation regression are presented in Table 3.3. 
I run regressions for each industry year and the respective normal level of accruals 
are applied for each industry and year to estimate abnormal accruals, a proxy for 
earnings management. The mean (median) R2 for the equations is 0.15 (0.14). The 
average estimated coefficient for property, plant, and equipment is positive (0.378). 
Although earlier studies in nonprofit earnings management studies do not report the 
results of the estimation regression, I would expect a positive expected sign for 
property, plant, and equipment because of the income-increasing accrual due to the 
large legacy income in the form of assets. However, a negative sign is also plausible 
due to depreciation charge as for Jones (1991). (Leone and Van Horne, 2005). The 
expected sign for the change in revenues coefficient is not as obvious as in the case 
of Jones (1991). The change in income can cause income-increasing changes in some 
working capital accounts (e.g., increases in accounts receivable) and income-
decreasing changes in others (e.g., increases in accounts payable). It is probable that 
the positive sign represents that most income of charities is not accrued due to the 
unpredictability and prudence but their expenses may be. 
                                               
This is confirmed by the positive sign of the difference in the happy range, suggesting that the firms have migrated 
into that range more than the expected number of firms in this range. 
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Table 3.3: Estimation models results 
Estimation models for normal levels of accruals 
The table presents results of the regression of the forms: 
𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝜟𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕/






















For EBDA, I find that the z-score of the standardised differences for the benchmark 
range and the two adjacent ranges on either side are all not significantly different from 
zero.  The interval on the left of the benchmark range in Panel A has the z-score of 
the standardised difference of -0.17, which is not significantly different from 0. 
Similarly, the z-score of the standardised difference in the interval to the immediate 
right of the benchmark range is −0.44, which is also not significantly different from zero 
and in the predicted direction. The benchmark range of the interval between 0 and -
0.005 has a z-score of the standardised difference of 0.29. That is also not significantly 
different from 0.This supports Leone and Van Horn’s (2005) inference that managers 
use discretionary accruals to manage earnings to report a small surplus and avoid 
Independent Variable 
Dependant Variable: 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 
Mean Median 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept 0.001 0.179 0.002 0.136 
1/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 -5152.79 0.136 -4376.09* 0.076 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 -0.133*** 0.004 -0.122*** 0.000 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 0.378*** 0.001 0.373*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 -0.043* 0.097 -0.048** 0.023 
R2 0.15  0.14  
Variable Definition 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡  Change in revenues from year t-1 to year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡  Property, plant, and equipment in year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  
Return (Net Income) on assets in year t measured as net income in year t divided by 
total assets in year t. 
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1  Total assets in year t-1 
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losses. The difference in Panels A and B of Figure 3.1 rejects the possibility that the 
kink could be entirely due to operating activities. Therefore, I find limited support for 
hypothesis 1, that charities are more likely to report a small surplus compared to a 
small deficit.  
To test the second hypothesis, I follow the methodology set by Leone and Van Horn 
(2005). I begin with the following model to examine the relationship between earnings 
before discretionary accruals (EBDA) and discretionary accruals: 
𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑵𝒆𝒕_𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕   (3.2) 
Where: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is discretionary accruals in year t from equation (3.1); 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 is earnings before discretionary accruals in year t, measured as income in year 
t less discretionary accruals; 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡−1is net income in year t-1 deflated by lagged total assets; and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡is the error term. 
Following the literature (e.g. Leone and Van Horn, 2005), assuming that discretionary 
accruals are used to report a small surplus, I expect an inverse relationship between 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡and 𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡.  𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡−1is added as a control variable because there is a 
positive relationship between past performance and discretionary accruals for the 
present period. A positive sign is expected for β2. 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡−1controls for the probability 
of autocorrelation in discretionary accruals (e.g. Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ferreira 
et al., 2013).64 I also include a control for size (𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1)) and change in income. 
Although the sign remains positive when the regression is run as a simple OLS (e.g. 
Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ferreira et al., 2013), when year fixed effects are included 
and standard errors are clustered by nonprofit subgroups in the model, the sign 
becomes negative. The results are presented in table 3.4 without the addition of the 
two control variables: size and change in income. 
                                               
64 Following Petersen (2009) methodology, I run linear regression with standard errors clustered by firms. This is 
done so the standard errors are unbiased and produce a more accurate size of confidence intervals considering 
temporary or permanent firm effects. 
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Table 3.4: Tests of accrual manipulation in charities 
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 














The results in table 3.4 indicate that there is a negative and significant coefficient 
between discretionary accruals and EBDA (𝛽1 = -0.391, significant at the 1% level). 
Therefore, hypothesis 2 is supported, whereby there is evidence that charities use 
more discretionary accruals when earnings before discretionary accruals are lower. In 
terms of the control variables, the results indicate that larger firms with higher past 
performance have lower current year discretionary accruals.  
I run equation 2 regression, when EBDA is a) above zero b) below zero. The results 
as tabulated in Table 3.5 confirm that the relationship between discretionary accruals 
and earnings before discretionary accruals is more negative for the firms with pre-
managed earnings below zero. This supports the hypothesis that a deficit is less 
desirable for charities than a small surplus with a significantly negative relationship of 
EBDA with DACC (coefficient -0.31 for the firms with positive EBDA and -0.59 for the 
nonprofits with negative EBDA). 
Independent Variable Prediction Coeff P-value 
Intercept  0.021*** 0.000 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡 - -0.391*** 0.000 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 + -0.062*** 0.000 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1  -0.181*** 0.000 
Observations  74,319  
R2  0.35  
Variable Definition 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  Net income in year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  Discretionary accruals in year t from equation (1) of chapter 3. 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡  
Earnings before discretionary accruals in year t, measured as net income in year t less 
discretionary accruals. 
Chapter 3: Study on Accruals-based and Real Activities Earnings Management by UK Charities 
121 
 
Table 3.5: Tests of accrual manipulation in charities by direction of 
manipulation 
The table presents results of regressions across positive and negative EBDA of the 
form: 
𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑵𝒆𝒕_𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕   (3.2) 
  
  
Charities with positive 
EBDA 
Charities with negative 
EBDA 
Independent Variable Prediction Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value 
Intercept  0.002 0.248 0.003** 0.020 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡 - -0.311*** 0.000 -0.594*** 0.000 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 + -0.085*** 0.000 -0.021** 0.012 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 ? -0.181*** 0.000 -0.118*** 0.000 
Observations  40,985  35,391  
R2  0.18  0.37  





Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 relate to the behaviour of charities that have different types of 
funders i.e. sophisticated vs. unsophisticated, endowment vs. no-endowment, and 
service-oriented vs. charitable. I use the following regressions to test these 
hypotheses: 
𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑺𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕 +  
𝜷𝟒𝑵𝒆𝒕_𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      (3.3)  
  
Variable Definition 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1  Net income in year t-1, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  Discretionary accruals in year t from equation (1) of chapter 3. 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡  
Earnings before discretionary accruals in year t, measured as net income in year t less 
discretionary accruals. 
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𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑬𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑬𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 +  
𝜷𝟒𝑵𝒆𝒕_𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      (3.4)  
𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑺𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕 +  
𝜷𝟒𝑵𝒆𝒕_𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      (3.5)  
Where Sophisticated is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median 
restricted funds within its respective  nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise; 
Endowment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median 
endowment fund ratio (end of year endowment fund divided by total funds) within its 
respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise; 
Service is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median programme 
service revenue to total revenue within its respective nonprofit classification, and 0 
otherwise; 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
The results of the equations are tabulated in Table 3.6. The coefficient on the 
interaction of charity with more sophisticated donors with EBDA is significantly positive 
at the 5% significance level (coefficient 0.026; p=0.045), suggesting that a charity with 
more sophisticated donors is less likely to manipulate earnings using discretionary 
accruals.  Similarly, nonprofits that receive their largest funds from the endowments 
are less likely to manipulate the earnings figure (coefficient 0.066; p=0.003). This can 
be explained by a regularly assured stream of income from an endowment, pointing 
to a lower persistent resource dependency from the endowing funders of an endowed 
nonprofit. My finding extends this to accruals-based earnings management. In order 
to disentangle the complexities of accruals-based earnings management, small and 
unsophisticated donors would require data across charities and time. To analyse 
“normal” levels of accruals and any deviations, they would need to utilise statistical 
models which are far more formal than “heuristics” (Yetman and Yetman, 2013) for an 
unsophisticated funder. Tinkelman (1998) use the size of donors as a proxy for their 
sophistication. They find that larger donors are more likely to discount joint cost 
disclosures relative to smaller (less sophisticated) donors, whereas Khumawala et al. 
(2005) find that expert donors are less likely to discount joint cost disclosures relative 
to novice donors. 
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Table 3.6: Tests of accrual manipulation in charities related to type of funders 
The table presents results of regressions of the form: 
𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑺𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕 +  
𝜷𝟒𝑵𝒆𝒕_𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      (3.3)  
 
𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑬𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑬𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 +  
𝜷𝟒𝑵𝒆𝒕_𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      (3.4)  
 
𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑬𝑩𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑺𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕 +  










 Sophisticated Endowment Service 
Independent Variable Prediction Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value 
Intercept  0.013*** 0.000 0.021*** 0.000 0.028*** 0.000 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡 - -0.407*** 0.000 -0.396*** 0.000 -0.337*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡 ? 0.015*** 0.000     
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 ?   -0.002 0.691   
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 ?     -0.011*** 0.000 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡
∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡 
+ 0.026** 0.045     
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 +   0.066*** 0.003   
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 ?     -0.114*** 0.000 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 + -0.062*** 0.000 -0.062*** 0.000 -0.060*** 0.000 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 ? -0.181*** 0.000 -0.181*** 0.000 -0.180*** 0.000 
Observations  74,319  74,319  74,319  
R2  0.35  0.35  0.36  
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Variable definitions:  
 
The heightened government oversight is associated with lower financial reporting 
aggressiveness through accruals-based earnings management (Koreff et al., 2019).  
The results of equation (3.5) are tabulated in the third set of results of Table 3.6, 
illustrating that more service-oriented charities are more likely than their charitable 
counterparts to manipulate the bottom-line earnings through accruals-based earnings 
management. Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction of service-oriented 
charities with EBDA is significantly negative (coefficient -0.114; p=0.000), suggesting 
that more service-oriented nonprofits are more likely to manipulate earnings using 
discretionary accruals than less service-oriented the charitable nonprofits. 
The increased propensity of accruals-based earnings management is consistent with 
the notion that the demand for financial reporting increases as the donor’s direct 
involvement with the recipient organisation decreases (Gordon and Khumawala, 1999; 
Balsam and Harris, 2013) therefore accruals-based management is more likely where 
financial statements are less referred to relative to other information sources. “In 
contrast, supporters who are recipients of nonprofit services can directly evaluate the 
quality of those services and, thus, have less demand for financial reporting” (Balsam 
and Harris, 2013). As financial statements become more relevant for charitable 
nonprofits with a bigger donor-recipient separation, the accounting-based 
manipulation may be less desirable due to its detectability through financial 
Variable Definition 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  Net income in year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1  Net income in year t-1, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  Discretionary accruals in year t from equation (1)  
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1  Discretionary accruals in year t-1 from equation (1)  
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑡  
Earnings before discretionary accruals in year t, measured as net income in year t less 
discretionary accruals. 
𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median restricted funds within its 
respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median endowment fund ratio (end 
of year endowment fund divided by total funds) within its respective nonprofit 
classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median programme service revenue 
to total revenue within its respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
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statements. On the contrary, the more service-oriented charities have diminished 
demand for the financial statements due to an indistinct donor-recipient separation as 
they would have other ways to get the information of a charity’s performance. There 
is a common belief that managers prefer accrual-based management compared to 
real earnings management as the potential consequences could be worse for real 
manipulation (e.g. Graham et al., 2005; Gunny, 2005; Zang, 2011; Kothari et al. 2015). 
A low donor-beneficiary separation would suggest an aversion to real manipulation, 
with a potentially larger impact on services and closer scrutiny by the beneficiaries, a 
large portion of whom is also its donors. Another possible explanation could be that 
the donations from small donors are hard to accrue, hence the opportunity for the 
income-based earnings management may be less available to charitable nonprofits. 
On the other hand, when there are large contracts, where the payment periods can 
shift between periods there is a more likelihood of subjectivity in income recognition.  
 
3.6.2 Real accounts manipulation 
The hypotheses relating to real manipulation are in relation to managerial discretion in 
levels of fundraising spending. The fundraising expenses are not directly related to 
achieving the main purpose of a charity, therefore are comparable to discretionary 
expenses which according to both for-profit and nonprofit literature are prone to 
manipulation.  
Hypothesis 6 examines fundraising expenses as a tool to manage earnings, either 
upwards or downwards in pursuit of a zero-profit benchmark. Following Eldenburg et 
al. (2011) I compute “projected income” which signifies what net income would be if 
the fundraising expenses in year t were the same as in year t-1.  This is calculated by 
computing net income before fundraising expense of the same year t and then adding 
back the reported fundraising costs in year t-1. The purpose for computing projected 
income is to categorise the ranges which are mainly above and below benchmark net 
income ranges. A charity is classified within the “benchmark range” if its projected 
income deflated by lagged total assets falls in interval [0, 0.04). If a charity has a large 
enough deficit in year t that by substituting fundraising expenses in t-1 for the 
fundraising expenses in year t will not push it to the benchmark range this is classified 
as “far below”. The projected income of a “far below “charity is below zero by an 
amount more than the fundraising expenses in t-1 and therefore the real expense 
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management of fundraising costs on its own will not suffice to enter the desired 
benchmark range.  In other words, even if the fundraising expense were to be brought 
down to zero, the firm would not enter the benchmark range. The neighbouring bins 
of the benchmark range is “below” on its left and a downward adjustment to the 
expense can help to migrate the firm into the benchmark range. 
Following Eldenburg et al. (2011), I hypothesise that the firms in the “below” range 
have incentives to push their way into the benchmark range. They achieve the desired 
range by managing fundraising expenses downwards in relation to their fundraising 
expenses in t-1. Likewise, the firms in “above” range have incentives to migrate into 
the benchmark range from the right. These firms would have incentives in achieving 
the benchmark range by managing fundraising expenses upwards in relation to their 
fundraising expenses in t-1.  
Therefore, for H665, I expect managers to decrease fundraising expenses in relation 
to the previous year so that the reported net income is more positive than projected. 
Likewise, I expect managers to increase fundraising expenses in relation to the 
previous year so that the reported net income is less positive than projected, in order 
to avoid additional scrutiny due to a large bottom line. Regarding “far below” firm years, 
following Eldenburg (2011), I have no directional prediction. These nonprofits that 
have their projected income far below the benchmark range are faced with two 
possible choices, a) come very close to the benchmark range by deferring the 
fundraising expenses as much as possible, despite the fact they are unable to reach 
zero earnings even if the fundraising cost on their own are completely removed, b) 
“Take a bath” by bringing forward some discretionary expenses from a future period 
to the current period, so that the expenditure is reduced and hence income becomes 
larger in a future period. 
I run the following regression to test the hypothesis: 
𝜟𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑵𝒐𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕−𝟏) +
𝜷𝟓𝜟𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝟓+𝒋𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒋
𝟏𝟐
𝒋=𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕       (3.6) 
where: 
                                               
65 For easy reference H6 is restated here:  
When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be below (above) the benchmark, nonprofits will decrease 
(increase) spending on fundraising activities. 
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ⵠ𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = change in fundraising expenses from t-1 to t, deflated by lagged total assets; 
Decrease = 1 if projected income is below benchmark range ([0, 0.04)) by an amount 
lower than previous year’s fundraising expense, 0 otherwise; 
Increase = 1 if projected income is above benchmark range ([0, 0.04)) by an amount 
larger than previous year’s fundraising expense, 0 otherwise; 
NoPred= 1 if projected income is below benchmark range ([0, 0.04)) by an amount 
larger than previous year’s fundraising expense, 0 otherwise; 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡−1)is log of total assets in year t-1; 
ⵠ𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡is change in total income (similar to revenues in for-profit firms) from t-1 to 
t, deflated by lagged total assets; and 
YEARj = 1 if observation is in year j of the sample, 0 otherwise; 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
The independent primary indicator variables of interest are Increase, Decrease and 
NoPred. Increase and Decrease in the multivariate regression model represent the 
charity years for which I expect management to manage fundraising expenditure 
upwards and downwards respectively (corresponding to the “above” and “below” 
classifications discussed above). The NoPred variable indicates the firm-years which 
are “far below” the benchmark range and hence the direction of manipulation cannot 
be predicted. Following the extant literature, I use the log of total assets to control for 
the charity size and ⵠ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 to control for changes in ordinary operations from t-1 to t. 
If hypothesis 666 is supported, I expect a negative sign for β1and a positive sign for β2. 
The results are presented in Table 3.7. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the charities with negative (positive) projected net 
income decrease (increase) fundraising expenses to achieve the target benchmark 
net income. The coefficient estimate on Decrease is -0.091 and significant at the 1% 
significance level. 
Table 3.7: Test of real manipulation in charities 
                                               
66 For easy reference H6 is restated here:  
When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be below (above) the benchmark, nonprofits will decrease 
(increase) spending on fundraising activities. 
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The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
𝜟𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕  =  𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑵𝒐𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕−𝟏) +
𝜷𝟓𝜟𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝟓+𝒋𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒋
𝟏𝟐
𝒋=𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕       (3.6) 
Independent Variables Prediction Coeff P-Value 
Intercept  0.082*** 0.000 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 - -0.100*** 0.000 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 0.022*** 0.000 
𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 ? -0.012*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡)  -0.006*** 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  0.013*** 0.000 
Year Indicators  Yes  
Observations  86,777  
R2  0.13  
 





The coefficient estimate on Increase is 0.021 and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, 
although the propensity is lower than for the charities with small deficit, the charities 
far below the benchmark range also decrease their fundraising expenses, presumably 
in their effort to reduce their deficit.  The results from Equation (3.6) represent that a 
charity with higher level of net income will increase fundraising expenses, in its effort 
to enter the benchmark range.  
Variable Definition 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  Change in Income from year t-1 to t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t. 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if projected income is below benchmark range ([0, 0.04)) by 
an amount lower than previous year’s fundraising expense, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if projected income is above benchmark range ([0, 0.04)) by 
an amount higher than previous year’s fundraising expense, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if projected income is below benchmark range ([0, 0.04)) by 
an amount larger than previous year’s fundraising expense, and 0 otherwise. 
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To test H7, H8 and H967 I include an interaction term in my empirical model by 
examining the interaction of Increase, Decrease and NoPred with indicator variables 
representing sophisticated funders, endowment funds, and service-oriented funding.  
As discussed earlier the sophisticated donors have a detailed direct scrutiny or 
monitoring because of higher than median level of restricted donations. An increased 
level of restricted donations implies increased monitoring by the donors relative to the 
nonprofits funded by unrestricted income from less sophisticated donors. I expect such 
interaction will decrease the likelihood of REM employing the fundraising expenses. I 
interact Decrease, Increase and NoPred with Sophisticated as well as Endowment 
and Service in the following models: 
∆FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏Decrease𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐Increase𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑NoPred𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒Sophisticated 𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓Decrease𝒊𝒕 ∗
Sophisticated 𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔Increase𝒊𝒕 ∗ Sophisticated 𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕NoPred𝒊𝒕 ∗ Sophisticated 𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟖Log(Assets𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟗∆Income𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝟗+𝒋
𝟏𝟐
𝒋=𝟏 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹𝒋 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕     (3.7) 
∆FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏Decrease𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐Increase𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑NoPred𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒Endowment𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓Decrease𝒊𝒕 ∗
Endowment𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔Increase𝒊𝒕 ∗ Endowment𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕NoPred𝒊𝒕 ∗ Endowment𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖Log(Assets𝒊𝒕) +
𝜷𝟗∆Income𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝟗+𝒋
𝟏𝟐
𝒋=𝟏 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹𝒋 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕         (3.8) 
∆FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏Decrease𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐Increase𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑NoPred𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒Service𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓Decrease𝒊𝒕 ∗
Service𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔Increase𝒊𝒕 ∗ Service𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕NoPred𝒊𝒕 ∗ Service𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖Log(Assets𝒊𝒕) +
𝜷𝟗∆Income𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝟗+𝒋
𝟏𝟐
𝒋=𝟏 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹𝒋 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕         (3.9) 
Where all variables have been previously defined.  
The first set of results in Table 3.8 are from Equation (7). Consistent with H768, the 
coefficient on the interaction of the indicator variable Sophisticated with Decrease is 
                                               
67 For easy reference, H7, H8 and H9 are restated here: 
H7: When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be above (below) the benchmark, nonprofits with more sophisticated 
funders are less likely to increase (decrease) spending on fundraising activities than nonprofits with less 
sophisticated funders. 
H8: When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be above (below) the benchmark, nonprofits with high endowment 
funding are less likely to increase (decrease) spending on fundraising activities than other nonprofits. 
H9: When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be above (below) the benchmark, nonprofits that are service-
oriented are less likely to increase (decrease) spending on fundraising activities compared to charitable nonprofits. 
 
68 For easy reference H7 is restated here:  
H7: When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be above (below) the benchmark, nonprofits with more 
sophisticated funders are less likely to increase (decrease) spending on fundraising activities than nonprofits with 
less sophisticated funders 
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significantly positive (coefficient 0.016; p=0.002). The coefficient of the interaction with 
Increase is significantly negative (coefficient -0.007; p=0.001). These results suggest 
that a charity funded predominantly by sophisticated donors, who place restrictions on 
the use of their funds, is less likely to employ real earnings management using 
fundraising expenses from either side of the benchmark. The coefficient on the 
interaction of Sophisticated with NoPred is not significant, indicating that the 
sophistication of a charity’s funders does not affect the willingness of nonprofit 
managers, when their projected income is far below the benchmark range.  
The second set of results in Table 3.8 relates to endowment funds (equation 3.8). 
Consistent with H869, the coefficient on the interaction of the indicator variable 
Endowment with Decrease is significantly positive (coefficient 0.07; p=0.000) and that 
with Increase is significantly negative (coefficient -0.013; p=0.000). This suggests that 
a charity funded predominantly through endowment income, from the donors who also 
tend to be sophisticated, placing restrictions on the use of funds, is less likely to employ 
real earnings management using fundraising expenses from either side of the 
benchmark. The coefficient on the interaction of endowed charity with NoPred is 
significantly positive, indicating that the endowment charities are less likely to manage 
fundraising expenses downwards to reduce large deficits. The final hypothesis refers 
to the impact of interaction with service-oriented nonprofits, which by design have a 
higher level of direct scrutiny due to a low donor-beneficiary distance. On the contrary, 
the donors of more charitable nonprofits are predominantly disparate donors who are 
not the beneficiaries of the charity. Hence, the reliance on a more detailed study of the 
financial statements is expected relative to their more service-oriented counterparts 
that have other direct sources of information of a charity’s services. I interact 
Decrease, Increase and NoPred with a service-oriented charities dummy, with the 
expectation that real earnings management is less detectable through financial 
statements than AEM. 
 
 
                                               
69 For easy reference H8 is restated here:  
When nonprofits’ earnings are expected to be above (below) the benchmark, nonprofits with high endowment 
funding are less likely to increase (decrease) spending on fundraising activities than other nonprofits. 
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Table 3.8: Test of real manipulation in charities related to type of funders 
The table presents results of regressions of the form: 
∆FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏Decrease𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐Increase𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑NoPred𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟒Sophisticated ( Endowment or Service)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓Decrease𝒊𝒕
∗ Sophisticated ( Endowment or Service)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔Increase𝒊𝒕
∗ Sophisticated ( Endowment or Service)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕No_Pred𝒊𝒕




+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                                                          ( 𝟑. 𝟕, 𝟑. 𝟖, 𝟑. 𝟗) 
 
 
*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 Sophisticated Endowment Service 
Independent Variable Prediction Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value 
Intercept  0.081*** 0.000 0.084*** 0.000 0.087*** 0.000 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 - -0.109*** 0.000 -0.110*** 0.000 -0.098*** 0.000 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 0.025*** 0.000 0.023*** 0.000 0.030*** 0.000 
𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 ? -0.011*** 0.000 -0.014*** 0.000 -0.020*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡 - -0.001 0.636     
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 -   -0.002 0.473   
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 ?     -0.004* 0.073 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 0.016*** 0.002     
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡 - -0.007*** 0.001     
𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡 ? -0.002 0.355     
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 +   0.065*** 0.000   
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 -   -0.013*** 0.000   
𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 ?   0.009*** 0.000   
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 ?     -0.001 0.901 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 ?     -0.015*** 0.000 
𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 ?     0.014*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡)  -0.006*** 0.000 -0.006*** 0.000 -0.006*** 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  0.013*** 0.000 0.012*** 0.000 0.012*** 0.000 
Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  86,777  86,777  86,777  
R2  0.13  0.13  0.13  





The results appear in the final columns of table 3.8. The coefficient on the interaction 
of the indicator variable, Service, with Decrease is not significant and that with 
Increase is significantly negative (coefficient -0.015; p=0.000) suggesting that a 
service-oriented charity is less likely to employ real earnings management to increase 
fundraising expenses to reduce net income. It may be that a service-oriented charity 
would be more concerned to shift its deficit into the benchmark than reducing its 
income employing real activities management; avoiding it looking financially unviable 
to a contract-providing authority. On the contrary, the coefficient on the interaction of 
service-oriented charity with NoPred is significantly positive (coefficient 0.014; 
p=0.000). There are two possible explanations to explain this. It may be an indication 
that a service-oriented charity is less likely to manage its fundraising costs than its 
charitable nonprofit counterpart to move towards the benchmark range when it makes 
a very large deficit, like in the case of a small deficit. Alternatively, it may take a “bath” 
by employing REM to increase the expenses further by bringing them forward 
(Eldenburg et al., 2011), hence shifting discretionary expenditures from future periods 
to the current period. Such practice can potentially improve the chances of achieving 
the benchmark in the next period, when the probability to convert loss into surplus 
would otherwise be remote.   
Variable Definition 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  Change in Income from year t-1 to t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t. 
𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median restricted funds within its 
respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median endowment fund ratio (end 
of year endowment fund divided by total funds) within its respective nonprofit 
classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median programme service revenue 
to total revenue within its respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if projected income is below benchmark range ([0, 0.04)) by 
an amount lower than previous year’s fundraising expense, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if projected income is above benchmark range ([0, 0.04)) by 
an amount higher than previous year’s fundraising expense, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if projected income is below benchmark range ([0, 0.04)) by 
an amount larger than previous year’s fundraising expense, and 0 otherwise. 
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3.7 Robustness tests 
I run the estimation regression using Kothari (2005), by adding return on assets for the 
current year (ROAt) and previous year (ROAt−1) as a control variable for the effect of 
performance on measured discretionary accruals. I run the regressions by industry 
and year and the results are essentially similar using either the current year (ROAt) or 
the previous year (ROAt−1) to those reported in the main analysis.  
I run all regressions, adding log of total assets and change in net income to the 
equation as control variables too. The results are broadly similar with the coefficient 
on EBDA as -0.44 in the main regression and a significantly positive result or change 
in net income with the coefficient of 0.16. The coefficient on log of total assets is not 
significant. For the interaction regressions, although the coefficient on sophisticated 
charity is not significant, the endowment charity interaction remains significantly 
positive with the coefficient 0.044, supporting a weaker negative relationship between 
DACC and EBDA for an endowment charity. The results for more the more service-
oriented charities are also similar with a significantly negative interaction term 
coefficient of -0.1, confirming a higher degree of accrual manipulation for more service-
oriented charities.  
In addition to the above, I run regressions using continuous variables, rather than 
using dichotomous variables as proxies for sophistication and donor-beneficiary 
separation in the main analysis. The continuous variable for sophistication is the 
restricted funds as a ratio of total funds, and programme service revenue as a ratio of 
total income for donor-beneficiary separation. The results are all broadly similar to the 
results tabulated for the main analysis.  The result for restricted funds interaction is 
significantly positive and for programme service revenue, it is significantly negative. 
To address a possible mechanical relation between discretionary accruals and EBDA, 
following Leone and Van Horn (2005) and Vansant (2016), I substitute EBDA with 
EBAE i.e. earnings before total accrual expenses. To calculate EBAE I add back total 
accruals to net income. The results are similar to those for the main analysis. With 
DACC as the dependent variable, the coefficient on EBAE is -0.45. By employing 
EBAE-Sophisticated interaction, the coefficient is .046 and EBAE-Endowment 
interaction is 0.072, confirming a mitigating impact by donor sophistication through 
restriction or endowment. Similarly the coefficient on EBAE-Service interaction is -.10 
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alluding to a higher likelihood for a service-oriented charity to manage earnings using 
accruals-based earnings management techniques. 
In my main study to test real earnings management hypotheses, following earlier 
studies (e.g. Degeorge, 1999; Leone and Van Horn, 2005), I calculated bin widths for 
net income using the formula 2(IQR)n⅓ and based on which the bin width 0.005, as 
reported in the main study. However, I also impose the bin widths of 0.004 and 0.006. 
The results are quite similar to those for all REM hypotheses.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This study investigates both accrual and real manipulation in charities around a 
significant benchmark: zero profits, with a focus on charity types. I find that nonprofits 
avoid large surplus and deficits and in so doing employ real and accrual-based 
earnings management techniques. The propensity and method of such manipulation 
depends on sophistication and donor-beneficiary distance. I find evidence that 
charities funded by sophisticated donors or those with large endowment funds, are 
less likely to manage earnings using accounting-based or real activities-based 
techniques. 
I first investigate whether UK nonprofits use discretionary accruals to manage earnings 
to a small surplus benchmark and whether the likelihood of earnings management in 
this setting is affected by donor sophistication and donor-beneficiary separation. I find 
that UK nonprofits manage earnings towards a small surplus benchmark after 
observing pre-managed earnings on either side of the benchmark.  The evidence is 
consistent with both the zero-profit (Bouwens et al, 2004; Leone and Van Horn, 2005; 
Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; ) and loss avoidance (e.g. 
Leone and Van Horn, 2005) hypotheses, with an amplified appetite for loss avoidance 
than a large surplus aversion. This is consistent with the earlier literature and can be 
explained in light of resource dependency theory. The funders may consider charities 
with large surpluses as less needy of their funds, hence prompting managers to 
appease funders through earnings management.  
I also find that charities with sophisticated funders are less likely to engage in earnings 
management behaviour to reach this zero-profit benchmark. In addition, charities that 
are mostly funded by endowments are less likely to manipulate bottom-line income. I 
also investigate manipulation in service-oriented charities that are dependent mainly 
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on public support through programme revenue from government grants or contracts. I 
find these charities to be less manipulative in targeting a small surplus employing real 
accounts manipulation (i.e. fundraising costs). This could be because a low donor-
recipient separation would make abnormal changes to fundraising costs more 
noticeable and hence reduce their preference as a tool for earnings management. This 
may also be because such charities resort mainly to accrual manipulation techniques 
as a substitute during the year. Since accrual manipulation is employed at year-end, 
it remains less noticeable for the funders who, because of having access to several 
other sources of information, are less likely to read the financial statements at year-
end compared to other charities. 
Overall, the oversight for real spending appears better for service-oriented charities, 
presumably, due to a low donor-recipient separation, through better supervision of 
charity funds. Possibly, the reduced desire for real accounts manipulation points to a 
better awareness of the adverse effects of this on future performance compared to the 
accounting-based earning management. 
There are some differences between small and large charities too; larger charities are 
less likely to manage earnings by altering fundraising costs. Given that the size of a 
firm is used as a proxy of management sophistication in prior literature, these findings 
support the argument that real manipulation is seen as more dysfunctional, hence 
sophisticated donors and managers are comparatively more wary of its use.  
This study has a multitude of implications at various levels. As the focus of the study 
is on larger UK charities, it covers a very large portion of the sector which includes all 
charities that are audited.  Hence, there are economically important implications for 
the audit profession through understanding the incentives for manipulation vis-à-vis 
funding types. This can potentially guide auditors at the audit plan stage in deciding 
on an effective balance between analytical review, tests of control and substantive 
testing. Similarly, given that one in four adults donate to the sector in the UK, this study 
is relevant to ensure that the funders are not unduly fixated on the bottom line figure; 
rather, their main concern should be on the effectiveness, efficiency and stewardship 
of a charity utilising a multitude of information sources. A large army of volunteers also 
have the right to be informed of the reporting misgivings in the sector.  This study also 
informs donors to consider placing restrictions on their funds in order for managers to 
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be more careful to maintain a good financial reporting quality. In addition, this study 
also has implications for the donors of less service-oriented charities showing that 
these charities could compromise on financial reporting quality in pursuit of a target 
bottom-line figure employing a more costly method of earnings management, the real 
activities manipulation.  
 
3.9 Limitations and future research 
As with all research, there are limitations in this study. For example, there may be 
certain firms that are temporarily targeting a particular funding source whilst making 
accounting or expense-related decisions, hence cannot practically have typical 
attributes of its particular taxonomy. Similarly, a complex mix of funding from 
programme, fundraising, restricted, and unrestricted income sources could make a 
manager’s job more difficult to predict than a manager of a nonprofit that belongs to a 
clearly defined classification.   
Better understanding of the interplay between accruals-based and real activities 
management would make a useful addition to this work. Similarly, the addition of a 
high quality audit as a monitoring mechanism as a control variable will help in 
understanding management’s behaviour purely due to donor monitoring.  
Furthermore, the study of the impact of real activities and accruals-based earnings 
management on future performance would have important policy implications. For-
profit earnings management research points to a more severe impact on a firm’s future 
health when it engages in real manipulation (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kim and 
Sohn, 2013). Empirical evidence to test the same for nonprofits will have implications 
for several stakeholders. Accounting-based manipulation that is found to be prevalent 
in service-oriented nonprofits may be lesser of the evils, only if it could be 
demonstrated that its impact is less severe on the future services of a charity. This 
could be linked with a corporate governance study of charities to assess whether 
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Appendix 3.1: Figures 
 
Figure 3.1: EBDA and net income histograms 
Panel A: Histogram showing distribution of earnings before discretionary accruals (EBDA) of nonprofit 
sample 
 





Chapter 3: Study on Accruals-based and Real Activities Earnings Management by UK Charities 
138 
 




Group 1 Culture and recreation 
Group 2 Education and research 
Group 3 Health 
Group 4 Social services 
Group 5 Environment 
Group 6 Development and housing 
Group 7 Law, advocacy and politics 
Group 8 Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion 
Group 9 International 
Group 10 Religion 
Group 11 Business and professional associations, unions 
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Chapter 4: Study on Expense Misclassification: Evidence 
from UK Charities 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The UK charity sector is going through a period of strained financial resource 
availability. Various challenges are currently faced by charities to guarantee them a 
safely funded space for themselves. Increased funding pressures with long years of 
austerity culminating in unprecedented strain on government spending following the 
coronavirus outbreak in 202070, and a generally reduced public trust in the sector have 
exacerbated the uncertainty in reliably raising funding. In 2019, the fundraising income 
and spending declined by £300 million, moreover, the Charity Commission has warned 
of the worsening accounting quality of UK charities71 for the third consecutive year. 
For the first time, the drop has been described as “significant” by the Commission. 
Recently, Nigel Davies, the Charity Commission head of accountancy services stated 
that ‘The public want and deserve to know how charities spend their money, so this 
deterioration in the quality of accounts is of serious concern’.72 The drop in fundraising 
income when accompanied by a fall in fundraising expenses begs the question 
whether expenses are being hidden to convince the donors of the continued legitimacy 
of the relevant charities.73 Although the largest fundraising charities’ total income has 
increased slightly over the last two years, since 2014/15 the annual income growth 
has been on a downward trajectory.74  
                                               
70 A high degree of social disruption has impacted on the delivery of and demand for the activities of 
charities, the availability of staff for work, and levels of illness across society which will affect the 
beneficiaries of charities. There are therefore potential implications for charity income, expenditure 
and commitments. In some cases the implications may be so severe as to cast doubt upon a charity’s 














74 Report by Cathy Pharoah and Philanthropy Research at Cass Business School.  
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Given the significance and reach of the sector, with over 180,000 registered charities 
in the UK75 if anything appears out of the norm with respect to a specific charity, this 
may impact future funding. There are various metrics to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of charities, both qualitatively and quantitatively. One such quantitative set 
of metrics to assess efficiency is the expense ratios of charities. Expenses in charities 
are broadly classified as programme (or referred to as charitable activities expenses), 
fundraising and administrative. Programme related expenses are associated with 
fulfilling the recognised objectives of a charity; fundraising costs are expended for 
generating income e.g. individual and corporate donations and government grants, 
and administrative expenses amount to the costs for managing the entity (Krishnan 
and Yetman, 2010). In the UK charity data, it is easier to identify the reported 
fundraising and programme spending but administrative costs are not separately 
presented as they are embedded within the fundraising and charitable expenses.  
The commonly used expense ratios are the 1) fundraising ratio – fundraising costs as 
a percentage of total expenses or total income, 2) charitable activities (programme) 
ratio – charitable activities costs as a percentage of total expenses or total income, 
and 3) administration costs ratio - support and governance costs as a ratio of total 
costs (e.g. Gordon et al., 2006, 2009; Krishnan et al., 2006; Connolly et al., 2013).  The 
programme related expenses, which are favourable expenses from donors’ and 
media’s perspective, reflect those expenses that are directly associated with achieving 
the charitable cause for which a charity is registered with the Charity Commission. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the public, as potential beneficiaries and 
contributors to UK charities, and the Charitable Commission are indeed concerned 
with this ratio. For example, in 2017 the Charity Commission issued a stark warning 
to a Derbyshire charity after it emerged that the charity had spent just 3 percent of its 
total expenditure on charitable activities in 2014-15; the majority of the expenditure 
was on fundraising and other expenses.76 The Charity Commission has raised 
concerns about the misallocation of expenses in a very large number of charities77, but 
                                               
75 183,333 charities – 167,772 main and 15,561 connected charities; Charity Commission register 
accessed 26 February 2020  
76 https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/how-much-charities-spend-good-causes. 
77 The commission found that only 3 (4%) of the charities had a reasonable explanation for their high 
level of governance costs. The governance costs should only include audit, legal and other 
constitutional and statutory related expense, hence it is unlikely that they would be seen as excessive 
by donors. 
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to my knowledge no extant study exclusively examines the existence or extent of 
misclassification of expenses in the UK charity sector setting.  
It is important to note that fundraising costs cannot always be “unfavourable”. Their 
inherent purpose is to increase the information for the donors, hence reducing their 
information costs. Although fundraising costs increase the level of contributions 
directly by reducing information costs for donors, they also decrease contributions by 
increasing the price of giving (e.g. Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1985; Posnett and 
Sandler 1989). This is because high fundraising costs can lead funders to believe that 
less is ending up spent on their intended cause. 
A significant body of research points to the association between the programme ratio 
and future donations. Various studies model donation receipts as a function of charity 
expense type such as fundraising or programme (charitable) expenditure. A positive 
association has been reported by a number of studies between the programme ratio 
and ensuing donations (e.g. Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986; Tinkelman 1998, 1999; 
Greenlee and Brown 1999; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Buchheit & Parsons, 2006; Amin 
and Harris, 2017; Parsons’ et al., 2017;), whereas there is evidence that higher 
fundraising costs lead to reduced grant amounts (Ashley and Faulk, 2010).  
The cost to a donor of purchasing one dollar’s worth of an organisation’s output is an 
important consideration for stakeholders.78  Since the introduction of Charity 
Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) 2005, the programme ratio as 
calculated from the face of the Statement of Financial Activities (SOFA)79 increased 
significantly (Connolly et al., 2013). This points to the possibility that managers may 
manipulate accounting numbers on the face of the SOFA as average users may not 
look at the notes to the accounts to investigate allocations of support costs into 
charitable activities and fundraising costs. As far as donors are concerned their main 
                                               
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/47
7927/amr_high_governance_costs.pdf 
78 According to Posnett and Sandler (1989), price is defined as 1/(1-(f +a)), Where f and a are the 
proportions of total expenditure earmarked to fundraising and administration, respectively. If, for 
example, f +a =0.2, a donor will be required to contribute £1.25 to generate an increase in charitable 
output of £1, and this is the implicit price of giving. 
 
79 The Statement of Financial Activities is akin to income statement as in for-profit firms. It presents all 
incoming resources and resources expended by the charity in the year on all its funds. 
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interest is in knowing how much every pound they donate is spent on charitable 
activities (Parsons, 2003).  
To add to the problem, there is inconsistency across charities in what they classify as 
fundraising and programme spending, and more typically so for the allocation of joint 
costs which are mainly made up of administrative or marketing expenditure. A 
common example is the variation across charities in allocation of advertising mailshot 
costs which some charities would argue also educate the donors, thus fulfilling the 
identified charity objective. This often results in arbitrary or subjective allocation of 
such costs between fundraising and programme spending. This allocation depends on 
how much of such expense can be justified as fulfilling the primary objectives for which 
a charity was registered with the Charity Commission. Up to 30% of charities have 
differences in their reported performance, solely due to accounting choices (Sargeant 
& Jay, 2004). 
The donors are specifically interested in spending on charity administration as a 
percentage of total expenditure and fundraising costs as a percentage of total 
expenditures (e.g. Tinkelman, 1999; Margolis, 2001; Parsons’ et al., 2017).  
There is an argument that the objective of a charity should not be a mere reduction in 
fundraising costs, and fundraising costs should not be viewed unfavourably if they 
contribute to marginal productivity, however small it may be. In other words if $1 of 
fundraising expense results in $1 of additional revenue (e.g. Steinberg, 1991; Young 
and Steinberg, 1995) then such fundraising cost should not be avoided by a charity 
for the sake of being seen as efficient. Although there is no legal limit imposed on 
fundraising costs as a percentage of income, either in the US or the UK, there is 
considerable public interest (Sargeant & Kähler, 1999). Donors target certain minimum 
levels of donations as “reasonable” to end up for the core charitable causes. However 
they suspect that the amounts shown by nonprofits understate their fundraising costs 
(e.g. Harvey and McCrohan, 1988; Doble, 1990).80 The perception of donors regarding 
the level of spending also impacts the likelihood that donors would donate to a 
                                               
80  Doble (1990) in a focus group study found that donors expect that ideally a minimum target of 75 
percent of a nonprofit’s donations should be spent for the causes for which a charity is formed. Harvey 
and McCrohan (1988), through their study of a US-wide study of workers report the link between 
perceived organisational efficiency and giving. They report that a figure of 60 percent may represent a 
threshold.  However the majority of donors suspect that the actual programme spending may be less 
than 50 percent of total expenses (Doble, 1990). 
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particular charity (e.g. Glaser, 1994). In order to ensure an increase in donations, it is 
not enough that charities are efficient with their fundraising costs; the evidence 
suggests that they need to be seen to have low fundraising costs too. ‘If knowledge of 
fund-raising efficiency is not effectively communicated to prospective donors, gift sizes 
equivalent to very low efficiency levels can be expected’ (Harvey and McCrohan, 1988, 
p. 21) 
The incentives for charities to manipulate their financial statements differ from their 
for-profit counterparts. However, the financial results for charities could be 
consequential, hence worth managing from management’s perspective (Jones and 
Roberts, 2006). The literature suggests that charities that depend on donations are 
more likely to manage their programme ratio favourably (e.g. Jones and Roberts, 
2006; Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008). This is because the commonly 
implied objective of a charity is to maximise its revenues and charitable activities 
expenses whilst minimising the non-charitable expenses such as fundraising costs 
(Hansmann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1980, 1996). Therefore I posit that charitable 
nonprofits (NFPs) (Balsam and Harris, 2013) would be more prone to misclassify their 
expenses from an unfavourable category (fundraising expenses) to the favourable 
category (charitable expenses) when compared to other types of nonprofits. Following 
the literature on managerial discretion over nonprofit financial reporting (Jones & 
Roberts, 2006; Keating et al. 2008; Krishnan & Yetman, 2011; Krishnan, Yetman, & 
Yetman, 2006; Yetman, 2001), I hypothesise that charities’ management behave 
differently depending on the type of funders. 
The first aim of this paper is to determine whether UK charities manipulate their version 
of the Income Statement, the SOFA to misclassify fundraising costs as charitable 
activities (programme expenses). The second aim of this research is to establish 
whether funders’ sophistication mitigates the tendency of such misclassification. The 
third and the final aim of this paper is to investigate whether donor-beneficiary 
separation will lead charities’ managers to misclassify their “unfavourable” expenses 
as “favourable” or charitable expenses.  This paper further investigates whether 
unfavourable expense ratios exacerbate the tendency for such manipulation.  
Using a sample of UK charities with income above £0.5m over a period of twelve years 
(2007 to 2018), I find significant impact of both sophistication and donor-beneficiary 
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separation in the expense misclassification behaviour. I find that the charities that 
receive higher than the median level of restricted income funding, within their 
respective charity classification, are less likely to misclassify their fundraising costs as 
charitable activities expenses. This can be explained by the fact that a sophisticated 
funder looks beyond just the reported numbers and an organisation is aware of this. 
On the contrary, an average donor is unable to detect misclassification and is keen to 
view seemingly reasonable levels of the expense ratios as “legitimate”. Therefore, the 
charities’ management are more likely to manipulate their expense ratios by 
misclassifying their fundraising expenses as charitable activities expenses.   
To my knowledge there are no studies that investigate the misclassification between 
the two types of expenses in the charitable sector using a large dataset. The study 
makes two important contributions to the literature. Firstly, it contributes to the 
literature of misclassification of income statement items in for-profit organisations (e.g. 
McVay 2006; Fan et al., 2010; Fan and Liu, 2017) by examining the setting of UK 
charities. Secondly, it contributes to the limited literature on earnings manipulation in 
nonprofits (e.g. Ballantine, et al.,  2007; Eldenburg et al., 2011).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a 
theoretical perspective and prior research in expense misclassification in charities, 
leading up to several empirically testable hypotheses. The following section describes 
the data, methodology and models in testing the hypotheses. This section is followed 
by the results section that presents the main findings of the study. The paper ends 
with the conclusion section. 
 
4.2 Theoretical background 
This paper studies misclassification of expenses by UK charity managers, using 
institutional and resource dependence perspectives rather than the more traditional 
economic theory perspective. This study considers institutional isomorphism and 
resource dependence theories that suitably explain motivations for expense 
misclassification within the nonprofit setting. These theories are closely associated 
and complementary. The standard economic model of agency theory explaining the 
agency-principal relationship is difficult to comprehensively apply to the distinctive 
non-market situation of nonprofits (e.g. Helmig et al., 2004). In light of interviews with 
charity finance directors in my earlier study (Essay 1), it is clear that the prevailing 
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motives for financial misreporting in nonprofits setting are not limited to the pursuit of 
personal economic gains, rather it is for a wider range of reasons, most of which are 
ultimately aimed at the preservation of an organisation’s continued flow of income.  
Institutional theory stresses on the external environment including state, society, and 
culture that can influence the behaviour of an organisation (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). ‘Organizations which incorporate institutionalised myths are more legitimate, 
successful, and likely to survive’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 361). Nonprofit firms 
depend heavily on donations from the government, public and corporations and 
sometimes have a difficult job to convince the donors of their legitimacy which in many 
ways is a requisite for their survival. The environment of the firms deviating from 
expectations may therefore lead to them not being recognised as legitimate nonprofits 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
An organisation is less likely to resist institutional pressures that constrain its action, if 
it is heavily dependent on the source of these pressures (Oliver 1991). Nonprofits 
depend on a diverse set of funding streams to sustain their operations (Besel et al., 
2011), hence the pressures of often uncertain amounts of funding may be stronger in 
nonprofits than for-profit firms and such pressures may vary within the charitable 
sector depending on the sources of their funding. Legitimacy is critical for nonprofit 
organisations in their ability to secure vital resources (Bigelow and Stone, 1995). A 
nonprofit’s need to satisfy the funders to legitimate its existence would depend on the 
sophistication and donor-beneficiary separation. Legitimacy is a generalised 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are ‘within socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
Nonprofits are expected to become isomorphic in their structures and processes 
(Ramanath, 2009).  In their effort to fit in the socially constructed norms, I posit that all 
three processes of institutional isomorphism, as argued by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), namely mimetic, coercive, and normative would also shape the financial 
reporting behaviour of nonprofits. The seminal paper on institutional isomorphism by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) provides several elaborations that can be linked to the 
charitable sector. In fact they refer to the sector their paper too. According to them, the 
more uncertain the relationship between means and ends, the greater the extent to 
which an organisation will model itself after organisations it perceives to be successful. 
Chapter 4: Study on Expense Misclassification: Evidence from UK Charities 
146 
 
External actors may induce an organisation to conform to its peers, through mimetic 
isomorphism, hence leaving less choice by nonprofits to faithfully represent their 
financial statements. I postulate that one explanation for nonprofits’ manipulation of 
expense ratios is mimetic isomorphism where in the wake of uncertainty of their 
funding, they tend to mimic other established nonprofits as ‘uncertainty is also a 
powerful force that encourages imitation’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Coercive isomorphism is a more subtle and less explicit type that results from both 
formal and informal pressures from other organisations and society. For example 
despite being largely ceremonial, yet consequential, nonprofits are required to 
maintain accounts and hire accountants (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) adhering to the 
rituals of conformity in the sector. It would therefore not be far-fetched to expect that 
nonprofits do not only draft financial statements in a particular way as required by the 
Charity Commission, but also conform to the norms and expectations in uncertain 
times on what those accounts should and should not look like. To enhance their 
legitimacy, organisations model themselves on other organisations in times of 
uncertainty and therefore a nonprofit is expected to legitimate itself by adopting the 
“ubiquity of certain structures” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) including showing 
“normal” expense ratios.   
For Normative pressures, the third source of isomorphic organisation, change stems 
from professionalization. Professionalisation is the collective struggle of members of 
an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work. In the nonprofit 
sector, where legal barriers to collusion do not exist, structuration81 may proceed even 
more rapidly (Larson, 1977; Collins, 1979; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Hence, I posit 
that charity sector accountants behave in a certain way that suits the environment and 
at times at the cost of their sceptic professional judgement because their ‘futures are 
inextricably bound up by the organisation’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.152), leaving 
them with a dilemma involving an impulsive choice between professional uprightness 
and organisational commitment. The charity sector financial statements, in general, 
                                               
81 Structuration - According to Giddens (1984) the actions of humans, as agents, in their social 
contexts produce social structure. Humans are in a constant state of reflexive monitoring of their 
situation with a consistent potential for change. 
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are expected to have a significantly lower levels of fundraising costs compared to 
programme costs. Therefore, the charity accountants are expected to submit to this 
expectation, in their attempt to fulfil the needs of their employer charity. In doing so in 
some cases they may be compromising their professional integrity.  
Correspondingly, according to resource dependence theory, a firm is constrained by 
the pressures that arise when it pursues resources, and the survival of the firm 
demands adjustments to its environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Resource 
dependence theory posits that an organisation’s operating strategy is influenced by 
expectations and preferences of its resource providers and it can also explain 
organisational actions that could sometimes be in pursuit of societal acceptance rather 
than economic performance being the primary motive (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Drees 
& Heugens, 2013).  
4.3 Literature review and hypotheses development 
Regarding the approaches in raising income and expending resources, the extant 
literature points to budget maximisation and service maximisation. The objectives of a 
nonprofit firm as postulated by Steinberg (1986) are that they either seek to maximise 
gross resources (revenues), which he refers to as budget maximisers, or maximise 
the residual available for charitable service. The latter can be done by minimising 
fundraising and administrative expenses and leaving enough for spending on 
programme-related charitable activities. He refers to this group as service maximisers. 
A budget-maximising firm will keep increasing its fundraising expenditure as long as 
the marginal donative product (C/F) remains a positive number82. A service-
maximising firm will only increase fundraising costs when the marginal donative 
product is at least 1 i.e. as a minimum the marginal returns are equal to the marginal 
increase in the fundraising costs. Hence there is a likelihood that a budget-maximising 
charity may pursue wasteful spending. Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) study the US data 
using Form 990 of tax returns (1973–1976) and estimate the fundraising elasticity of 
donations for a sample of nonprofits is not significantly different from zero in all seven 
industry segments considered. They conclude that ‘nonprofit firms are not maximisers 
of net expenditures on output’ (service maximisers); However, ‘they may be 
maximisers of total expenditures’ (budget maximisers). In contrast, Posnett and 
                                               
82 C is a function of F; where F indicates the fundraising costs and C refers to the associated increase 
in contribution as a result. 
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Sandler (1989) find that their sample of UK charities maximises the surplus available 
for expenditure on charitable output, making them service maximisers.  
An organisation is seen as less efficient if a higher portion of its funds are utilised in 
expenses other than its charitable activities.83 The charities that spend a larger 
proportion of their funds on furthering their missions and a smaller proportion on 
administrative or fundraising activities are viewed favourably by their donors. There 
are various commonly used metrics to assess efficiency in the use of resources 
received from funders e.g. programme ratio is computed by dividing programme 
expenses by total expenses; the fundraising ratio is calculated as fundraising 
expenses divided by total expenses (or total revenues); sometimes administrative 
costs are also added to fundraising costs, as less expenses and then divided by total 
expenses. Sometimes the same is expressed as price, where total expenses are 
divided by charitable activities expenses, with donors expecting a number not much 
higher than 1. In the UK, as fundraising more commonly feature on media reports in a 
bad light, I focus on charity’s pursuit for low fundraising costs, which congruently also 
imply high charitable costs. This is not much different in essence to the other metrics 
discussed above such as quest for higher programme ratio or low price to the donors.  
There has been much interest in relative efficiency of fundraising costs (Sargeant and 
Kähler, 1999) but it is also well established that managers, donors, regulators and 
reporters care about fundraising cost ratios which can lead to harmful side effects in 
reporting (Steinburg and Morris, 2010). 
The uncertainties about the quality of select few nonprofit organisations might lead the 
public and media to attribute the same characteristics to all nonprofits. In response, to 
legitimise itself, a nonprofit is incentivised to signal its trustworthiness to stakeholders 
(Tremblay‐Boire et al. 2016) through various means. It could even be that a smaller 
number of less ethical charities compel more ethical charities to misreport their 
programme spending to remain legitimate in the eyes of donors and media. Ratio 
management is one such way to legitimise their existence. A natural behavioural 
response to a “legitimate” reference point may be the emulation of the pre-existing 
behaviour and commonly considered ratios. It is imperative that financial reporting by 
                                               
83 The charitable activities costs are used for fulfilling the direct objective of a charity and are 
extensively referred to as programme costs. Both terms have been used interchangeably in this 
paper. 
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charities is improved significantly as its misreporting leads to loss of trust, eventually 
resulting in reduced funding by individuals and institutions (Steinberg, 2006).  
A nonprofit is constrained by lack of funds and would therefore do all that is in its 
control to sustain its funding including misclassification of expenses i.e. moving out a 
portion of fundraising expenses and transfer into the charitable activities expense 
category, with the aim to legitimate the levels of programme ratio and fundraising ratio.  
Managers are known to use judgement in financial reports to mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying performance in for-profit firms (e.g. Healy and 
Wahlen 1999). Within the earnings management studies in commercial organisations 
there is a growing body of literature on classification shifting (e.g. McVay, 2006; Fan 
et al., 2010; Abernathy et al., 2014). Classification shifting does not violate GAAP; 
hence not scrutinised as stringently by regulators and auditors as accrual-based and 
real-activities earnings management (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010). The case with 
nonprofits would however be different where misclassification of expenses has a much 
larger impact on funders and beneficiaries than in the case of classification shifting in 
for-profit firms.  
McVay (2006) in her seminal study of 76,901 firm-year observations (1988-2003) of 
US corporations examines the classification of items within the income statement as 
an earnings management tool.  Using a model of core earnings, similar to that of the 
accrual model between core expenses (cost of goods sold and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses) and special items, she finds this expense shifting to be more 
pervasive when incentives to meet the analyst forecast are present, as special items 
tend to be excluded from this earnings benchmark. Fan et al. (2010), extend McVay’s 
expectation model for core earnings by removing current quarter’s accruals and 
including additional controls for performance. In their study of 67,980 US firms’ 
quarters (1988-2007) they show that classification shifting is more likely in the fourth 
quarter and when managers are constrained in doing accruals-management (AEM). 
Abernathy et al. (2014) in their study of 33,619 firm-year observations (1988-2011) 
find that constraints of both real activities earning management (REM) and AEM lead 
to higher levels of classification shifting84.  
                                               
84 I do not expect a substitution effect in charities between expense misclassification and accruals-management, 
because both have different objectives .The purpose of misclassification of expenses being a show of the efficiency 
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Motivations for financial misreporting exist both in for-profit and nonprofit firms, albeit 
with mostly dissimilar purposes. In the for-profit firms, the incentives for accounting 
misinformation have been mostly explained through agency theory, focusing at 
personal gains for the agents (managers), causing moral hazard problems at the cost 
of principals’ (shareholders’) desired objectives.  
In nonprofit firms, there are few studies which point to agents’ personal gains (e.g. 
Baber et al., 2002; Jegers, 2010) providing evidence of a positive association between 
managers’ compensation and programme spending (Baber et al., 2002), therefore 
pointing to incentives for an improved programme ratio. Specifically, when the 
programme spending ratio is higher than the median ratio (in a firm’s particular 
industry), there is a stronger positive relationship between the change in compensation 
and change in revenue. 
Amongst an overall limited amount of accounting literature in the nonprofit sector, a 
substantial portion is dedicated to expense misclassification, which is somewhat 
similar to classification shifting in commercial organisations. The managers of 
nonprofits have a variety of motivations to shift expenses from fundraising expenses 
into the charitable activities expense category. As nonprofits’ managers do not 
distribute profits as dividends, they can use charitable resources to reward themselves 
through inflated salaries and perks (e.g. Oster 1995; Baber, et al. 2001; Krishnan et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, there are institutional pressures to efficiently fulfil the 
charitable mission (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Covaleski et al., 2003), given these 
pressures nonprofits have been found to shift costs into the programme expense (e.g. 
Baber et al., 2001; Khumawala et al. 2005; Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008; 
Krishnan and Yetman, 2011;  Parsons et al., 2017) in order to sustain or increase 
income.  
In their study of the US-based nonprofits’ data of 1,239 firm years (1992-1998), Baber 
et al. 2001 suggest that the charities that deviate from their expected programme 
spending ratio need to be investigated in detail before drawing definitive conclusions 
                                               
and effectiveness of charity’s operations and that it is spending responsibly in fulfilling its charitable objectives, 
whereas, accruals-management is focused on exhibiting that the charity is not hoarding cash. 
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about their performance. They find that the unusually high amount of programme 
spending may be due to large allocations of joint costs to programme spending.  
Baber et al. (2002) in their study of 658 US-based charities (years 1996 and 1997) find 
that changes in compensation are positively associated with changes in spending on 
programme expenses.  
In an experimental design, involving 125 participants, Khumawala et al. (2005) find 
that preparers base contribution decisions almost entirely on the reported fundraising 
cost and accept the validity of reported programme ratios. Foundation executives, the 
experienced user group in the sample, would also accept joint cost allocations as 
reported, whereas, novice users consider expense allocation disclosures more often 
when deciding on the amount of a hypothetical gift. 
Keating et al. (2008) in their study of a final sample of 16,977 fundraising campaigns, 
indicate that 74 percent of nonprofit organisations fail to properly report telemarketing 
expenses. Smaller nonprofits that are less monitored, and those with less accounting 
sophistication are more likely to misreport costs as a component of net revenues rather 
than as expense. 
Krishnan and Yetman, (2011) study a sample of 620 hospital-year observations of 
California nonprofit hospitals. They report the hospitals that obtain higher donations 
revenue, shift costs to a greater extent. Parsons et al., 2017 in their survey of 200 
nonprofit executives, investigate the pressures for managing efficiency ratios. They 
find the donors that make restricted gifts or government grantors influence perceptions 
of pressure; and more sophisticated managers perceive less pressure to manage 
ratios. Likewise, monitors and sophisticated managers reduce the likelihood of ratio 
management. 
The prior literature discussed above informs that the nonprofit organisations 
depending on donations are more likely to manage ratios to report maximum 
programme spending (e.g. Jones & Roberts, 2006; Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et 
al., 2008). Whilst some donors expect, unrealistically low fundraising costs, others are 
rightfully concerned because there are charities that spend excessive amounts on 
activities other than those directly associated with the intended charitable causes. This 
leads managers' focus of attention to various acceptable levels of efficiency ratios 
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(Krishnan et al., 2006; Tinkelman and Mankaney 2007; Yetman and Yetman 2012), 
hence increasing the risk of manipulation through expense misclassification. The 
reporting efficiency of charities is calculated in various ways e.g. by taking the ratio of 
administration (includes support and governance costs), fundraising and charitable 
expenses with total costs or income (e.g. Gordon et al., 2006, 2009; Krishnan et al. 
2006; Connolly et al., 2013).  
In light of the above, I expect that charitable organisations would be motivated to 
misclassify a portion of their fundraising costs as charitable activities expenses. The 
propensity of such motivation is expected to be a function of the charity type and 
predominant funding source.  Thus, I posit that a negative relationship will be observed 
between the unexpected levels of fundraising and charitable activities related costs 
and, therefore, formulate my first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: The unexpected levels of fundraising costs are negatively associated with 
the unexpected levels of charitable activities costs.  
A negative relationship between the two expenses as hypothesised in H1 above, 
should guide in formulating further testable hypotheses. It is in a similar vein to the 
initial hypothesis for a negative association between discretionary accruals and pre-
managed performance (e.g. Leone and Van Horne, 2005; Verbruggen and Christiaens 
2012), which leads to other testable sub-hypotheses.  
The donations that a charity may use for any charitable purpose according to its 
objects85 are referred to as unrestricted income. Restricted income can only be used 
for the purposes that are narrower than the overall charitable purposes of the charity. 
Technically, the restricted funds that include both restricted income funds and 
endowments are not reserves of a charity due to the restrictions in their use. Donors 
can place restrictions on their donations in two ways. Firstly by way of restricted 
income funds that are spent for the furtherance of specific projects from within the 
charity’s broad objects, and secondly, through endowment funds, whereby mostly 
assets are permitted to be invested or used by the nonprofit, but the charity is obligated 
not to spend for charitable purposes other than those narrowly specified outcomes86. 
                                               
85 A charity's objects are a statement of its purposes which must be exclusively charitable. 
 
86 The endowment funds could be permanent or expendable. Permanent endowments have restrictions but of 
capital nature, where only the income form the capital bequest, e.g. land, building, cash, investments, can be spent 
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Therefore, any manipulation of the restricted income or endowment funds, if 
discovered, may have serious reputational or existential consequences. It is therefore 
expected that such restrictions would deter management from manipulating. The 
Statement of financial Activities of a charity is required to present both in separate 
columns. I would therefore test both separately and both imply a degree of donor 
sophistication  
It is implied by the presence of both restricted income funds or endowment funds that 
the donors are relatively sophisticated and are likely to monitor the use of their financial 
support than (often smaller) donors who do not place restrictions on their donations. 
More sophisticated donors have increased incentive and ability to identify low reporting 
quality and therefore they discount programme ratios when fundraising expenses 
appear to be understated (Yetman and Yetman, 2013). On the other hand 
unsophisticated donors are more likely to accept the reported amounts as they appear 
(Tinkelman, 1998). Hence monitoring donors reduces the likelihood of ratio 
management, and financial reporting quality is expected to be better in more 
sophisticated nonprofits (e.g. Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008; Parsons’ et 
al., 2017). This is in line with the for-profit literature that provides evidence that the 
level of investor sophistication has a positive impact on financial reporting quality (e.g. 
Tan et al., 2014; Collins et al., 2003; Balsam et al., 2002). In the nonprofit setting, 
consistent with the prior nonprofit ratio manipulation literature (e.g. Yetman and 
Yetman, 2013; Balsam and Harris, 2014), I also classify nonprofits’ donors as 
sophisticated if they make their donations with permanent or temporary restrictions. 
These restrictions impose direct control over the spending of resources (Silverman & 
Beatty, 2006; Loftin, 1998). Smaller and less sophisticated donors are expected to 
donate without restrictions, hence they rely on media to report on the reasonableness 
of nonprofits’ ratios (e.g.  Balsam and Harris, 2014; Amin and Harris, 2017). 
Sophisticated donors have access to more information than their less sophisticated 
counterparts and are expected to be larger with better resources to closely monitor the 
performance of a charity. Often, they are members of the nonprofit’s boards of 
                                               
for the charitable causes according to donors’ stipulated wishes and instructions. The capital bequest is generally 
invested in various projects and the generated income from the capital e.g. stock returns are used for the 
preassigned charitable purposes. Hence a permanent endowment cannot be spent as income, but the capital from 
the endowment is invested to produce income for the charity. Expendable endowment, however, offer more 
flexibility to the charity trustees in the use of the funds, hence may have a commutatively more managerial 
discretion. 
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directors and hence aware of various internal operations and matters arising in the 
statutory audit, that are discussed by management (Amin and Harris, 2017). 
I use restricted income and endowment funds as proxies for sophistication and expect 
that sophisticated funders are likely to act as deterrents against misclassification of 
expense and therefore, formulate the following hypotheses incorporating donor 
sophistication:  
H2a: The association between unexpected fundraising and unexpected 
charitable activities costs is likely to be less negative for the nonprofits that 
receive a higher amount of restricted income within their respective peer 
groups.     
H2b: The association between unexpected fundraising and unexpected 
charitable activities costs is likely to be less negative for the nonprofits that 
receive a higher amount of endowment funds within their respective peer 
groups.    
Balsam and Harris (2014) categorise nonprofits in two broad types, namely service-
oriented and charitable. The service-oriented charities are those that receive a 
significant amount of their revenues from programme service (charitable activities) 
income. The Charity SORP refers to them as ‘exchange transactions’ that provide 
contract income87.  This could be viewed as a type of earned income as opposed to 
donations and government grants that do not require services in return.  
These service-oriented organisations are expected to have a low donor-beneficiary 
separation, i.e. donors also receive services from the nonprofit. Service-oriented 
charities could fall within various charity classifications such as professional institutes 
with its associate or fellow members paying a certain annual subscription to retain their 
membership titles, universities with alumni gaining benefits from their association with 
a prestigious alma mater, and museum patrons having exclusive access to exhibitions 
by enjoying discounts at museum shops and cafes. These are typical examples of the 
warm glow (Andreoni,1990) that would partially be because of the sheer joy of serving 
the cause while acquiring some sort of benefit in return for the contributions. This is 
an example of “impure altruism.” Any amount paid over and above the price for such 
                                               
87 CHARITIES SORP (FRS 102) (second edition - October 2019) Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk 
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benefit is likely to be for the donor’s satisfaction that they have made a difference for 
a relevant cause (Balsam and Harris, 2014).   
Charitable organisations, on the other hand, are more reliant on support from 
donations and government grants without an identifiable economic benefit in return. 
The donor-beneficiary separation is high. Charitable nonprofits are likely to include 
organisations that provide support without a fee. The Charity SORP refers to them as 
income from ‘non-exchange transactions’ that comprise income from gifts88.  These 
may include charities supporting the underprivileged by organising food banks, soup 
kitchens (Balsam and Harris, 2014) and homeless shelters (Amin and Harris, 2017). 
The donors for such nonprofits are more likely motivated by pure altruism or impure 
altruism to the extent that they receive personal satisfaction by contributing to the 
cause. There are no economic gains expected in return. An increase in demand for 
financial reporting is expected for the charitable nonprofits with a high donor-
beneficiary separation because they do not have many other alternative sources to 
assess the performance of the charity. This is because of a low level of direct 
involvement by donors. The information, therefore, contained in financial statements 
becomes more relevant (Gordon and Khumawala, 1999). On the contrary, the ability 
to appraise the services and efficiency of a service-oriented nonprofit (Balsam and 
Harris, 2014) is less dependent on financial statements. Therefore, I would expect a 
nonprofit would be less motivated to manipulate its efficiency ratios if its funders are 
more service-oriented compared to its peers, as it would not be interested on the ratios 
as much as on the identifiable services that they receive in return for their financial 
support. This leads me to my following hypothesis: 
 H3: The association between unexpected fundraising and unexpected 
charitable activities costs is likely to be less negative for service-oriented 
nonprofits compared to charitable nonprofits. 
I would expect a stronger negative relationship between charitable activities expenses 
and fundraising costs in case of those charities that have a stronger motivation to 
misclassify. The notion of pure altruism or perceived positive personal impact on a 
                                               
88 CHARITIES SORP (FRS 102) (second edition - October 2019) Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk 
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donor through contributing (warm glow)89 would suggest that a donor would prefer all 
or a larger portion of their contribution for the intended cause (Andreoni,1990). A high 
level of fundraising costs represents a diversion of organisational resources away from 
the programme spending (e.g. Bowman, 2006; Gneezy et al., 2014). I would, 
therefore, expect those charities which have higher (lower) than normal levels of 
fundraising (charitable) costs to be more inclined to misclassifying their fundraising 
(charitable) costs downwards (upwards).  
As a charity’s efficiency can be calculated in various ways, such as through its 
fundraising and charitable programmes ratio with total costs or income, the expense 
misclassification, therefore, should require tests, using various ratios. I postulate that 
a charity with a high (low) ratio of fundraising (charitable) costs with total expenses or 
income, is more likely to consider expense misclassification.  
This leads me to my fourth hypothesis, which is stated as follows: 
H4: The association between unexpected fundraising and unexpected charitable 
activities costs is likely to be more (less) negative for nonprofits with relatively higher 
(lower) fundraising (charitable) costs.  
The extant literature (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2014) provides evidence that donors avoid 
charities that dedicate a high percentage of expenses to administrative costs, as it 
implies that a nonprofit has not been effective in providing the intended services. 
Therefore, charities use joint costs to manage their efficiency ratios (e.g. Roberts, 
2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006). The joint costs include support costs in carrying out 
the operations that are both directly associated with programme delivery and other 
administrative tasks including fundraising costs. If the support costs are high, 
management may be more prone to misclassifying expenses to avoid unfavourable 
press attention. Management is known to use its discretion in allocating these support 
costs e.g. by over-apportioning a larger part of the mailings expense as charitable and 
less as fundraising costs.  
                                               
89 According to Andreoni (1990) Warm glow (joy of giving) represents the selfish pleasure gained from "doing 
good", regardless of the actual impact of giving. A donor may be "impurely altruistic" if he is in part motivated by 
the joy of giving. Pure or perfect altruists are solely motivated by the desire to provide for a recipient. 
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I therefore posit that the charities reporting a higher amount of support costs than their 
respective peer groups are expected to have a higher tendency to misclassify 
expenses. This leads me to the next hypothesis: 
H5: The association between unexpected fundraising and unexpected 
charitable activities costs is likely to be more negative for nonprofits that report 
high support costs compared to those that report low support costs.  
 
4.4 Research Design 
 
4.4.1 Sample selection 
My initial sample constitutes 113,511 nonprofit firm year observations available on the 
Charity Commission for England and Wales’s register of charities90 from 2007 to 2018, 
which covers the entire available data since the first year of its availability.  The 
charities are required to submit their accounts to the Charity Commission within ten 
months of their financial year-end. Due to limited data availability, mostly of the small 
charities, the sample consists of all firms with the gross income over £0.5m from 2007 
to 2018. After removing charities with less than three years of data and firm years with 
missing variables, the final sample includes 100,583 firm year observations. I also 
restrict the sample selection to include only charities that have crossed the audit 
threshold. Until 2015, the audit threshold for registered charities was £1m, which was 
subsequently reduced to £0.5m under the Charity Commission’s Statement of 
Recommended Practice (SORP: FRS102).91   
I winsorise all variables used in regressions to minimise the impact of possibly 
spurious outliers. This is especially important given that the data are skewed towards 
a large number of small charities.  
Given that the selection criteria for the data is to include all those charities that have 
crossed the audit threshold of £0.5 million in income, there should not have been any 
firm years in my data below the threshold.  
                                               
90 The content is publicly available under the Open Government Licence v3.0. 
91 In England and Wales, an audit is required if either the charity’s gross income exceeds £500,000 or 
its gross assets exceed £3.26m and gross income exceeds £250,000. 
http://www.charitysorp.org/media/619101/frs102_complete.pdf 
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All charities with a minimum of three years of data are included in the final regressions 
where standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). To mitigate the scale 
effect, all variables other than expense ratios are deflated by lagged total assets. 
4.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the main variables in my 
study. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets, unless otherwise stated. The 
mean (median) of total income in my sample is 4.91 million (1.55 million) and for total 
expenses it is 4.71 million (1.50 million). Of the expenses, total fundraising (FR) 
expenses have the mean (median) of 0.26 million (0 million) and 3.91 million (1.24 
million) of charitable activities expenses (CAE). The appendix defines the variables 
used in the study. My primary variables of interest in the study are unexpected FR 
(UE_FR) and unexpected CAE (UE_CAE). As expected, since these are the residuals 
from the estimation regressions, they both have a mean of zero. Panel B presents the 
correlation matrix which evaluates the linear relationship between the variables used 
in the analysis. The highest correlation is 0.973 between total expenses and charitable 
expenses. There does not appear to be issues of multicollinearity between variables 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡(in millions) 100,853 4.91 1.55 10.22 0.84 4.03 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑡(in millions) 100,853 4.71 1.50 10.00 0.80 3.85 
𝐹𝑅𝑡 (in millions) 100,853 0.26 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.12 
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡(in millions) 100,853 4.27 1.35 9.11 0.70 3.48 
𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 84,986 -0.56 0.79 41.24 0.10 2.93 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 85,050 -0.03 -0.02 0.20 -0.07 0.02 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡 85,061 0.07 0.03 0.32 -0.06 0.13 
𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 85,061 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡 85,050 0.54 0.06 1.45 0.00 0.38 
𝐿𝐸𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡 85,050 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
𝐹𝑅𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡 85,050 0.66 0.13 1.55 0.01 0.57 
𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡 85,050 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 
𝑂𝑇𝐻_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡 85,050 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) 100,837 14.81 14.66 1.70 13.52 15.98 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  100,867 -0.02 0.02 0.52 -0.03 0.11 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  100,853 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.03 0.22 
𝐹𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡  100,853 0.07 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.06 
𝑃𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡  100,853 0.89 0.97 0.18 0.89 0.99 
𝐹𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡  90,819 6.22 0.01 379.35 0.00 0.28 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡 −  𝑀𝑐𝑉𝑎𝑦  72,090 0.00 -0.01 0.12 -0.02 0.00 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 −  𝑀𝑐𝑉𝑎𝑦  72,090 0.00 -0.01 0.60 -0.11 0.10 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡 −  𝑌𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛  72,131 0.00 -0.01 0.13 -0.02 0.001 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 −  𝑌𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛  72,131 0.00 -0.03 0.65 -0.12 0.06 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡 −  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑  60,752 0.00 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.01 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 −  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑  60,752 0.00 -0.01 0.55 -0.11 0.10 
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𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  1 0.949 0.488 0.936 0.010 0.006 0.073 -0.080 -0.023 0.120 -0.027 -0.004 0.011 0.529 0.032 -0.079 -0.033 0.020 0.007 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑡  0.932 1 0.484 0.988 0.007 -0.004 0.017 -0.053 -0.021 0.080 -0.027 -0.001 -0.002 0.515 -0.050 -0.093 -0.043 -0.033 0.009 
𝐹𝑅𝑡  0.263 0.263 1 0.392 0.013 0.000 0.014 -0.023 -0.004 0.169 0.034 0.014 0.020 0.289 0.006 -0.045 0.427 -0.402 0.035 
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  0.897 0.965 0.136 1 0.006 -0.005 0.015 -0.054 -0.019 0.070 -0.031 -0.009 -0.005 0.509 -0.055 -0.092 -0.087 0.096 -0.002 
𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡  0.038 0.012 0.024 0.017 1 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.117 0.019 -0.111 0.007 -0.001 0.045 0.111 0.018 0.010 -0.012 -0.001 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  -0.017 -0.045 -0.018 -0.046 -0.045 1 0.043 -0.021 0.007 0.052 0.002 0.038 0.006 0.035 0.078 -0.013 0.004 -0.015 -0.002 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  0.172 0.069 0.024 0.066 0.070 0.053 1 -0.552 0.150 0.164 0.156 0.053 0.105 0.027 0.138 -0.025 0.014 -0.014 -0.001 
𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  -0.165 -0.095 -0.017 -0.094 -0.061 -0.027 -0.846 1 -0.044 -0.062 -0.051 -0.002 -0.041 -0.034 -0.112 0.004 0.010 -0.019 -0.002 
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  -0.108 -0.135 0.099 -0.135 0.097 0.030 0.109 -0.021 1 0.110 0.957 -0.061 0.043 -0.338 -0.357 -0.066 0.020 0.009 -0.006 
𝐿𝐸𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.213 0.151 0.201 0.132 0.027 0.050 0.038 0.000 0.203 1 0.113 0.037 -0.008 0.028 0.139 -0.031 0.102 -0.080 -0.005 
𝐹𝑅𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  -0.099 -0.133 0.194 -0.168 0.137 0.008 0.115 -0.031 0.852 0.151 1 -0.073 0.048 -0.364 -0.325 -0.060 0.091 -0.056 -0.007 
𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.107 0.103 0.104 0.085 -0.104 0.090 0.007 0.005 -0.062 0.229 -0.116 1 -0.033 0.237 0.022 -0.077 -0.003 -0.112 -0.001 
𝑂𝑇𝐻_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.113 0.098 0.081 0.092 0.024 -0.004 0.034 -0.028 -0.064 0.046 -0.067 0.003 1 -0.104 0.022 0.018 0.048 -0.039 0.041 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  0.678 0.635 0.197 0.600 -0.212 0.033 0.012 -0.035 -0.344 0.225 -0.398 0.303 0.082 1 0.158 -0.093 -0.015 -0.049 0.008 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  0.134 -0.104 0.003 -0.102 0.119 0.113 0.332 -0.266 0.119 0.187 0.146 -0.019 0.044 0.024 1 0.106 0.051 -0.084 -0.002 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  -0.025 -0.065 0.025 -0.062 0.042 -0.037 -0.014 0.002 -0.037 0.007 -0.014 -0.062 0.040 -0.043 0.113 1 0.026 -0.011 -0.003 
𝐹𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡  0.098 0.090 0.965 -0.046 0.021 -0.009 0.015 0.001 0.135 0.182 0.238 0.088 0.058 0.077 0.018 0.044 1 -0.862 0.011 
𝑃𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡  0.019 0.053 -0.709 0.198 0.066 -0.035 0.010 -0.034 -0.080 -0.198 -0.170 -0.211 -0.040 -0.127 -0.027 -0.058 -0.761 1 -0.039 
𝐹𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡  0.140 0.154 0.916 0.040 0.032 -0.035 -0.005 -0.006 -0.060 0.092 0.030 0.064 0.085 0.099 -0.031 0.046 0.916 -0.644 1 
 









                                               
92 Defined as Salest/((Net Operating Assetst + Net Operating Assets t-1)/2). Net Operating Assets, is equal to the 
difference between Operating Assets - Operating Liabilities. Operating Assets is calculated as Total Assets less 
Cash. Operating liabilities is calculated as Total Assets less Total Debt.  
93 Defined as change in current assets less change in current liabilities less change in cash and depreciation in t.  
Variable Definition 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  Total income in year t, in millions 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑡  Total expenses in year t, in millions 
𝐹𝑅𝑡  Total fundraising expenses in year t, in millions 
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  Total charitable activities expenses in year t, in millions 
𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡  Asset Turnover in year t as defined in McVay (2006), deflated by lagged total assets
92 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  Accruals in the year t, deflated by lagged total assets
93 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  Change in total income from year t-1 to year t, deflated by lagged total assets 
𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  Dichotomous variable: 1 if ∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 is below 1, 0 otherwise   
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Voluntary income in year t deflated by lagged total assets 
𝐿𝐸𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Legacy income in year t deflated by Lagged total assets 
𝐹𝑅𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Fundraising income in year t deflated by Lagged total assets 
𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Investment income in year t deflated by Lagged total assets 
𝑂𝑇𝐻_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Other income deflated in year t by Lagged total assets 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  Return (Net Income) on assets in year t 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  Support cost divided by total expenses in year t 
𝐹𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡   Fundraising ratio: Fundraising expense divided total expenses in year t 
𝑃𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡   
Programme expense ratio: Charitable activities expenses divided by total expenses  in 
year t 
𝐹𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡   Fundraising efficiency ratio: Fundraising expense divided fund raising income in year t 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Unexpected fundraising costs estimated by models (1.1) McVay, (1.3) Yetman or (1.5)  
Combined 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  
Unexpected charitable activities expenses estimated by models (1.2) McVay, (1.4) 
Yetman or (1.6)  Combined 





The primary inspiration for the methodology has been drawn from the for-profit 
research in classification shifting (e.g. McVay 2006; Fan, Barua, Cready, and Thomas 
2010; Fan and Liu, 2017). However, certain modifications are made to accommodate 
the unique setting of nonprofit organisations. Earlier studies in classification shifting 
(e.g. McVay 2006; Fan and Liu, 2017) conclude that managers opportunistically shift 
core expenses to special items to inflate current core earnings, resulting in a positive 
relation between unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items. As 
discussed in the literature, expenses are expected to be shifted from fundraising into 
charitable activities expenses. Therefore, including the charitable activities expense 
as the independent variable would be comparable to McVay (2006), whereby these 
expenses would impact on the level of unexpected fundraising costs.   
My initial model for the first hypothesis is based on that proposed by McVay (2006) 
who uses core earnings (CE) as the dependent variable, regressing this on special 
items (SI) as the main independent variable. The situation is, however, different for 
charities because there are no core earnings, calculated by excluding special items 
from the bottom-line earnings. The model I propose is different from those in the for-
profit classification shifting literature to the extent that both fundraising and charitable 
activities expenses are operating expenses and hence not akin to special items. 
Therefore, my primary empirical model builds on the CE estimation model (McVay, 
2006) for nonprofits, to study classification shifting between fundraising and charitable 
expense. Insofar as the direction is concerned, the model is well suited for estimating 
the expense misclassification in charities. This methodology is useful to the extent that 
the direction of expense movement on classification shifting is from CE to SI, i.e. from 
the dependent variable to the independent variable (as in McVay, 2006 and 
subsequent literature). In the same vein, I study the misclassification of fundraising 
costs as charitable expenses and use predictor income variables in Yetman and 
Yetman (2012, 2013) to predict the normal level of fundraising expenses.  
Therefore, the first stage estimation regressions used to estimate normal/expected 
levels of fundraising costs as well as charitable activities expenses, follow the 
methodology in McVay (2006) and Yetman and Yetman (2012, 2013). Following 
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Steinberg (1986) and Yetman and Yetman (2012, 2013), I estimate the fundraising 
expense estimation model by using various income types generated from t+1 as 
independent variables. In the same vein, I also estimate the charitable activities 
expense estimation model. Following previous literature, I incorporate lagged effects 
in my model because of informational and response delays. Fundraising and donating 
occur over a fiscal year, rather than at a point in time. Thus, it is quite reasonable to 
assume that solicitations occurring late in the year result in donations in the following 
year. I use a fixed-effect model using one year lags.94 Although longer lags are 
theoretically plausible, I follow previous research and limit it to one year. I also add the 
lagged fundraising and charitable activities expenses in their respective estimation 
regressions to mitigate simultaneity problems.95 
The sample is distributed across 11 industries based on the International Classification 
of Non-profit Organisations (ICNPO). A minimum of 15 observations per industry-year 
ensures a sufficiently large sample to estimate normal levels of fundraising and 
charitable costs (e.g. Fan and Liu, 2017). Organisations in the same sector are likely 
to have a similar objective therefore, I estimate regressions by subgroup and year to 
calculate normal/expected levels of fundraising and charitable activities costs.  I further 
develop the methodology by also calculating the unexpected level of charitable 
activities expense. It is preferable to use unexpected charitable activities expenses 
over using charitable activities expense because the first hypothesis suggests that 
charities would shift expenses between fundraising (FR) and charitable activities 
expenses (CAE) and therefore this expense shifting will cause unexpected levels for 
both expense types. The movement would be in opposite directions. 
                                               
94 Following Steinberg (1986) the assumption is that a firm-specific intercept is constant across time periods and a 
time-specific intercept is constant across firms. The firm-specific effects control for the idiosyncratic factors e.g. 
charity’s location, specific donors, goodwill in society, popularity of its specific objectives, accounting practices etc. 
The time-specific effects control for the stage of the charity’s life cycle, tax advantages to donors in specific years, 
popularity of certain charitable programmes in certain years e.g. relief efforts following a catastrophe such as the 
Coronavirus outbreak. 
95  ‘(independent variable)  is included as a lagged variable in order to mitigate simultaneity problems’ (Aschhoff 
and Schmidt, 2008). ‘We investigate the effect of lagged (variable) on current performance to avoid potential 
simultaneity problems’ (Gupta, 2005, p 995). ‘It is well known that when endogenous variables are used as 
regressors, the correlation between those variables and the disturbance term renders the OLS estimates biased 
and inconsistent. For this reason, lagged rather than contemporaneous strategy variables are specified as 
instruments in an attempt to alleviate (the problem)’ (Spanos et al., 2004). 
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I estimate the normal levels of FR and CAE in three ways. I employ (a) an estimation 
regression containing the variables used to estimate CE by McVay (2006), (b) an 
estimation model similar to Yetman and Yetman (inspired from prior research e.g. 
Steinberg’s, 1986; Yetman and Yetman 2012), and (c) an estimation model combining 
variables from (a) and (b) as follows: 
(a) McVay (2006) estimation regressions: 
𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝑻𝑶𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓∆𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 +
  𝜷𝟔𝑵𝑬𝑮_∆𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕                  (4.1.1) 
𝑪𝑨𝑬𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑨𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝑻𝑶𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓∆𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟔𝑵𝑬𝑮_∆𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕                    (4.1.2) 
(b) Yetman and Yetman (2012, 2013) estimation regressions: 
𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝛂𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑽𝑶𝑳_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑬𝑮_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑭𝑹_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +
𝜷𝟓𝑰𝑵𝑽_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟔𝑶𝑻𝑯_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +  𝛃𝟕𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕+𝟏) +  + 𝜺𝒊𝒕          (4.1.3)      
𝑪𝑨𝑬𝒊𝒕 = 𝛂𝟎 +  𝛃𝟏𝑪𝑨𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑽𝑶𝑳_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑬𝑮_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑭𝑹_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +
𝜷𝟓𝑰𝑵𝑽_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟔𝑶𝑻𝑯_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +  𝛃𝟕𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕+𝟏) +  + 𝜺𝒊𝒕             (4.1.4) 
(c) Combined estimation regressions: 
𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝛂𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝑻𝑶𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓∆𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟔𝑵𝑬𝑮_∆𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕+ 𝜷𝟕𝑽𝑶𝑳_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟖𝑳𝑬𝑮_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟗𝑭𝑹_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +
𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑰𝑵𝑽_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑶𝑻𝑯_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +  𝛃𝟏𝟐𝑳𝑶𝑮(𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑻𝑺)𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +  𝜺𝒊𝒕        (4.1.5) 
𝑪𝑨𝑬𝒊𝒕 = 𝛂𝟎 +  𝛃𝟏𝑪𝑨𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝑻𝑶𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓∆𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟔𝑵𝑬𝑮_∆𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕+ 𝜷𝟕𝑽𝑶𝑳_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟖𝑳𝑬𝑮_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟗𝑭𝑹_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +
𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑰𝑵𝑽_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑶𝑻𝑯_𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +  𝛃𝟏𝟐𝑳𝑶𝑮(𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑻𝑺)𝒊𝒕+𝟏 +  𝜺𝒊𝒕        (4.1.6) 
All variables have been defined in the appendix. The above models are referred to in 
the remainder of the paper as the McVay model, the Yetman model, and the combined 
model.  
4.4.3.1 Empirical model to test H1 
My first research hypothesis is that the unexpected levels of FR and CAE (residuals 
from the above regressions 1.1 to 1.6) will have a negative relationship. The 
independent variable CAE is defined as the total charitable activities costs and grants 
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to institutions as contained in the Charity Commission data. Likewise, FR costs are 
defined as the total voluntary income cost, fundraising trading costs and other 
resources expended. As in prior studies, I use the log of total assets to control for 
charity size and Return on Asset (ROA) as an additional independent variable to 
control for the FR costs due to ordinary operations (Kothari et al., 2005). I also include 
support cost as most of that is apportioned between FR and CAE according to some 
objective or subjective allocation bases by a nonprofit. I do not make a directional 
prediction of the control variables due to lack of sufficient literature studying abnormal 
fundraising costs. The second stage model to test H1 is therefore as follows: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟑ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (4.2) 
4.4.3.2 Empirical models to test H2a and H2b 
Building on the existing literature (e.g. Yetman and Yetman, 2013; Balsam & Harris, 
2014) that donor sophistication influences donor behaviour, my second hypothesis is 
that donor sophistication will reduce the incident of expense misclassification.  
Following Yetman and Yetman (2013) and Balsam and Harris (2014), I use the 
existence of restricted donations as a proxy for donor sophistication. The restricted 
donations are gifts with either permanent or temporary limitations concerning the 
timing and/or purpose of their use. Similarly, I also use endowment funds as a further 
proxy for sophistication. To measure donor sophistication vis-à-vis funds restriction I 
partition my sample nonprofits into those that have above or below median restricted 
funds using a 1/0 dichotomous variable. To examine the impact of sophistication of 
donors on the likelihood of expense misclassification, I employ the following model: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒ROA𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕         (4.3) 
Where CHARITYTYPE refers to the sophisticated donor variable (restricted) as 
described above. All other variables are defined in the appendix. In model (3), I expect 
the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term (β3) will be positive hence showing a 
reduction in the negative relationship between UE_FR and UE_CAE. 
To separate endowment charities from others, I also partition sample nonprofits into 
those that have above or below the median of endowment funds using a 1/0 
dichotomous variable.  I use the same model (3) including the sophisticated donor 
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variable (endowment) as described above. In model (3), I expect the sign of the 
coefficient on the interaction term (β3)  to be positive hence showing a reduction in the 
negative relationship between UE_FR and UE_CAE. The above models are analysed 
using UE_FR and UE_CAE from all three estimation approaches. 
4.4.3.3 Empirical models to test H3 
In nonprofits that are more service-oriented in nature, where the donor-beneficiary 
separation in either low or absent, it is expected that the propensity and possibility of 
accounting manipulation will be lower than in less service-oriented charities. This is 
because a more service-oriented charity donor is likely to have the opportunity to 
directly evaluate the financial reporting quality of the services. Therefore, it is less likely 
that these donors will depend entirely on the reported numbers, implying lower 
motivation for misreporting expenses by such charities’ managers. I do not expect that 
the motivation for such misclassification can be completely absent but its propensity 
is expected to be lower than for those charities, which are donated predominantly by 
donors who do not receive services in return.    
Following Yetman and Yetman (2013) and Balsam and Harris (2014), I use the level 
of programme service revenue (PSR)96 to proxy for donor sophistication. I calculate 
PSR by dividing charitable activities income by the total income in the period t. PSR is 
a proxy for services in exchange for donations, hence implying a low donor-beneficiary 
separation. I partition sample nonprofits into those that have above or below median 
PSR using a 1/0 dichotomous variable. Specifically, the nonprofit years with lower than 
the median level of PSR in their respective industry and year group take the value of 
1, and 0 otherwise. To examine the relative expense misclassification behaviour by 
more service-oriented charities, I employ the model in (3), Where CHARITYTYPE 
refers to the service-type variable described above using the partitioning of PSR. In 
model (3), I expect the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term (β3) will be positive 
hence showing a reduction in the negative relationship between UE_FR and UE_CAE.  
 
 
                                               
96 Charitable activities income in the Charity Commission data. 
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4.4.3.4 Empirical model to test H4 
In order to test the fourth hypothesis, I create three expense ratios and test whether 
they are important considerations for manipulation. To the best of my knowledge, 
previous studies do not study whether ‘less acceptable’ ratios could be a trigger for 
expense misclassification.  
I define a charity as LOW_PR that has lower than the median level of programme ratio 
in t-1. Following earlier literature, I calculate this by taking a ratio of charitable activities 
expense to total expenses. CAE includes charitable activities cost and grants to 
institutions. I partition sample nonprofits into those that have above or below median 
programme ratio using a 0/1 dichotomous variable.  
The current literature defines FR efficiency ratio by dividing FR expenses by 
fundraising income. I categorise a firm-year as HIGH_FRE if Its FR efficiency ratio in 
t-1 is above the median of other charities in its industry. The fundraising income relates 
to donations and FR expense includes voluntary expenses, fundraising trading 
cost and other resources expended. These are normally the costs that are not directly 
spent for fulfilling the main charitable causes, hence theoretically “less desirable” for 
donors. I partition sample nonprofits into those above or below median FR efficiency 
ratio in t-1 using a 0/1 dichotomous variable.  
Following earlier literature, the FR ratio is calculated as FR (fundraising expenses) 
divided by total expenses. I categorise a firm-year as HIGH_FR if the ratio in t-1 is 
above the median. The nonprofit years in my sample with higher than the median level 
of FR ratio in their respective industry and year group take the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise HIGH_FR equals 0.  
In order to reject the null hypothesis that expense ratios do not affect the expense 
manipulation behaviour, I employ the following model. 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐RATIO_SUSPECT𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ RATIO_SUSPECT𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟓ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕     (4.4) 
RATIO_SUSPECT in the above regression represents either LOW_PR, HIGH_FRE 
or HIGH_FR. All other variables are defined in the appendix. The expected sign of the 
coefficient on the 𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 interaction term is negative.  
 




4.4.3.5 Empirical model to test H5 
Lastly, to test my fifth hypothesis, I define a nonprofit year as HIGH_SC if it has higher 
than the median level of support costs in year t. I partition sample nonprofits into those 
that have above or below median support cost using a 0/1 dichotomous variable. In 
order to reject the null hypothesis that high support cost is not a factor to affect 
manipulation behaviour, I employ the following model. 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐HIGH_SC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 × HIGH_SC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) +
𝜷𝟓ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕         (4.5) 
All variables are defined in the appendix. The expected sign of the coefficient on the 




4.5.1 Estimation using McVay model 
Table 4.2 presents the mean and median coefficients and p-values from running 319 
regressions for each of the expenses for the three estimation models (1.1 to 1.6).97 
Panel A presents the results using the McVay model. The first variable is lagged for 
the respective FR and CAE expense estimation regressions. The coefficient shows 
persistence of the expenses from year t-1 to year t (Median coefficient 0.774 between 
FRt and FRt-1 and 0.993 between CAEt and CAEt-1).  
I expect the remaining variables to have opposite signs to those shown in McVay 
(2006) as I model for expenses as opposed to her estimation of core earnings. Since 
the asset turnover ratio (ATO) is inversely related to profit margin (e.g., Nissim and 
Penman 2001; MvcVay 2006), therefore its relationship with FR and CAE is expected 
to be positive.  
In prior literature, accruals have been reported as highly correlated with extreme 
performance changes (DeAngelo et al. 1994); unexpectedly good (poor) performance 
                                               
97 For estimating normal levels of each of the two expenses and 11 charity subgroups, totalling 638 estimation 
regressions, I run 110 regressions following Yetman and Yetman, 2013 (2008-2017), 110 following McVay, 2006 
(2009-2018) and 99 for the combined model (2009-2017).  
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is positively associated with a large increase (decrease) in accruals. Following McVay 
(2006), I also include accruals in year t and t-1. Erratic income movements may be 
conceivable, but I would not expect frequently large changes in expenses. I do not 
have a directional prediction for accruals.  
For charities, the link between income and expense is not necessarily always in the 
same direction. For example, charities that spend a large amount to prepare for a 
fundraising event in advance of a flagship event, such as a charity gala, will face a 
period mismatch in reporting its expense and income (Essay 1). However, overall, I 
would expect expenses to be in line with income and a negative change in sales to 
have a negative association with FR and CAE. Legacy income is an efficient way to 
sustain future income for a nonprofit. It is, however, difficult to predict but needs to be 
ensured through employing significant fundraising costs in convincing the public to 
leave their bequest for the nonprofit. I expect a negative relationship between CAE 
and legacy income, the reason being that resources would need to be diverted away 
from providing information and paying administrative costs for the fundraising team in 
convincing potential donors to leave funds to the organisation through their will. I would 
expect voluntary and fundraising income to benefit from a higher amount of spending 
on CAE as theory suggest their positive impact on donors’ willingness to donate as 
they perceive that the charity is spending for the charitable causes. I do not have a 
sign prediction for other income. 
In panel A, as expected the relationship for FR and CAE is positive and significant with 
their lagged counterparts (mean coefficient = 0.675 and mean p-value = 0.007 for FR; 
mean coefficient = 0.986 and mean p-value = 0.000 for CAE).  The coefficient on ATO 
does not appear to be significantly different from zero for both expense categories. 
Accrualst-1 is also not significantly different from zero for both expense categories. For 
charities, income and expenses may be accrued between years, due to legacy and 
deferred donations and grants. The direction of the coefficient is as expected i.e. 
positive (as for core earnings it is expected negative) but the results are not significant 
for both FR and CAE. Accrualst are significant and negative as expected for CAE 
(coefficient= -0.229, p-value=0.086). For core earnings as per McVay (2006) the 
predicted and observed sign is positive, hence a negative relationship is expected with 
expenses. Examples could include amounts that are not yet paid to the beneficiaries 
such as grant commitments from a foundation charity to a smaller charity. While the 
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mean for the Accrualst coefficient is not significant in predicting FRt, the results are 
weakly significant using the median of the industry-year estimation regressions 
(coefficient= -0.01, p-value=0.099). An insignificant mean of the coefficient on 
Accrualst may be partially because of a low amount of fundraising costs in the 
accounts, of which accrued expenses may be a very small fraction.  
I substitute the term Sales in McVay (2006) for Income as charities’ income is largely 
from non-trading activities and hence the term sales may not represent the 
predominant reality for charities. The expenses are expected to move in the same 
direction as Income. Panel B of Table 4.2 shows that as expected the direction is 
positive for both expenses but the mean and median are not significant for FR. CAE 
is significantly positive (coefficient= 0.536, p-value=0.009). The expected and 
observed coefficient signs are negative for 𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 from time t-1 to t. The 
median p-value for CAE estimation is significant (coefficient = -0.064, median p-
value=0.045). Various individual industry year results are significant for both FR and 
CAE but only averages are tabulated in Panel A of Table 4.2.  
4.5.2 Estimation using Yetman model 
Using the theoretical link motivated by Steinberg (1986) and Yetman and Yetman 
(2012, 2013), I expect the coefficient signs on various income types would depend on 
how the donors view the reporting quality of fundraising and charitable activities 
expense. A positive sign for FR expense’s predictor income variables would point to a 
positive impact of fundraising spending in promoting the charitable cause to donors. A 
negative sign may point to either a negative impact on a section of donors who 
disapprove of fundraising costs or a switch from one income type e.g. voluntary 
income to another income type e.g. other income.  Likewise, a positive sign for the 
CAE expense predictor income variables would point to a positive impact on donors 
indicating their belief that the charity is spending on the right causes. A negative impact 
may be an indication that a higher amount spent on CAE may either be viewed as 
expense classification shifting or an indication that low investment in promotional or 
other similar non-programme expenses in the prior period affects donations in the 
following year.   
In light of the theory, I expect that the voluntary donations will be negatively associated 
with fundraising costs. This is one of the fundamental assumptions in this line of 
literature. On the contrary, I would expect a positive relationship between fundraising 
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income and FR expense. This is because charities need to invest in certain fundraising 
events and as a result, they generate income. As discussed earlier, it is correct to 
assume that future income depends on current fundraising expenses to generate that 
income. I expect investment income to be negatively associated with fundraising 
expense because such spending would not help this type of income as it would take 
the resources away from investment-related costs. 
Panel B of Table 4.2 presents the results using the Yetman and Yetman (2012, 2013) 
variables. The lagged variables to predict FR and CAE are both significantly positive. 
 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 is weakly insignificant and negatively (positively) associated with FR 
(CAE). A negative relationship (coefficient -0.022, p-value=0.119) with FR alludes to 
a general dislike by the donors for FR expenses. The insignificant result perhaps 
explains that there are also benefits of fundraising costs for future voluntary donations. 
A positive relationship (mean coefficient 0.014, mean p-value=0.115, median 
coefficient 0.000, median p-value=0.028) with CAE points to the established 
knowledge of donors’ affinity towards higher levels of CAE but the result is too weak 
to give confidence that it confirms the theory.  
The coefficient on 𝐿𝐸𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 is not significant for both expenses of interest, 
suggesting that legacy income is not conclusively affected by the levels of fundraising 
and charitable activities. There are various competing forces and it is likely that their 
net effect becomes insignificant. For example fundraising activities help in increasing 
the legacy income but donors who plan to leave a sizeable portion of their lifelong 
savings are less keen on funding a charity that spends a higher than acceptable level 
on fundraising activities. The amount spent on CAE may have a positive impact on 
donors leaving their bequest but there may be insufficient allocation for fundraising 
activities, hence they are less informed on how a charity fulfils their individual aims 
and objectives for their legacy funds, and overall the balance shifts towards a negative 
but statistically insignificant impact.  
𝐹𝑅𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 has a significantly positive relationship with FR (mean coefficient 0.042, 
mean p-value=0.053) points to the logical explanation that a charity’s fundraising 
income is positively associated with the expense on fundraising activities. An example 
is a fundraising event, costs of which are paid from the fundraising expense category. 
Its relationship with FR being opposite to that for Voluntary Income is understandable. 
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Likewise, a significantly positive relationship with CAE (mean coefficient 0.089, mean 
p-value=0.077) points to the established knowledge of donors’ preference for higher 
levels of CAE, leading to higher fundraising income in subsequent period(s), it is also 
consistent with the theory. The relationship with  𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 and  𝑂𝑇𝐻_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 is not 
significant for both FR and CAE. This is understandable due to the nature of these 
income types. I would expect that investment income does not have a direct link with 
either fundraising or charitable activities expense in the previous period, only to the 
extent that there may be less resources available to making investments, but that may 
not be a strong argument against this observation.  
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡+1) has a positive and significant association with CAE expense (mean 
coefficient 2,928.5, mean p-value=0.096). It would be plausible to expect a positive 
relationship between CAE, the largest expense type and assets. It is conceivable that 
a larger charity will be spending a larger sum on its charitable activities.  
4.5.3 Estimation using the combined model 
Panel C of Table 4.2 presents the results using the combined estimation models for 
the two expenses of interest. FRt-1  and CAEt-1 have a significantly positive relationship 
with FRt and CAEt respectively. The coefficient on ATO does not appear to be 
significantly different from zero for both expense categories. Accruals in year t-1 is 
also not significantly different from zero for both expense categories. The direction of 
the coefficient is positive as expected. Accruals in year t  is significant and negative as 
expected for CAE (mean coefficient -0.234, mean p-value=0.095). ∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸t as 
expected, has a  positive association with both expense types, albeit not significant 
with FR expense. The association is significantly positive (mean coefficient= 0.5, p-
value=0.014) with CAE. The expected and observed coefficient signs are negative for 
𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 from time t-1 to t. The median p-value for CAE estimation is significant 
(coefficient = -0.06, median p-value=0.053). Several individual industry year results 
are significant for both FR and CAE but only averages are tabulated in Panel C of 
Table 4.2.  
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 is weakly insignificant and negatively (positively) associated with FR 
(CAE). A negative relationship (mean coefficient -0.022, p-value=0.122) with FR 
alludes to a general dislike by the donors for FR expenses. The insignificant result 
perhaps explains that there are also benefits of fundraising costs for future voluntary 
donations. A positive relationship (mean coefficient 0.02, mean p-value=0.109, 
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median p-value=0.025) with CAE points to the established knowledge of donors’ 
affinity towards higher levels of CAE.  
The coefficient on 𝐿𝐸𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 is not significant for expenses, suggesting that legacy 
income is not conclusively associated with the levels of fundraising and charitable 
activities. The weakly insignificant and positive (negative) association with FR (CAE) 
complements the directional predictions. A negative coefficient (mean coefficient -
0.081, p-value=0.188) for FR estimation indicates a general aversion to FR expenses.  
𝐹𝑅𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 has a significantly positive relationship with FR (mean coefficient 0.038, 
mean p-value=0.065) suggesting that a charity’s fundraising income is positively 
associated with the expense on fundraising activities. As predicted, a significantly 
positive relationship with CAE (mean coefficient 0.051, mean p-value=0.09) suggests 
that donors like to observe high levels of CAE. The association with  𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 and 
 𝑂𝑇𝐻_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 is not significant for both FR and CAE. There is no theoretical reason for 
investment income to be associated with fundraising or charitable activities expense. 
Similarly other income is expected to be of miscellaneous and irregular nature, hence 
less likely to have an association with either expense. 
The signs of FR and CAE with 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡+1) are, although not significant. This 
perhaps points to the substitution effect of the two expense types. It would be plausible 
to expect a positive relationship between the largest expense type, the CAE, and 
assets. It is conceivable that a larger charity will be spending a larger sum on its 
charitable activities and the marginal costs of fundraising due to the fixed costs 
element (e.g. fundraising staff salaries or other administrative costs) will decrease with 
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Table 4.2: Estimation models for normal levels of FR and CAE 
Panel A: McVay model 
The table presents results of the regression of the forms: 
𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕   =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝑻𝑶𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝜟𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑵𝑬𝑮_∆𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕  (4.1.1) 




Dependant Variable: 𝐹𝑅𝑡 Dependant Variable: 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  0.017 0.171 0.015* 0.080 0.059 0.237 0.054* 0.085 
𝐹𝑅𝑡−1 +     0.675*** 0.007    0.774*** 0.000     
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡−1 +     0.986*** 0.000 0.993*** 0.000 
𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 + 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.158 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 + 0.004 0.174 0.006 0.117 0.062 0.172 0.046 0.108 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 - -0.018 0.154 -0.010* 0.099 -0.229** 0.086 -0.200** 0.019 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡 + 0.033 0.158 0.019 0.102 0.536*** 0.009 0.448*** 0.000 
𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡 - -0.003 0.227 -0.001 0.209 -0.070 0.119 -0.064** 0.045 
R2  0.54  0.62  0.92  0.92  
 
*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
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Panel B: Yetman model 
The table presents results of the regression of the forms: 
FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏FR𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐VOL_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑LEG_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒FR_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓INV_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟔OTH_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟕LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕+𝟏) + 𝜺𝒊𝒕    (4.1.3) 

















Dependant Variable: 𝐹𝑅𝑡 Dependant Variable: 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  0.012 0.270 0.010 0.144 0.098 0.134 0.083** 0.016 
𝐹𝑅𝑡−1 + 0.629*** 0.002 0.702*** 0.000     
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡−1 +     0.895*** 0.000 0.922*** 0.000 
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 -/+ -0.022 0.119 -0.004** 0.027 0.014 0.115 0.000** 0.028 
𝐿𝐸𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 +/- 0.096 0.184 0.076 0.177 -0.346 0.189 -0.359 0.151 
𝐹𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 +/+ 0.042* 0.053 0.020*** 0.000 0.089* 0.077 0.093*** 0.001 
𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 -/- -0.013 0.233 -0.114 0.217 -1.066 0.179 -0.891 0.137 
𝑂𝑇𝐻_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 ?/? 0.050 0.184 0.036 0.144 0.266 0.137 0.235* 0.086 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡+1) ?/? 4.451 0.152 -19.77 0.106 2928.5* 0.096 1795.6*** 0.007 
R2  0.58  0.66  0.91  0.91  
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Panel C: The combined model  
The table presents results of the regression of the forms: 
FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏FR𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐ATO𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒ACC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝜟INCOME𝒊𝒕 +  
𝜷𝟔NET_∆INCOME𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕VOL_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟖LEG_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟗FR_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎INV_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏OTH_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕+𝟏) + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (4.1.5) 
CAE𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏CAE𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐ATO𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒ACC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝜟INCOME𝒊𝒕 +  
𝜷𝟔NET_∆INCOME𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕VOL_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟖LEG_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟗FR_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎INV_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏OTH_INC𝒊𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕+𝟏) + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (4.1.6) 
 




Dependant Variable: 𝐹𝑅𝑡 Dependant Variable: 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  0.012 0.343 0.009 0.253 0.081 0.219 0.069** 0.050 
𝐹𝑅𝑡−1  + 0.644*** 0.007 0.720*** 0.000     
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡−1 +     0.910*** 0.000 0.937*** 0.000 
𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 + 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.188 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 + 0.008 0.201 0.000 0.154 0.034 0.174 0.017 0.130 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 - -0.010 0.178 -0.008 0.168 -0.234* 0.095 -0.207*** 0.008 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  + 0.025 0.176 0.018 0.137 0.500** 0.014 0.420*** 0.000 
𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  - -0.005 0.235 -0.003 0.215 -0.062 0.120 -0.060* 0.053 
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1  -/+ -0.022 0.122 -0.003** 0.036 0.020 0.109 0.002** 0.025 
𝐿𝐸𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1  +/- 0.081 0.188 0.069 0.166 -0.312 0.165 -0.337 0.158 
𝐹𝑅𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 +/+ 0.038* 0.065 0.020*** 0.000 0.051* 0.090 0.040** 0.012 
𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 -/- -0.048 0.243 -0.146 0.248 -1.688 0.160 -1.227 0.135 
𝑂𝑇𝐻_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1 ?/? 0.041 0.196 0.034 0.201 0.176 0.177 0.133 0.154 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡+1) ?/? -49.76 0.173 -48.40* 0.097 2787.5 0.118 1893.6** 0.031 
R2  0.60  0.68  0.93  0.93  






                                               
98 Defined as Salest/((Net Operating Assetst + Net Operating Assets t-1)/2). Net Operating Assets, is equal to the 
difference between Operating Assets - Operating Liabilities. Operating Assets is calculated as Total Assets less 
Cash. Operating liabilities is calculated as Total Assets less Total Debt.  
99 Defined as change in current assets less change in current liabilities less change in cash and depreciation in t.  
Variable Definition 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  Total income in year t, in millions 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑡  Total expenses in year t, in millions 
𝐹𝑅𝑡  Total fundraising expenses in year t, in millions 
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  Total charitable activities expenses in year t, in millions 
𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡  Asset Turnover in year t as defined in McVay (2006), deflated by lagged total assets
98 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  Accruals in the year t, deflated by lagged total assets
99 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  Change in total income from year t-1 to year t, deflated by lagged total assets 
𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑡  Dichotomous variable: 1 if ∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 is below 1, 0 otherwise   
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Voluntary income in year t deflated by lagged total assets 
𝐿𝐸𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Legacy income in year t deflated by Lagged total assets 
𝐹𝑅𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Fundraising income in year t deflated by Lagged total assets 
𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Investment income in year t deflated by Lagged total assets 
𝑂𝑇𝐻_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡  Other income deflated in year t by Lagged total assets 
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1  Voluntary income in year t+1 deflated by lagged total assets 
𝐿𝐸𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1  Legacy income in year  t+1 deflated by Lagged total assets 
𝐹𝑅𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1  Fundraising income in year  t+1 deflated by Lagged total assets 
𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1  Investment income in year  t+1  deflated by Lagged total assets 
𝑂𝑇𝐻_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1  Other income deflated in year  t+1  by Lagged total assets 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  Return (Net Income) on assets in year t 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  Support cost divided by total expenses in year t 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Unexpected fundraising costs estimated by models (1.1) McVay, (1.3) Yetman or (1.5)  
Combined 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  
Unexpected charitable activities expenses estimated by models (1.2) McVay, (1.4) 
Yetman or (1.6)  Combined 
𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median restricted funds within its 
respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median endowment fund ratio end 
of year endowment fund divided by total funds) within its respective nonprofit 
classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median program service revenue to 
total revenue within its respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                




4.5.4 Expense shifting hypothesis (H1) 
My first hypothesis is based on the expectation that the relationship between 
unexpected fundraising expenses and unexpected charitable activities expenses will 
be negative. This is because in order to show low fundraising costs, charities would 
be inclined to allocate more expenses to charitable activities than fundraising 
expenses. A charity that employs expense shifting will have lower than expected 
fundraising costs.  Table 4.3 shows that the relationship between the two major 
expense categories is significantly negative, indicating expense misclassification. 
Table 4.3 reports the results of the estimation of fixed-effects models for all three sets 
of variables using McVay (2006), Yetman and Yetman (2013) and the combined 
model. As predicted by the expense shifting hypothesis, the coefficient on UE_CAE is 
negative and highly significant employing all three estimation models (β1=−0.057, 
−0.050 and −0.068 with UE_FR as the dependent variable using the McVay model, 
the Yetman model, and the combined model, respectively). The coefficient on return 
on assets is significantly negative and the coefficient on size is significantly positive 
for all three estimation models. This points to the fact that large charities are less prone 
to manipulation, which could be either because of a large surplus or low amounts of 
assets that will lead to more manipulative behaviour.  
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Table 4.3: H1 results 
Regressions testing association between UE_FR and UE_CAE 
Panel A: Results using McVay model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 







*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
Independent Variable Prediction Coeff P-value 
Intercept   -0.093*** 0.003 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.057*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.006*** 0.003 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡             - -0.049*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡   -0.012*** 0.005 
Observations   69,874   
R2   0.04   
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Panel B: Results using Yetman model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 







*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
Panel C: Results using the combined model 
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 







*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
Variable definitions: 
 
Independent Variable Prediction Coeff P-value 
Intercept   -0.234*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.050*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.016*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.039*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡   -0.019*** 0.000 
Observations   69,922   
R2   0.03   
Independent Variable Prediction Coeff P-value 
Intercept   -0.265*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.068*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.018*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.060*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡   -0.011** 0.013 
Observations   58,447  
R2   0.04  
Variable Definition 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Unexpected fundraising costs estimated by models (1.1) McVay, (1.3) Yetman or (1.5)  
Combined 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  
Unexpected charitable activities expenses estimated by models (1.2) McVay, (1.4) 
Yetman or (1.6)  Combined 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  Return (Net Income) on assets in year t 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  Support cost divided by total expenses in year t 
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4.5.5 Effect of sophisticated donors (H2) 
My second hypothesis is that charities with sophisticated donors will have less 
expense misclassification, given the donors’ better insight of the charity. Table 4.4 
shows that sophisticated donors have a negative impact on the propensity for 
manipulation such that the relationship between UE_FR and UE_CAE is less negative. 
The sophistication in the sample has been defined in two ways. First, for those donors 
who place restrictions on donations, and such amounts are shown as restricted funds 
in the nonprofits’ Balance Sheets. The second type of restriction is expected to be 
even stronger due to the effect of closer monitoring of donors in endowment charities. 
Both instances of restriction are expected to be deterrents for charities’ managers’ 
tendency to misclassify expenses. 
As confirmed by the results in Table 4.4, I find that charities that receive a higher level 
of their funds from donors who gift through restricted donations are less manipulative. 
Specifically, the coefficient for the interaction effect is significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that managers of a charity funded largely in the form of restricted donations 
is less prone to misclassify expenses. For instance, if UE_CAE and UE_FR  are 
calculated using McVay (2006) model, for the nonprofits that are funded more through 
restricted donations, the total effect of UE_CAE on UE_FR would be -0.044 (main 
coefficient -0.069 added to the interaction coefficient +0.025). The interaction 
coefficient is significant in the remaining two models also (coefficient = 0.019, p-value 
= 0.007 using the Yetman model; coefficient = 0.025, p-value = 0.007 using the 
combined model). 
Charities with high levels of endowment funds also have a higher level of 
sophistication of donors through close monitoring and restriction on the use of funds. 
The second set of results in Table 4.4 suggest that the relationship between UE_FR 
and UE_CAE becomes less negative by interacting UE_CAE with highly endowed 
charities. The interaction variable is significantly different from zero, suggesting that 
managers are less prone to misclassifying expenses if a charity is funded primarily 
through endowment funds. 
I find (see Table 4.4) the interaction term for charities with ENDOWMENT type funding 
(coefficient = 0.040, p-value = 0.000) is significantly positive, using the McVay model. 
Similarly, the interaction term is significantly positive using the other two models 
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(coefficient = 0.016, p-value 0.089 using the Yetman model, coefficient = 0.036, p-
value = 0.000 using the combined model). 
4.5.6 Effect of service-oriented charities (H3) 
My third hypothesis is that the charities with higher than the median level of 
programme revenue in their respective charity subgroup (i.e. more service-oriented) 
will be less prone to misclassifying between fundraising and charitable activities 
expenses. This is because the donor-beneficiary distance is generally expected to be 
lower for more service-oriented charities, hence there are other methods to appraise 
the performance of a charity than just the reported figures for the donors/beneficiaries. 
The performance of a charity is better seen by the beneficiaries who in many cases 
also happen to be its financial supporters. Table 4.4 shows that the interaction effect 
of more service-oriented charities is negative implying that it reduces the negative 
relationship between UE_FR and UE_CAE. The sum of the two coefficients is 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that managers are less prone to 
misclassifying expenses if a charity falls within the service-oriented category. 
Specifically, as shown in the final column of Table 4.4, I find that charities with a higher 
level of funds from donors who gift through restricted donations are less manipulative. 
(coefficient of interaction term in the McVay model = 0.020, p-value = 0.004; coefficient 
= 0.028, p-value = 0.000 using the Yetman model; coefficient = 0.035, p-value = 0.000 
using the combined model). 
A possible explanation for the negative coefficient on the service-oriented variable 
could be that such charity is less likely to spend on fundraising costs compared to their 
charitable nonprofit counterparts, because charitable firm by definition depends more 
on raising funds from private and public sources and that is not in exchange of services 
to the donors. Such charities are expected to make more efforts to convince disparate 
donors; hence in a large industry pool for estimation that includes both service-
oriented and charitable nonprofits, It is possible that lower levels of fundraising costs 
are attributable to the service-oriented nonprofits, hence in a large estimation pool they 
appear unexpectedly low in fundraising costs, leading to a negative unexpected 
fundraising and service-oriented charity relationship.  
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Table 4.4: H2 and H3 results: 
Regressions of UE_FR on UE_CAE with charity type interactions 
Panel A: Results using McVay model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒ROA𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕        (4.3) 
Independent Variable Prediction 
Restricted Endowment Service 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.086*** 0.005 -0.094*** 0.002 -0.080*** 0.009 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.069*** 0.000 -0.059*** 0.000 -0.065*** 0.000 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡 ? -0.001 0.207 0.009** 0.019 -0.021*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡 
+ 0.025*** 0.002 0.040*** 0.000 0.020*** 0.004 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.006*** 0.004 0.006*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.003 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.048*** 0.000 -0.049*** 0.000 -0.050*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.012*** 0.004 -0.011*** 0.005 -0.012*** 0.003 
Observations  69,874  69,874  69,874  
R2  0.04  0.04  0.05  
*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Panel B: Results using Yetman model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒ROA𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕        (4.3) 
*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Panel C: Results using the combined model 
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒ROA𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕        (4.3) 
 




Restricted Endowment Service 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.231*** 0.000 -0.231*** 0.000 -0.226*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.060*** 0.000 -0.051*** 0.000 -0.063*** 0.000 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡 ? 0.003* 0.080 0.011*** 0.007 -0.027*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡 
+ 0.019*** 0.007 0.016* 0.089 0.027*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.015*** 0.000 0.015*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.038*** 0.000 -0.039*** 0.000 -0.041*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.019*** 0.000 -0.019*** 0.000 -0.019*** 0.000 
Observations  69,922  69,922  69,922  




Restricted Endowment Service 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.259*** 0.000 -0.262*** 0.000 -0.250*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.080*** 0.000 -0.070*** 0.000 -0.084*** 0.000 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡 ? 0.0008 0.483 0.013*** 0.004 -0.021*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡
∗  𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡 
+ 0.025*** 0.004 0.036*** 0.000 0.035*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.017*** 0.000 0.017*** 0.000 0.017*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.058*** 0.000 -0.059*** 0.000 -0.061*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.011** 0.011 -0.011** 0.013 -0.012*** 0.008 
Observations  58,447  58,447  58,447  
R2  0.04  0.04  0.04  







4.5.7 Effect of ratios hypothesis (H4) 
My fourth hypothesis expects a stronger negative relationship between charitable 
activities expenses and fundraising costs for charities that have less favourable 
commonly used expense ratios. Managers of a charity with a lower than the median 
level of programme spending ratio may have a stronger inclination towards reducing 
fundraising costs in favour of charitable activities expenditure. Table 4.5 shows that 
the interaction with a charity reporting lower programme ratio in t-1 than the median of 
its relevant charity subgroup further intensifies the negative relationship between 
UE_FR and UE_CAE. Therefore, a charity with a programme ratio in t-1 below the 
median of its peer group is more likely to misclassify expenses to improve its position 
in its peer group. 
Table 4.5 shows the impact of the interaction of LOW_PR with UE_CAE as negative, 
which means it increases the negative relationship between UE_FR and UE_CAE 
(coefficient = -0.022, p-value = 0.001 using the McVay model; coefficient = -0.026, p-
value = 0.000 using the Yetman model; coefficient = -0.02, p-value = 0.009 using the 
combined model).  
However, the results for the other two expense ratios are not all significantly negative.  
I expect that a charity with a higher than median level of fundraising ratio in its peer 
group will also be incentivised to raise its charitable activities expense and reduce its 
fundraising costs. The unexpected fundraising and charitable activities estimated form 
the first stage estimation regressions employing McVay (2006) have a more 
significantly negative relationship when HIGH_FR interacts with the main independent 
Variable Definition 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Unexpected fundraising costs estimated by models (1.1) McVay, (1.3) Yetman or (1.5)  
Combined 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  
Unexpected charitable activities expenses estimated by models (1.2) McVay, (1.4) 
Yetman or (1.6)  Combined 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  Return (Net Income) on assets in year t 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  Support cost divided by total expenses in year t 
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variable UE_CAE (coefficient = -0.017, p-value = 0.000). The results are not significant 
using the combined model.  
When fundraising efficiency ratio is used as the interaction term, it also produces 
mixed results. The unexpected fundraising and charitable activities estimated from the 
first stage estimation regressions employing McVay (2006) have a more significantly 
negative relationship when HIGH_FRE interacts with the main independent variable 
UE_CAE (coefficient = -0.019, p-value = 0.006). The results are not significant when 
the other two estimation regression models are used.  
Table 4.5: H4 results 
Regressions of UE_FR on UE_CAE interacted with firm years with less 
favourable expense ratios 
Panel A: Results using McVay model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐RATIO_SUSPECT𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ RATIO_SUSPECT𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟓ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕     (4.4) 
 




LOW_PR HIGH_FR HIGH_FRE 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.042 0.104 -0.035 0.142 -0.011 0.377 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.045*** 0.000 -0.046*** 0.000 -0.042*** 0.000 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡 - -0.023*** 0.000 -0.023*** 0.000 -0.023*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡
∗  𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡 
- -0.022*** 0.001 -0.018*** 0.008 -0.019*** 0.006 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.004* 0.051 0.003* 0.073 0.002 0.231 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.048*** 0.000 -0.049*** 0.000 -0.049*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.012*** 0.003 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.000 
Observations  69,874  69,874  62,228  
R2  0.04  0.04  0.04  
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Panel B: Results using Yetman model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐RATIO_SUSPECT𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ RATIO_SUSPECT𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟓ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕     (4.4) 
*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
Panel C: Results using the combined model 
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐RATIO_SUSPECT𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ RATIO_SUSPECT𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟓ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕     (4.4) 




LOW_PR HIGH_FR HIGH_FRE 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.184*** 0.000 -0.180*** 0.000 -0.154*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.037*** 0.000 -0.044*** 0.000 -0.042*** 0.000 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡 - -0.028*** 0.000 -0.032*** 0.000 -0.030*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡
∗  𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇 
- -0.026*** 0.000 -0.010* 0.055 -0.009* 0.100 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.013*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 0.012*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.037*** 0.000 -0.039*** 0.000 -0.038*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.019*** 0.000 -0.021*** 0.000 -0.023*** 0.000 
Observations  69,922  69,922  62,216  




LOW_PR HIGH_FR HIGH_FRE 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.220*** 0.000 -0.212*** 0.000 -0.196*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.057*** 0.000 -0.065*** 0.000 -0.060*** 0.000 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡 - -0.027*** 0.000 -0.029*** 0.000 -0.028*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡
∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡 
- -0.020*** 0.005 -0.004 0.319 -0.006 0.223 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.016*** 0.000 0.015*** 0.000 0.014*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.058*** 0.000 -0.059*** 0.000 -0.059*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.011*** 0.010 -0.013*** 0.005 -0.016*** 0.001 
Observations  58,447  58,447  51,976  
R2  0.04  0.03  0.03  







4.5.8 Support cost hypothesis (H5) 
The final hypothesis expects a stronger negative relationship between charitable 
activities expenses and fundraising costs for the charities that have higher than the 
median level of charity administration expenditure in the reporting year. Table 4.6 
shows that the interaction increases the negative relationship between UE_FR and 
UE_CAE, only if the Yetman estimation model is employed. The results are not 
Variable Definition 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Unexpected fundraising costs estimated by models (1.1) McVay, (1.3) Yetman or (1.5)  
Combined 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  
Unexpected charitable activities expenses estimated by models (1.2) McVay, (1.4) 
Yetman or (1.6)  Combined 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  Return (Net Income) on assets in year t 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  Support cost divided by total expenses in year t 
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has higher than the median level of fundraising 
ratio in year t-1. Where Fundraising ratio is defined as Fundraising expenses divided 
total expenses in year t 
 𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has lower than the median level of programme 
ratio in year t-1.Where Programme expense ratio is defined as Charitable activities 
expenses divided by total expenses  in year t 
𝐹𝑅𝐸_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡   
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has lower than the median level of fundraising 
efficiency ratio in year t-1.  Fundraising efficiency ratio: Fundraising expense divided 
fund raising income in year t.   
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Unexpected fundraising costs estimated by models (1.1) McVay, (1.3) Yetman or (1.5)  
Combined 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  
Unexpected charitable activities expenses estimated by models (1.2) McVay, (1.4) 
Yetman or (1.6)  Combined 
𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median restricted funds within its 
respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median endowment fund ratio end 
of year endowment fund divided by total funds) within its respective nonprofit 
classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median program service revenue to 
total revenue within its respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Chapter 4: Study on Expense Misclassification: Evidence from UK Charities 
189 
 
significant for regressions using the other two estimation models. The interaction effect 
using the Yetman model is coefficient = -0.014, p-value = 0.040.   
This shows that the effect of higher than median support cost is either absent or very 
weak. The prior literature does not directly hypothesise that a high level of support 
cost is certain to lead to a raised likelihood of manipulation. Hence it would be safe to 
accept that only a large amount of support cost should not on its own be a reason to 
develop doubts about the intentions and expense reporting quality of a charity.   
Table 4.6: H5 results 
Regressions of UE_FR on UE_CAE interacted with firm years including high 
support costs 
Panel A: Results using McVay model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐HIGH_SC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ HIGH_SC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) +
𝜷𝟓ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕         (4.5) 
Independent Variable Prediction 
HIGH_SC 
Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.094*** 0.003 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.053*** 0.000 
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐶𝑡 - -0.006*** 0.001 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗  𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐶𝑡 - -0.010 0.115 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.006*** 0.002 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.049*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.004 0.213 
Observations  69,874  
R2  0.04  
 
*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
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Panel B: Results using Yetman model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐HIGH_SC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ HIGH_SC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) +









*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Panel C: Results using the combined model 
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐HIGH_SC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ HIGH_SC𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) +
𝜷𝟓ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕         (4.5) 
Independent Variable Prediction 
HIGH_SC 
Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.266*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.066*** 0.000 
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐶𝑡 - -0.006*** 0.001 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗  𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐶𝑡 - -0.005 0.289 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.018*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.059*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.003 0.285 
Observations  58,447  
R2  0.04  
*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
Independent Variable Prediction 
HIGH_SC 
Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.236*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.046*** 0.000 
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐶𝑡 - -0.008*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗  𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐶𝑡 - -0.014** 0.041 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.016*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.038*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.010** 0.040 
Observations  69,922  
R2  0.03  






I conduct below supplemental tests to examine the robustness of my main results and 
run additional regressions to further understand the impact of the suspect variables on 
various charity types. 
4.5.9 Additional analysis 
In my additional analysis I employ triple interaction involving LOW_PR  (low 
programme ratio) with charity and donor types. I select LOW_PR  as it provided more 
conclusive results in my main analysis using all three models.  The results are shown 
in Table 4.7 for the following empirical model.  
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 ∗
CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟗ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕  (4.6) 
I report the results using all three estimation models in Panels A, B and C of Table 4.7. 
Given that the results in my main analyses indicate that managers appear to be 
incentivised to report a low programme ratio, I further study whether programme ratio 
adversely impacts the expense manipulation behaviour by the three different types of 
charities: sophisticated, endowment and service-oriented.   
I predict that the interaction coefficient would be negative when a sophisticated or 
service-oriented charity type is interacted with UE_CAE. An interaction of low 
programme ratio and UE_CAE is also predicted to have a negative sign. On the 
contrary a triple interaction will not have a directional prediction as it would depend on 
Variable Definition 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Unexpected fundraising costs estimated by models (1.1) McVay, (1.3) Yetman or (1.5)  
Combined 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  
Unexpected charitable activities expenses estimated by models (1.2) McVay, (1.4) 
Yetman or (1.6)  Combined 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  Return (Net Income) on assets in year t 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  Support cost divided by total expenses in year t 
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐶𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has higher than the median level of 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 (Support cost in year t). 
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whether the low programme ratio is a more powerful reason to manipulate than the 
deterrence caused by the sophistication and low donor-beneficiary separation. 
Table 4.7 shows that the LOW_PR interaction increases the negative relationship 
between UE_FR and UE_CAE even for the nonprofits that receive higher funding from 
restricted donations. This means that the overall positive coefficient becomes much 
smaller for a charity with sophisticated donors if its programme ratio in the previous 
year is below median. However due to the presence of sophisticated funders the 
overall impact remains lower than the baseline charity that does not have added 
pressure to manipulate due to an unwanted programme ratio.  Using the McVay (2006) 
estimation model, I observe a negative effect from having both a low programme ratio 
and restricted donations of -0.027 (p-value = 0.034) using the McVay model and -
0.026 (p-value = 0.043) using the combined model. The results using the Yetman 
model are not significant, alluding to no impact of programme ratio on the 
preparedness for manipulation by sophisticated charities.  
The next column of results in Table 4.7 examine the effect of endowment charities on 
manipulative behaviour of nonprofits with low programme ratio. I find that the charities 
with higher endowment funds are  less incentivised to misclassify. This is consistent 
with the main analysis as endowed charities tend to have closer monitoring by its 
patrons.  The interaction term UE_CAE*LOW_PR*CHARITYTYPE is 0.039 and 
significant using the McVay model, and 0.05 and significant using the combined 
model. The results using the Yetman model also support the results where  a weakly 
insignificant (p<0.11) reduction in the baseline negative coefficient is noted by 0.031. 
This signals that the restrictive impact of endowment funds overpowers the motivation 
to misclassify in response to low programme ratio.  
The results using all three models suggest that for a charity with higher endowment 
there is less likelihood for expense misclassification even if the programme ratio is 
lower than the median in t-1. I infer from it that there will be a more stringent monitoring 
for an endowed charity with low programme spending in the previous year, it would 
therefore be less prone to misguiding through expense manipulation.  
The third column shows the results from interacting with service-oriented charities. 
The results using the service-oriented charity type variable present a different story. 
The output from all three estimation models show that the LOW_PR increases the 
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negative aggregate coefficient for service-oriented types. Specifically, the high 
programme ratio increases the negative correlation between UE_FR and UE_CAE 
more so in service-oriented firms (interaction coefficient of -0.043, p-value = 0.003 
using the McVay model; coefficient = -0.039, p-value = 0.000 using the Yetman model; 
coefficient = -0.045, p-value = 0.003 using the combined model).  
Table 4.7: Programme ratio - additional results 
Regressions of UE_FR on UE_CAE interacted with firm years including low 
programme ratios and charity types 
Panel A: Results using McVay model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 ∗
CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟗ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕  (4.6) 
 




Sophisticated Endowment Service 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.036 0.134 -0.040 0.116 -0.025 0.226 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.064*** 0.000 -0.046*** 0.000 -0.064*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 - -0.027*** 0.000 -0.025*** 0.000 -0.021*** 0.000 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡 ? -0.005*** 0.008 0.000 0.475 -0.020*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 - -0.006 0.308 -0.025*** 0.001 -0.001 0.464 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡  
+ 0.035*** 0.000 0.020** 0.027 0.039*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡  
? 0.008*** 0.003 0.017*** 0.000 -0.003 0.124 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡  
? -0.027** 0.034 0.039*** 0.003 -0.043*** 0.003 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡) + 0.003* 0.059 0.003* 0.059 0.003* 0.072 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.047*** 0.000 -0.047*** 0.000 -0.048*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.013*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.003 -0.013*** 0.002 
Observations  69,874  69,874  69,874  
R2  0.04  0.04  0.05  
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Panel B: Results using Yetman model  
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 ∗
CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟗ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕  (4.6) 
 
*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
Independent Variable Prediction 
Sophisticated Endowment Service 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.180*** 0.000 -0.179*** 0.000 -0.172*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.049*** 0.000 -0.037*** 0.000 -0.060*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 - -0.034*** 0.000 -0.032*** 0.000 -0.028*** 0.000 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡 ? -0.003* 0.068 -0.002 0.299 -0.027*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 - -0.020** 0.028 -0.027*** 0.000 -0.004 0.333 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡  
+ 0.024*** 0.001 0.001 0.471 0.043*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡  
? 0.011*** 0.000 0.022*** 0.000 -0.001 0.367 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡  
? -0.011 0.185 0.031 0.106 -0.039*** 0.002 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  + 0.013*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 0.014*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 - -0.036*** 0.000 -0.036*** 0.000 -0.038*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 - -0.019*** 0.000 -0.019*** 0.000 -0.019*** 0.000 
Observations  69,922  69,922  69,922  
R2  0.03  0.02  0.03  
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Panel C: Results using the combined model 
The table presents results of the regression of the form: 
UE_FR𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 ∗ CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕UE_CAE𝒊𝒕 ∗ LOW_PR𝒊𝒕 ∗
CHARITYTYPE𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖LOG(ASSETS𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟗ROA𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎SUPPORT_COST𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕  (4.6) 
 
*, **, *** Represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
Independent Variable Prediction 
Sophisticated Endowment Service 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept  -0.214*** 0.000 -0.213*** 0.000 -0.202*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 - -0.076*** 0.000 -0.057*** 0.000 -0.084*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 - -0.032*** 0.000 -0.030*** 0.000 -0.027*** 0.000 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡 ? -0.004** 0.019 0.001 0.464 -0.022*** 0.000 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 - -0.006 0.319 -0.024*** 0.002 0.004 0.386 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡  
+ 0.036*** 0.000 0.008 0.318 0.056*** 0.000 
𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡  
? 0.009*** 0.002 0.021*** 0.000 0.0001 0.484 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑡  
? -0.026** 0.043 0.050*** 0.007 -0.045*** 0.003 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  + 0.015*** 0.000 0.015*** 0.000 0.015*** 0.000 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  - -0.057*** 0.000 -0.057*** 0.000 -0.059*** 0.000 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  - -0.012*** 0.009 -0.011*** 0.010 -0.012*** 0.007 
Observations  58,447  58,447  58,447  
R2  0.04  0.04  0.04  






4.6 Robustness Tests 
In the following section, I present results from a number of sensitivity tests to confirm 
the robustness of my findings in the above analyses. I do not tabulate the results of 
the robustness tests but their findings are discussed below. 
4.6.1 Alternative charity categories  
In the main analyses, I define charities using earlier studies (e.g. Balsam and Harris, 
2014) where a charity above (below) the median level of programme revenue in its 
charity subgroup is coded as service-oriented (charitable). Similarly, charities above 
(below) the median level of restricted funds in their respective subgroups are coded 
as sophisticated (less sophisticated). As robustness, I use continuous variables to 
mitigate the subjectivity in assigning a specific threshold of the median value by 
interacting programme service revenue (PSR) with UE_CAE and the results are 
positively significant, confirming that an increase in the level of programme income, 
(or charitable activities income) decreases the likelihood of expense shifting.  I also 
Variable Definition 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Unexpected fundraising costs estimated by models (1.1) McVay, (1.3) Yetman or (1.5)  
Combined 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  
Unexpected charitable activities expenses estimated by models (1.2) McVay, (1.4) 
Yetman or (1.6)  Combined 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total assets in year t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  Return (Net Income) on assets in year t 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  Support cost divided by total expenses in year t 
𝑈𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
Unexpected fundraising costs estimated by models (1.1) McVay, (1.3) Yetman or (1.5)  
Combined 
𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑡  
Unexpected charitable activities expenses estimated by models (1.2) McVay, (1.4) 
Yetman or (1.6)  Combined 
𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median restricted funds within its 
respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median endowment fund ratio end 
of year endowment fund divided by total funds) within its respective nonprofit 
classification, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has above-median program service revenue to 
total revenue within its respective nonprofit classification, and 0 otherwise.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝑡 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the charity has lower than the median level of programme 
ratio in year t-1. 
Chapter 4: Study on Expense Misclassification: Evidence from UK Charities 
197 
 
interact the level of ‘Restricted funds’ with UE_CAE and the results are positively 
significant, confirming that an increase in the level of restriction also decreases the 
likelihood of expense shifting.   
4.6.2 Alternative definition of suspect firms 
The most important suspect variable that I examine above is a high programme ratio. 
To ensure a lower programme ratio in t-1 is a robust variable to test hypothesis 4, I 
employ substitute variables and run the regressions with the same control and charity 
type variables. First, I interact the change in programme ratio from t-1 to t and then 
from t-2 to t-1 to test whether a downwards change in programme ratio exacerbates 
misclassification behaviour. The results are robust and the relationship appears 
positive, implying that an increase in programme ratio will reduce the negative 
relationship between UR_FR and UE_CAE, hence confirming that a reduction in 
programme ratio must increase the likelihood of expense misclassification.  I also 
employ triple interaction with the charity and donor types and observe similar results. 
The results for a the sophisticated CHARITYTYPE and endowment CHARITYTYPE 
are not significant, confirming that sophistication and monitoring of donors deters 
expense misclassification, but that the charity type is not enough to resist the pressure 
created by a high programme ratio.   
I also create as a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the programme ratio 
has decreased from t-1 (t-2) to t (t-1) and 0 otherwise. The results are in line with my 
main tests, using the simple interaction with UE_CAE and triple interactions involving 
the charity types, based on the change in the ratio from t-1 to t. If the change in ratio 
is negative then it is expected that such charity would be more incentivised to 
manipulate its expense classification. 
4.6.3 Alternative CAE variable 
My main regression has the independent variable CAE, which is measured as the sum 
of charitable activities expenses and grants to other institutions. I believe this variable 
must include both as grants are paid by foundation charities and fall within the 
definition of programme related expenses. However, I also remove the grants to other 
institutions figures from my variable and the results remain predominantly similar, 
although the coefficients are much smaller. 
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4.6.4 Alternative deflator 
The variables in the main study are deflated by lagged total assets. To test the 
robustness of my tests following McVay (2006), I use total income as the deflator. The 
results remain qualitatively similar to those in the main tests. I also use total assets in 
t-1, log of total assets in t-1 and ROA as deflators. Again the results and signs for the 
variable of importance are similar to my main analyses. 
 
4.6.5 Alternative control variables 
Following Leone and Van Horne (2005), I include the lagged variable UE_FR as an 
independent variable and the signs remain the same; inferences remain unaffected. 
Similarly, I also remove the control variables either completely or one by one from the 
main regressions and find that the main variables of interest remain significant with 
the identical signs to the original analyses. 
4.6.6 Alternative UE_FR and UE_CAE prediction variables 
Although 3 models have been used to predict the two, I also use only the lagged 
versions of FR and CAE to predict the normal levels of the two variables. The results 
are consistent with those reported under the main analyses. 
 4.6.7 Alternative measure of high support cost 
The results of Hypothesis 5 were mostly insignificant and therefore I am unable to 
reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that higher than 
median support costs motivates management to misclassify their expenses more. I 
test this conclusion through further sensitivity tests by defining the HIGH_SC 
differently. I run the regressions by interacting three different substitutes for HIGH_SC 
with UE_CAE and CHARITYTYPE. These alternative proxies are (a) the change in 
support cost from t-1 to t, (b) a substitute dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
support cost has increased from t-1 to t, and 0 otherwise, and (c) a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if support cost is higher than the median in t-1, and 0 
otherwise. All results are mostly insignificant, confirming that a mere increase in 
support costs does not on its own lead to a higher likelihood of expense 
misclassification.  
I also test for the variance inflation factor (VIF) which indicates the magnitude of the 
inflation in the standard errors due to multicollinearity. The mean VIF for the combined 
estimation regression is 1.61 with the highest one for log total assets at 3.10. 
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Consistent with the prior literature, size (Total Assets) is significantly correlated with 
many other control variables (e.g. Balsam and Harris, 2014). The extant literature 
recognises that total assets can have a relatively higher VIF, given that it is used as a 
deflator. A VIF above 10 represents high multicollinearity (Belsley et al., 1980), 
whereas Rogerson, (2001) recommend a maximum VIF value of 5. I find that none of 
the variance inflation factors except for the interaction variables is over 4.0. 
One of the primary results is that the relationship between unexpected fundraising 
costs and unexpected charitable activities expenses is negative. Following the 
robustness tests, it does not appear that these results are due to a mechanical 
relationship or misspecified estimation of the unexpected expense variables. 
Mechanically, nothing is preventing the unexpected levels of the two expenses to 
move in the same direction. When the total expense in a certain period become 
unexpectedly higher or lower than the norm then it may result in both moving in the 
same direction. Studying the impact on manipulation by considering various measures 
for expense efficiency, I provide evidence that programme ratio is the most commonly 
pursued measure by nonprofit managers that warrants misclassification of expenses. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This paper examines misclassification between fundraising and charitable activities 
expenses within the Statement of Financial Position of nonprofits. Misclassification is 
a tool to misrepresent a nonprofit’s allocation of resources between its main objectives 
and the less favoured costs, the fundraising activities. I take inspiration from for-profit 
and nonprofit literature to design this research. Compared to classification shifting in 
for-profit firms, nonprofits are scrutinised more by media and the public to allocate 
most of their resources to the main charitable purpose for what a nonprofit exists for. 
This paper observes and reports that such misallocation does take place. Hence it is 
an important study that should interest regulators, donors and nonprofit managers. 
This can guide the regulator for policy formulation regarding how the expenses are 
recognised and reported, the donors to appreciate that charities in many cases feel 
almost compelled due to their unrealistic expectations, which in some cases leads to 
expense misreporting, and nonprofit management that such expense misclassification 
can lead to a loss in income. The unexpected levels of fundraising and charitable 
expenses can be observed and considering the extant literature, donors are tentative 
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in donating to a charity with low expense reporting quality. Hence misclassification can 
achieve quite the opposite to what it is intended for. 
I examine classification shifting between fundraising expenses (for promotion, salary 
or commission to fundraisers, reimbursements to volunteers etc.) and charitable 
activities expenses, the main purpose for which a nonprofit exists. I do not make 
judgments on whether the fundraising costs are excessive. In the current competitive 
climate, it is challenging for charities to raise funds for programme costs, let alone 
raising funds for fundraising expenses from public and private sources. 
This study contributes to the positive accounting theory and refrains from stumbling 
into the normative theory by pontificating on fairness and legitimacy of the expense 
levels. However, I understand the relentless pressures to raise funds which lead to the 
pressures to misclassify expenses. I observe expense misclassification with varying 
degrees depending on the levels of motivations and monitoring.  Although I believe 
the results persuasively show that types of funders and charities are important factors 
in predicting whether a charity is susceptible to misclassifying its expenses, the 
evidence by interacting the prevailing expense ratios is mixed. Similarly, the level of 
support cost does not seem to have a significant impact on the readiness to shift 
expense classification. 
Adapting to the models by McVay (2006) and Yetman and Yetman (2012, 2013), I 
employ three models to predict normal levels of fundraising and charitable activities 
expenses. I find that unexpected fundraising costs are significantly negatively 
associated with charitable activities expenses using all three models.  Furthermore, I 
find this shifting to be less prominent when a charity is funded more by sophisticated 
funders, i.e. those who a) place restrictions on their donations and b) pay endowment 
funds. Similarly, if a charity is more service-oriented, i.e. it receives a higher level of 
programme revenue then it is observed to manipulate less. This may be because the 
donor-beneficiary separation is low and managers are comparatively less motivated 
to misguide through financial reporting. The donors can observe the level and quality 
of services directly, hence the relevance of such manipulation is lower than in those 
charities which receive a lower degree of programme revenue.  
This study also classifies the sample into suspect and non-suspect groups. The 
nonprofit with higher than the median levels of programme expense, fundraising 
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efficiency and fundraising cost ratios in t-1 are classified as suspect. I hypothesise that 
all such firm years will be more prone to misclassify. I find that of all the ratios, 
programme ratio appears to be the one which nonprofit managers fixate on most, even 
for a more service-oriented charity. Programme ratio is a simple measure that presents 
the percentage spending on the main charitable causes compared to the total 
resources expended in a period. 
Contrary to my initial expectation, I find that higher than the median of support cost in 
the current year is not strong enough a reason to convince managers to misclassify 
between fundraising and charitable activities expenses. The expectation that simply 
having high support cost could be amenable to misclassification is based on the 
assumption that all support costs are disapproved of by donors. It is perhaps an 
indication that donors and nonprofit managers are becoming aware and more 
accepting that a charity needs to have support costs to run its operations. A mere 
presence of support cost must not be regarded as an antecedent for expense 
classification shifting.  
While my methodology has considered several predictor variables in various ways, the 
possibility that simultaneity or confounding variables influence my results cannot be 
ruled out. However, a large degree of this concern has been addressed through 
several robustness tests as mentioned above. It is important to note that this study 
and its various analyses are a first step in exploring the misclassification between 
expenses. Therefore, it should not be interpreted as conclusive evidence that the 
charities can be neatly classified into their respective groups. Also, it would be wrong 
to assume that all charities other than those falling outside the sophisticated or service-
oriented categories are more amenable to expense misclassification, or that an 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis comprises three studies in financial reporting manipulation in UK charities. 
The first study uses the qualitative method of semi-structured interviews with 
professionals suggesting several motivations for financial reporting manipulation. The 
motivations are found to be aiming for a small surplus as well as minimising fundraising 
ratios. This study also questions whether UK charities manage their earnings to a 
target range and if they misclassify their expenses to appear more legitimate. The 
motivations for earnings management and misclassification of expenses add to the 
scant literature fully dedicated to motivations, using the qualitative technique. The 
extant studies have predominantly focused on earnings management using US data 
employing quantitative techniques.  
The second study examines accrual-based and real earnings management using 
traditional quantitative techniques. The limited extant literature does not examine the 
extent of real and accruals earnings management in nonprofits according to their 
sophistication and donor-beneficiary proximity level.  
Finally, the third study is the first to examine expense misclassification in UK charities. 
Using three different methods, it estimates normal levels of fundraising and charitable 
activities expenses and uses their abnormal levels as proxies of misclassification. This 
methodology is the first which studies the classification shifting between the two major 
types of expenses. It tests whether charities’ willingness to shift the expenses between 
the two major expense categories is determined by the sophistication and donor-
beneficiary proximity. The main results and their implications are summarised in the 
following sections. 
 
5.2 Motivations for financial misreporting by UK charities 
Chapter 2 first investigates the motivators of financial misreporting in UK charities. 
This is the first qualitative study to my knowledge that is based on interviews with 
preparers of financial statements. This technique makes a valuable addition to the 
literature given the difficulty involved in hearing from the preparers of financial 
statements about misreporting. The richness of data does not only confirm that UK 
charities are willing to misreport in their financial statements, but it also adds to the list 
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of known motivators for misreporting. The predominant factor that managers attribute 
to in misreporting is the concern that donors view certain numbers unfavourably. Large 
surpluses, a deficit, high levels of reserves, low financial viability, high fundraising 
raising ratios and low programme ratios are undesirable and are viewed unfavourably 
by existing and potential donors. Therefore, managers are expected to undertake 
earnings management and expense misclassification to ‘adjust’ the numbers to 
favourable and ‘normal’ levels. The principal motivation for this misreporting is the 
continuance of funding into and beyond the foreseeable future. There are also various 
subordinate motivations that collectively lead to the overarching goal of sustainable 
funding as donors react adversely to high fundraising costs (Okten and Weisbrod, 
2000). Amongst the factors that contribute to such motivation are: a) The preparers of 
financial statements and auditors in my data agree that high levels of reserves are an 
important factor to put off the donors, which may result in crowding-out (e.g. Abrams 
and Schmitz, 1978, 1984; Daws and Thaler, 1988); b) The rising overheads puts 
pressure on charity managers to allocate more to charitable activities, as it is seen as 
a more favourable class of expenses; c) Shifting trends from voluntary to earned 
income poses a complex set of challenges as charities would also want to be seen 
‘financially viable’ increasing the need to avoid sustained deficits and consistently 
depleting reserves. Similarly, it would contribute to the pressure for peer benchmarking 
to vie with competitors in winning bids for contracts; d) Debt covenants; although they 
appear to be less in the nonprofit sector, (perhaps due to higher costs associated with 
it such as interest and monitoring) I find evidence that a charity faced with debt 
covenants will more likely manage earnings to a small surplus and avoid running out 
of reserves; e) The concern for professional reputation and career mobility cause 
further pressure of being ‘judged’ and seen as associated with a charity which is 
legitimate, financially secure and fulfilling its objectives. This also supports the extant 
literature that suggests changes in compensation are positively associated with 
changes in programme spending (Baber et al., 2002) and that managers pursue high 
programme ratios (e.g. Tinkelman 1998; Baber et al.,2001, Trussel, 2003, Jones and 
Roberts 2006; Krishnan et al. 2006; Keating et al. 2008, Tinkelman, 2009; Parsons et 
al., 2012); f) Less sophisticated users of financial statements, who are either not fully 
cognizant with charity accounting peculiarities or perhaps do not appropriately study 
a charity’s financial performance and position in light of its specific priorities, policies 
and circumstances, are another source compelling nonprofits to ‘adjust’ the numbers 
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to ‘legitimate’ and ‘normal’ levels; g) Income and expense mismatch in various periods 
creates issues for managers too. The accruals concept is at the heart of accounting 
and to appear consistent and stable (without large peaks and troughs in the bottom-
line figure) charities are motivated to ‘smooth’ their financial performance.  
In addition to the above motivators, the study also identifies ‘facilitators’ that increase 
the likelihood of turning the motivation into actual manipulation. When users cannot 
detect manipulation or the cost to manipulate is lower than the benefit associated with 
it (Matsumoto, 2002) then it is more likely that a charity will manage earnings and/or 
misclassify expenses. The study finds that the audit quality in the sector is generally 
inferior and facilitates manipulation as incentives for financial statements manipulation 
are enhanced if the chance of their detection is low (Wayne et al., 1996). The auditors 
appear to be aware of the challenges faced in auditing the sector due to lower audit 
fees, hence less time to plan the audits. Furthermore, inexperienced trustees and top 
management are other factors that facilitate misreporting. This finding also supports 
the argument in the extant literature that management’s honest behaviour regarding 
its assets is negatively associated with the independence of key individuals (Harris, 
2017). Lastly, unsophisticated donors are another reason that exacerbate the 
likelihood of manipulation because they are not expected by management to fairly 
scrutinise the financial statements themselves. In their place, the media judge charities 
according to certain “acceptable” benchmarks, which are relatively superficial and less 
specific to a charity’s priorities, policies and circumstances. 
 
5.3 Earnings management in charities 
Using quantitative techniques, chapter 3 examines whether UK charities manage 
earnings to a small surplus level as reported in the existing literature (e.g. Leone and 
Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012) and 
confirmed by the first study of this thesis. Chapter 3 includes tests to examine accruals-
based and real earnings management by UK charities. In addition, it studies the effect 
of sophistication and charity type in relation to its service-orientation.   The study finds 
that nonprofits avoid large surplus or deficits using real and accrual-based earnings 
management techniques. It also finds that sophistication and donor-beneficiary 
distance do indeed have an impact on the propensity of manipulation as well as the 
choice of the earnings management types. The charities funded by sophisticated 
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donors, either due to larger restricted funds or larger endowment funds, are less likely 
to manage earnings using either accounting-based or real activities-based techniques. 
The service-oriented charities that receive higher income through programme service 
revenue from government grants or contracts appear less likely to employ real 
accounts management, by reducing spending on fundraising, in pursuit of a small 
surplus. A low donor-recipient separation may explain this because abnormal changes 
to fundraising costs are more likely to be noticed by the users of services who also 
happen to be a charity’s source of funding. As accruals-based earnings management 
is employed at the year-end, it remains less noticeable for the funders who, because 
of having access to several other sources of information, are less likely to turn to the 
financial statements at year-end. Conceivably, a low preference for real accounts 
manipulation signals mindfulness of adverse effects of curtailing necessary 
fundraising costs as opposed to a pure accounting-based earning management. The 
second study also suggests that larger charities are less likely to manage earnings by 
altering fundraising costs, either because they are simply unable to shed a portion of 
their regular fixed costs or because their sophisticated management finds this to be a 
more dysfunctional route. 
 
5.4 Expense misclassification in charities 
Study 3 in chapter 4 examines expense misclassification in charities, contributing to 
literature on expense misclassification in general and for the charity sector in 
particular. This study confirms earlier research that in response to the donor dislike for 
high fundraising costs nonprofits shift costs into the programme expense (e.g. Baber 
et al., 2001; Khumawala et al. 2005; Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008; 
Krishnan and Yetman, 2011; Parsons et al., 2017). Using three different techniques to 
estimate normal levels of fundraising and charitable expenses I produce similar results 
and hence assured inferences. In the first stage estimation regressions of the study, I  
calculate normal or expected levels of fundraising and charitable activities costs, using 
the variables contained in (a) McVay (2006) and (b) Yetman and Yetman (2012, 2013). 
I also use a combined model including all variables in (a) and (b).  
The study presents evidence of expense classification shifting in UK charities. For the 
first time, a strong negative relationship between unexpected levels of fundraising and 
unexpected charitable activities expenses is identified. This points to expense 
misclassification between the two expense categories. All charity types as used in 
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Balsam and Harris (2014) on the whole shift expenses between the two categories. 
However, the level of such misclassification is less prevalent in some types compared 
to others. Similar to the finding in the second study the strength of such manipulation 
is likely to be weaker for a charity funded by sophisticated funders. This is shown 
through a less negative relationship between the unexpected levels of fundraising and 
charitable activities costs for the nonprofits supported by more sophisticated funders. 
Similarly, I confirm the results in the first study that low donor-beneficiary separation 
mitigates against expense misclassification. This confirms the findings in the prior 
literature that nonprofit organisations that depending on donations are more likely to 
manage ratios to report maximum programme spending (e.g. Jones & Roberts, 2006; 
Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008). Amongst the expense ratios, a low 
programme ratio is more likely a stronger motivation to manipulate. Contrary to my 
expectation from the first study, that rising overhead costs motivate managers to 
manipulate, I do not find evidence that high support cost on its own does indeed 
compel managers to misclassify. 
 
5.5 Limitations and further research 
This study has provided useful evidence to add to the current body of knowledge and 
paves a path for future research with other research designs to further confirm my 
findings.  This study has societal relevance as it boosts confidence in earnings quality 
of the charities funded by donors that are more sophisticated: those that place 
restrictions on the use of their donations. Also, it highlights an overall less 
preparedness by service-oriented charities to cook the books. This being the first study 
of its kind poses more questions than it answers. 
Qualitative studies looking into each type of charity subgroups, sophistication levels 
and charity type vis-à-vis donor-beneficiary distance will further clarify the complexities 
involved and paradoxes faced by charities when there are multiple types of financial 
supporters. It would be a useful addition to the literature if the competing forces are 
analysed and stronger pullers are identified. Further hand-collected data in addition to 
the available data can look into the corporate governance-related aspects and their 
influence on financial misreporting. The quantitative study contained in his thesis can 
also be improved by using more hand-control collected variables.  
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It is, however, necessary that I include some limitations of this study. One limitation of 
this study is that I have independently investigated different types of accounting 
manipulation that charities are suspected to undertake.  However, I understand that 
many other driving forces could influence the expense manipulation and earnings 
management. These could include individual charity circumstances such as chief 
executive’s compensation contracts, details of which are not easily identifiable, precise 
details of debt covenants and the mix of income sources and the varying demands of 
different sub-groups of financial supporters. The second limitation is that although I 
have followed extant literature in classifying the charities vis-à-vis sophistication and 
more service-oriented types, in practice, lines may be rather blurred and less distinct. 
Similarly, there are other factors which influence donor giving and they do not simply 
depend on ratios; some donors may use financial statements more than others. 
However this research does not claim to predict donor response to less palatable 
ratios and earnings figures; rather it reports what management appears to believe. It 
is the author’s understanding that the management of a charity would mostly act 
according to the perceived preferences of its respective donors. The author also feels 
the need for further research to understand whether management’s assumptions are 
primarily based on theoretical expectations or have a link with anecdotal evidence 
concerning their charities. The interviews in the first study, do however lead to a 
possibility that many managers simply follow the crowd. This can be empirically tested 
using the UK data and quantitative methods similar to the second and third studies. 
Due to the nature of the project and its particular focus, a variety of factors highlighted 
in the first study is not investigated in this research. The author finds audit quality as 
an important area that needs better understanding. Although qualitative research is 
not biased with a relatively small sample, a larger sample of bankers and auditors may 
further help the theory in the charitable sector.   
Furthermore, in studying accruals-based earnings management, there is a possibility 
that a mechanical relationship exists between discretionary accruals if discretionary 
accruals are measured with a measurement error. If DACC represents error then 
EBDA will carry the same error. This could result in a mechanical relation between 
DACC and EBDA. Since the data does not provide a further breakdown of accruals 
e.g. bad debt provision (e.g. Leone Van Horne, 2005), this remains a limitation in the 
study. However, various parametric tests confirm the small surplus hypothesis.  
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This study has not focused on the interplay of various manipulation types e.g. 
accruals-based and real earnings management, or their substitution effect. The author, 
however, recognises that further study in this regard will provide additional insight into 
an under-researched area. Another possible area to advance this study is to expand 
sub-groups according to their sizes, location and closest peer-group within the sub-
groups identified by The International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations – 
ICNPO used for this study.  
I also recognise that accruals based earnings management and real activities earnings 
management could be further understood by studying other accruals and expenses 
within the broad class of fundraising expenses. Currently, the data is limited in that 
regard but there is every possibility that in future more data will become available and 
academics will be interested to test more vigorously what this study has achieved with 
the given amount of data. It is the first step and there is every possibility that further 
studies will answer many questions that would not only be interesting for academics 
but will have significant practical relevance.   
While the methodology employed in testing expense classification uses several 
predictor variables in various ways, there always remains the chance that simultaneity 
or confounding variables influence the results. Nevertheless, this concern has largely 
been addressed through several sensitivity tests. The purpose of the study with 
various analyses should only be viewed as the first step in exploring in depth the 
misclassification between expenses. 
Throughout the study, the existing literature has been used in classifying the charities 
according to sophistication and donor-beneficiary proximity; however, it cannot be 
ruled out that charities that do not neatly fall within a specific category are equally 
amenable to expense misclassification. Similarly, a favourable expense ratio may not 
be a big concern for a charity which communicates effectively through sufficient 
disclosures through trustees’ report or similar channels. 
This study points out the unwelcome practice of financial misreporting, which should 
be discouraged and strongly reprimanded in a sector that is facing serious trust deficit 
in the times when it needs to be most effective and trustworthy. In the times of 
emerging new viruses where famines, geopolitical instability and social inequality are 
reaching unprecedented heights, the “third sector” can achieve all that neither the 
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public nor the private sector can achieve. In a world where compassion, care for the 
elderly, destitute and vulnerable needs should be the priority, a lack of faith in charities 
will not serve the cause that the world is in dire need of. Indeed, there are some 
dishonest and deceitful elements who drag the entire sector into disrepute and their 
acts need to be reprimanded in the most effective and impactful manner. At the same 
time, this thesis also recognises that most charities tangled in the undesirable financial 
reporting practices do not intend to cause harm and their managers are not motivated 
by self-interest; rather they are compelled to act in a way that they see as the only 
course.  
Good corporate governance in charities is fundamental to their success. Due to data 
unavailability in this regard, this thesis does not include various corporate governance 
variables such as board independence, CEO compensation, age, gender and race 
distribution etc. Therefore corporate governance mechanisms is one of the limitations 
of the thesis and could be an idea for future research.   
This thesis can be a useful tool to educate users of charity financial statements. The 
charity financial statements are specialised fund accounts, different from other 
business accounts. Assessing or measuring the efficacy of a charity superficially 
creates a vicious circle that not only casts doubts in the minds of donors over a 
charity’s efficiency and effectiveness but also causes managers to suspect that their 
funders are fixated on specific ‘normal’ levels. Just as every human is different and 
“normal” cannot be objectively defined, various accounting numbers are an 
inconsistent measurement tool at best and misguiding at worst. The author does not 
take sides in contributing to positive accounting theory but senses that donors and the 
media who develop unmanageable expectations regarding various ratios and 
numbers must share some blame. These result in the white lies that are difficult to turn 
into a true and fair picture of charities. 
This is a detailed initial work on all major methods for financial misreporting and invites 
further research on several avenues pointed out in this thesis.  The study of the entire 
sector is not without its challenges as various charity-specific attributes contribute to a 
complex mix of challenges. Because most charities are funded through a mix of 
sources and each funding source may have its own preferences, predicting financial 




viewed as a first step in the right direction for many more studies to help practitioners, 
the regulator, charity managers and most importantly the donors in managing right 
expectations, making informed decisions and contributing to serving the sector which 
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